Opinion
No. 89-1708
Submitted August 29, 1990 —
Decided May 29, 1991.
Workers' compensation — Determination of permanent total disability — Claimant who has multiple allowed conditions is not required to show that each condition, standing alone, is work-prohibitive — Award of permanent total disability benefits may properly be based on medical factors alone.
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 88AP-646.
Appellant and cross-appellee, Herman L. Haygood ("claimant"), sustained two injuries while in the course of and arising from his employment with appellee and cross-appellant, Galion Manufacturing Division, Dresser Industries, Inc. ("Dresser"). His first injury was recognized for "injury to right foot" and the second for "acute lumbar disc" and "psychogenic pain disorder."
In 1984 claimant applied for permanent total disability compensation, submitting several documents from Dr. Richard H. Retter, attending physician. Dr. Retter's September 16, 1981 report discussed claimant's physical symptoms and dismissed the suggestion that claimant's back pain had a hysterical component. He concluded that claimant was "unable to do any kind of work." In numerous C-84 physician reports spanning 1983 through 1987, Dr. Retter reached the same conclusion.
Claimant was physically and psychiatrically examined by specialists of appellee Industrial Commission ("commission"). Mack Lyons, Ph.D., performed a psychological evaluation and concluded that claimant was experiencing "significant depression with hypochondriacal features. * * *" He did not refer to the allowed condition of "psychogenic pain disorder." He also discussed claimant's psychological testing scores, commenting that:
"Individuals with this profile typically exhibit depression. * * * Prognosis for improvement through treatment is encouraging despite the individual's pessimistic attitude."
He concluded that claimant could not engage in sustained remunerative employment.
Claimant's application for permanent total disability benefits was ultimately granted "* * * based particularly on the reports of Doctors Retter and Lyons, a consideration of the claimant's age, education, work history and other disability factors including physical, psychological and sociological, that are contained within the Statement of Facts prepared for the hearing on the instant Application, the evidence in the file and the evidence adduced at the hearing."
Dresser filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, alleging, inter alia, that Lyons' report contained internal contradictions and relied on non-allowed conditions, and therefore was not "some evidence" supporting the commission's decision. The appellate court issued a limited writ remanding the cause to the commission to "clarify its decision and to issue an amended order stating the specific reasons for its decision * * *."
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal and cross-appeal as of right.
Porter, Wright, Morris Arthur, Brian D. Hall and Diane C. Reichwein, for appellee and cross-appellant.
Michael J. Muldoon, for appellant and cross-appellee.
Lee I. Fisher, attorney general, and James A. Barnes, for appellee.
We are once again asked to review the commission's order for "some evidence" as required by State, ex rel. Burley, v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936. For the reasons to follow, we find "some evidence" supporting that decision and reverse the appellate court's judgment.
Dresser directs its sole challenge at Lyons' report. Dresser contends that Lyons attributes claimant's inability to work to the nonallowed psychiatric condition of "depression with hypochondriacal features," and that Lyons characterizes the condition as temporary. Even if this description of the Lyons report is accurate, however, Dresser ignores the commission's additional reliance on Dr. Retter's reports which state that the allowed back condition alone prevents sustained remunerative employment. Contrary to Dresser's suggestion, a claimant who has multiple allowed conditions is not required to show that each condition, standing alone, is work-prohibitive. Here, regardless of claimant's mental status, he is physically unable to work. An unimpaired psychological state will not lessen or improve that physical incapacity. Dresser's challenge is thus unpersuasive.
The claimant asks this court to henceforth require the commission to specifically identify the nonmedical disability factors relied on in granting or denying benefits. We have recently discussed this subject in State, ex rel. Hartung, v. Columbus (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 257, 560 N.E.2d 196, and State, ex rel. Noll, v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245. The facts of this case, however, foreclose the need for further consideration of the nonmedical disability factors identified in State, ex rel. Stephenson, v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 31 OBR 369, 509 N.E.2d 946. While permanent total disability benefits may never be denied solely on the basis of medical evidence without consideration of Stephenson factors contained in the record, there are some situations where an award of such benefits may properly be based on medical factors alone. It would serve no practical purpose for the commission to consider nonmedical factors in extreme situations where medical factors alone preclude sustained remunerative employment, since nonmedical factors will not render the claimant any more or less physically able to work. Dr. Retter's reports found a total physical inability to work and concluded that rehabilitation was not indicated. This constitutes "some evidence" supporting an award of compensation for permanent total disability. We thus find a remand for additional consideration or explanation to be unnecessary.
Accordingly, the writ is denied and the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.