See State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash.2d 645, 653–54, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). the “contingency” exception,
Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin 62 Wn.2d 645, 671, 384 P.2d 833 (1963) (quoting Fla. Forest Park Serv. v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472, 476, 18 So. 2d 251 (1944)). An exception to this general rule is selective prospectivity, which allows a court to apply a new rule of law to the litigants in the case announcing the new rule and to all litigants whose claims arise after that decision.
However in 1963 the Washington court prospectively overruled Gruen by holding that bonds secured by the retail sales tax were "debt" in the constitutional sense. See State ex rel. Washington State Finance Committee v. Martin, 62 Wn.2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). Of the 522 million dollars in bonds issued between the two decisions, only 85 million were submitted to the voters for approval. 384 P.2d at 837.
In 1949, the dissenters were not persuasive. But fourteen years later, in State v. Martin, 384 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1963), their views carried the day completely. By that time, $660,000,000 in bonds had been authorized; $500,000,000 in bonds had been issued; and only $85,000,000 of the authorized amount had ever been submitted to the people for a vote.
Prior to 1949, the Supreme Court of Washington had applied the special-fund doctrine in several cases to uphold bonds payable from funds not derived from taxation, but had struck down bonds which were to be financed with State tax dollars. See State v. Martin, 62 Wn.2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963), for a discussion of these early cases. In Gruen v. Tax Commission, 35 Wn.2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949), over the dissent of four justices, the court vastly extended its application of the doctrine, holding that $80,000,000 in bonds issued to provide bonuses to World War II veterans payable from a special fund derived from an excise tax on cigarettes did not violate Washington's constitutional debt limitation provision.
As the highest court in Washington, we must balance our duty to the individual litigant and to the collective citizens. See State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash.2d 645, 665, 384 P.2d 833 (1963) (this court’s decisions bind all state courts and are often the last words on legal matters for Washingtonians).
As the highest court in Washington, we must balance our duty to the individual litigant and to the collective citizens. See State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wn.2d 645, 665, 384 P.2d 833 (1963) (this court’s decisions bind all state courts and are often the last words on legal matters for Washingtonians).
See Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 54, 211 P.2d 651 (1949), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wn.2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). ¶3 What is true of statutes enacted by the legislature is likewise true of initiatives, for when the people pass an initiative, they exercise legislative power that is coextensive with that of the legislature.
The State relies on this court's decisions in other areas of law, public policy arguments, and decisions from other states in support of "purely" prospective application. The State submits that State ex rel. Washington State Finance Committee v. Martin, 62 Wn.2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963) supports a prospective application of Andress. The Martin court opined:
In the long run, a search for distinctions, where there are no real differences, in order to bring a case to a just conclusion, contributes more to uncertainty in the law than does an outright reversal of policy and cancels two of the things upon which the law depends — reason and experience. State ex rel. Finance Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wn.2d 645, 666, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). Here the majority purports to apply two of the rather amorphous standards from Alderwood; "i.e., the nature and use of the property, and the impact of the decision upon the effectiveness of the initiative process.