The statute, by its own terms, contemplates continuing jurisdiction to modify child support orders. In Syllabus Point 6 of In re Estate of Hereford, 162 W. Va. 477, 250 S.E.2d 45 (1978), we held that "[c]hild support is always subject to continuing judicial modification," and in State ex rel. Trembly v. Whiston, 159 W. Va. 298, 220 S.E.2d 690 (1975), we held that the court's jurisdiction is not abrogated or limited by the existence of child support provisions in a property settlement agreement which has been approved by the court. Continuing jurisdiction under W. Va. Code, 48-2-15, as amended, in matters of child custody and support is based on sound public policy.

As indicated in the Syllabus of State ex rel. Canada v. Hatfield, 163 W. Va. 548, 258 S.E.2d 440 (1979), `The remedy of imprisonment for failure to pay child support should not be enforced except where it appears that the defendant is contumacious.' See also State ex rel. Trembly v. Whiston, 159 W. Va. 298, 220 S.E.2d 690 (1975); State ex rel. Varner v. Janco, 156 W. Va. 139, 191 S.E.2d 504 (1972); Ex Parte Beavers, 80 W. Va. 34, 91 S.E. 1076 (1917)."

As indicated in the Syllabus of State ex rel. Canada v. Hatfield, 163 W. Va. 548, 258 S.E.2d 440 (1979), "The remedy of imprisonment for failure to pay child support should not be enforced except where it appears that the defendant is contumacious." See also State ex rel. Trembly v. Whiston, 159 W. Va. 298, 220 S.E.2d 690 (1975); State ex rel. Varner v. Janco, 156 W. Va. 139, 191 S.E.2d 504 (1972); Ex Parte Beavers, 80 W. Va. 34, 91 S.E. 1076 (1917). In Trembly, 159 W. Va. at 302, 220 S.E.2d at 694, we stated: "Financial inability to pay, if supported by sufficient evidence, would relieve the relator from imprisonment on charges of contempt of court. Sutherland v. Workman, 119 W. Va. 683, 195 S.E. 856 (1938).

The doctor argues that the obligation to pay the educational expenses of his non-minor children is contractual in nature, not statutory. The doctor is correct — as was the Bankruptcy Court in its observation — that there is no West Virginia law placing such an obligation upon a parent. In State ex rel. Trembly v. Whiston, 159 W. Va. 298, 220 S.E.2d 690 (1975), the West Virginia Court did state that "[a] father may be required to provide his minor child with a college education, if his financial condition would not make such expenditures unreasonable." Id. at 694.

We note initially that the relator does not dispute subject matter jurisdiction and recognizes that the circuit court originally granting a divorce is vested with continuing subject matter jurisdiction under W. Va. Code § 48-2-15 to modify or alter its original order as to alimony and child support, as the altered circumstances of the parties and the needs of the children may require. See, e.g., Syl. pt. 6, In re Estate of Hereford, 162 W. Va. 477, 250 S.E.2d 45 (1978) (child support subject to continuing judicial modification); State ex rel. Trembly v. Whiston, 159 W. Va. 298, 220 S.E.2d 690 (1975) (child custody agreement merged in decree did not preclude change in custody). Although the divorce portion of the decree becomes final, we recognized in Acord v. Acord, 164 W. Va. 562, 264 S.E.2d 848 (1980), that the circuit court has continuing jurisdiction to reopen the judgment and modify the decree as to other matters pursuant to the provisions of W. Va. Code § 48-2-15.

This Court has rather consistently recognized that questions relating to the custody of children are within the sound discretion of the trial court and that the trial court's ruling on such questions will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that such discretion has been abused. Marcum v. Marcum, 183 W. Va. 265, 395 S.E.2d 509 (1990); Wyant v. Wyant, 184 W. Va. 434, 400 S.E.2d 869 (1990); Goddard v. Goddard, 176 W. Va. 537, 346 S.E.2d 55 (1986); Stone v. Stone, 173 W. Va. 72, 312 S.E.2d 296 (1984); Yanero v. Yanero, 171 W. Va. 88, 297 S.E.2d 863 (1982); Nichols v. Nichols, 160 W. Va. 514, 236 S.E.2d 36 (1977); State ex rel. Trembly v. Whiston, 159 W. Va. 298, 220 S.E.2d 690 (1975); and Witt v. Witt, 141 W. Va. 43, 87 S.E.2d 524 (1955). Certainly, in the present case there was abundant evidence that the appellant's husband was integrally involved in the care of the couple's infant children.

In the syllabus of Stewart v. Stewart, 177 W. Va. 253, 351 S.E.2d 439 (1986) we stated: `Under the provisions of W. Va. Code, 48-2-15, as amended, jurisdiction to provide for the support, maintenance and education of a minor child is not abrogated or limited by the existence of child support provisions in a property settlement agreement which has been "ratified and confirmed" in a divorce decree.' Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Trembly v. Whiston, 159 W. Va. 298, 220 S.E.2d 690 (1975). In this case the family law master recognized that the child support provisions in the parties' property settlement agreement, which had been ratified and confirmed by the trial court, could not "abrogate" his jurisdiction to order "child support payments in some amount" once appellee's equity in the marital home had been exhausted.

They are not independently represented in connection with any property settlement agreement and they are not parties to such an agreement." Stewart v. Stewart, 177 W. Va. 253, 351 S.E.2d 439 (1986) ( Stewart I) (quoting State ex rel. Trembly v. Whiston, 159 W. Va. 298, 302, 220 S.E.2d 690, 693.) See also, Stewart v. Stewart, 183 W. Va. 307, 310, 395 S.E.2d 551, 554 (1990) (affirming our holding in Stewart I, that Mrs. Stewart was entitled to child support and that "no consideration" be given to the real estate equity); Goff v. Goff, 177 W. Va. 742, 356 S.E.2d 496 n. 2 (1987) (holding that "only a court may modify a decree ordering the payment of support").

There, in a court-approved property settlement agreement, the husband/father conveyed his interest in two parcels of real estate in exchange for the wife/mother's waiver of her claim to alimony and child support. We invalidated the trial court's approval of this arrangement, relying upon our holding in syllabus point 2 of State ex rel. Trembly v. Whiston, 159 W. Va. 298, 220 S.E.2d 690 (1975): "Under the provisions of W. Va.Code, 48-2-15, as amended, jurisdiction to provide for the support, maintenance and education of a minor child is not abrogated or limited by the existence of child support provisions in a property settlement agreement which has been `ratified and confirmed' in a divorce decree." We reiterated this point on appeal after remand.

Under the provisions of W. Va. Code, 48-2-15, as amended, jurisdiction to provide for the support, maintenance and education of a minor child is not abrogated or limited by the existence of child support provisions in a property settlement agreement which has been "ratified and confirmed" in a divorce decree. Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Trembly v. Whiston, 159 W. Va. 298, 220 S.E.2d 690 (1975). We had previously determined that in this case, "the court had jurisdiction to make an award of child support after the parties remarried and divorced a second time. . . ."