Opinion
C/A 6:23-cv-02167-DCC-KFM
06-07-2023
Nagipe Jutawin Stanley, Petitioner, v. Dave Roberson, Bob Couey, Allen Pledger, United States of America, Director Floyd County Jail, Respondent.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge
The petitioner, a pretrial detainee in the Floyd County Jail in Georgia, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas relief. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
The petitioner's § 2241 petition was entered on the docket on May 19, 2023 (doc. 1). The case is in proper form at this time. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the petitioner's § 2241 petition be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file an answer or return.
ALLEGATIONS
The petitioner, a pretrial detainee currently located in the Floyd County Jail in Georgia (“the Detention Center”) brings this § 2241 action asserting that her rights have been violated in her pending criminal proceedings in the Floyd County Superior Court (doc. 1). The court takes judicial notice of the petitioner's pending charges for six counts of stalking, six counts of harassing telephone calls, and one count of terroristic threats and acts in the Floyd County Superior Court. Floyd Courts, https://www.floydcourts.com/ WebCaseManagement (click criminal and enter case number 22P100335 and 23CR00630) (last visited June 5, 2023). In the petitioner's pending criminal proceedings, indictments were entered on March 24, 2023. Id. It appears that the petitioner was originally arrested during June 2022, in Georgia, and remained out on bond until December 2022, when she was arrested in Oconee County, South Carolina. Id. The petitioner's bond was then revoked in April 2023. Id. An appeal of the bond revocation to the Georgia Court of Appeals remains pending at this time. Id.
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Here, the petitioner alleges violations of her rights in the pending criminal charges in Georgia as well as in extraditions to Georgia from Tennessee and South Carolina (doc. 1). As ground one for relief, the petitioner alleges violations of the United States Constitution, the Georgia Constitution, the South Carolina Constitution, and the Tennessee Constitution (id. at 5-7). The petitioner's second ground for relief is that the victim in the criminal case has changed illegally (id. at 7-8). The petitioner's third ground for relief is that her extradition from Tennessee was illegal, involved an invalid felony warrant, utilized a vindictive district attorney, had a biased judge, and involved pre-arrest prejudice (id. at 8-10). The petitioner's fourth ground for relief is that she was arrested without a warrant, which violated her Fourth Amendment rights (id. at 10-11). For relief, the petitioner seeks to have her record expunged, a protective order preventing the officials in Georgia from arresting her again, to be acquitted of her pending charges, to have the Floyd County Jail audited, to be released so she can prepare her defense, and for the states of Tennessee, South Carolina, and Georgia to have to answer for failing to investigate the petitioner's allegations (id. at 15).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The undersigned has reviewed the petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; and other habeas corpus statutes. As a pro se litigant, the petitioner's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The mandated liberal construction means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so. However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The petitioner, a pretrial detainee, filed this action seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (noting that a pretrial detainee's exclusive federal remedy for alleged unconstitutional confinement is to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). However, as outlined below, the petition is subject to summary dismissal.
Jurisdiction
A court may grant writs of habeas corpus “within their respective jurisdictions,” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and such writs “shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained,” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Therefore, the proper party respondent in a § 2241 action is generally the “person who has the immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the body of such party before the court or judge.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 (2004) (citation and emphasis omitted). Similarly, because “the court issuing the writ [must] have jurisdiction over the custodian,” generally in “habeas petitions challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement.” Id. at 442-43 (citation omitted). In the instant matter, the petitioner is incarcerated at the Detention Center in Georgia; therefore, this court lacks personal jurisdiction over the respondent, the petitioner's custodian. A district court should transfer a habeas petition to the proper district court so long as the transfer would further the interests of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Here, however, the interests of justice are not furthered by transfer of the instant petition, because the petition is duplicative of other habeas petitions pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the petitioner has not exhausted her state court remedies, and Younger abstention applies. Thus, the undersigned recommends that this matter be dismissed.
Duplicative Litigation
As noted above, the instant matter should be dismissed in the interests of justice because the petitioner has two habeas petitions already pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, where she is incarcerated. See Nagipejutawin v. Roberson, et al., C/A No. 4:23-cv-00102-WMR-WEJ (N.D.Ga.) (seeking habeas relief relating to the plaintiff's pending criminal charges as well as her extraditions to Georgia from Tennessee and South Carolina); Stanley v. Warden, C/A No. 4:23-cv-00063-WMR-WEJ (N.D.Ga.) (seeking habeas relief relating to her pending criminal charges as well as constitutional rights violations when she was arrested in 2022). As such, the interests of justice weigh against transferring the instant matter to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia based upon the duplicative habeas actions already pending in that court.
The petitioner has also filed another § 2241 petition in this court seeking habeas relief relating to her Floyd County Superior Court charges. See Stanley v. State of Ga., C/A No. 6:23-cv-01809-DCC-KFM (D.S.C.). In that case, a report and recommendation has been filed recommending that the matter be dismissed. Id. at doc. 12.
Exhaustion Requirement
The interests of justice also weigh against transfer in the instant matter because the petitioner's habeas petition appears subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust. A habeas corpus application allows a petitioner to challenge the fact, length, or conditions of custody and seek immediate release. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-85 (1973). As noted above, a pretrial detainee's exclusive federal remedy for alleged unconstitutional confinement is to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), but only after fully exhausting the available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added); See United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995); Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037, 1041 (4th Cir. 1976) (noting that “[u]ntil the State has been accorded a fair opportunity by any available procedure to consider the issue and afford a remedy if relief is warranted, federal courts in habeas proceedings by state [inmates] should stay their hand.” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391-92 (1918) (“It is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of a trial.”); Watkins v. Cartlege, C/A No. 3:13-cv-01129-CMC, 2013 WL 3282913, at *4 (D.S.C. June 26, 2013) (“Hence, pretrial detainees involved in state criminal proceedings who seek to bring challenges to their custody pursuant to § 2241, as well as state prisoners who seek to challenge their custody on any basis that may properly be raised pursuant to § 2241, must first exhaust their state-court remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus relief.”). Additionally, a petitioner must show the existence of special circumstances to justify federal intervention. Johnson v. Salmon, C/A No. 7:22-cv-00081, 2022 WL 446033, at *1 (W.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2022) (internal citations omitted).
Here, as noted above, the petitioner's criminal charges are still pending - with her charges indicted on March 24, 2023. Floyd Courts (click criminal and enter case number 23CR00630) (last visited June 5, 2023). However, although the petitioner has appealed the revocation of her bond, the petitioner has not asserted in her petition that she has exhausted her remedies in the trial and appellate courts in Georgia with respect to the grounds for relief presented in this action. As such, the petitioner has not exhausted her state court remedies and, as outlined below, has alleged no exceptional circumstances sufficient to excuse this failure. Thus, the interests of justice weigh towards dismissal in lieu of transfer.
Younger Abstention
Alternatively, the interests of justice weigh against allowing this action to proceed because federal courts cannot interfere with a State's pending criminal proceedings, absent extraordinary circumstances. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Younger noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Here, the first criterion is met, as the petitioner is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings in Georgia. As for the second criterion, the Supreme Court has stated that the “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criterion in noting “‘that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Here, the petitioner has the opportunity to argue in the Georgia criminal proceedings that her arrest was unlawful, the victim changed in the case illegally, she was wrongfully extradited, her speedy trial rights have been violated, and that her other Constitutional rights have been violated. In light of the foregoing, the petitioner has not made a showing of “extraordinary circumstances” justifying federal interference with the state proceedings. See Robinson v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A federal court may disregard Younger's mandate to abstain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings only where ‘extraordinary circumstances' exist that present the possibility of irreparable harm.”). In examining extraordinary circumstances, federal courts have essentially analyzed whether procedures exist which would protect a petitioner's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention - meaning no extraordinary circumstances are shown where a threat to the petitioner's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, such as that speedy trial rights have been violated (as partially alleged herein). See Brown v. Dir. of Florence Cnty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 2:20-cv-02951-JD-MGB, 2021 WL 6139411, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 5, 2021), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 6137483 (D.S.C. Dec. 29, 2021) (collecting cases noting that speedy trial claims could be raised during trial and on direct appeal and did not meet the standard of extraordinary circumstances to justify federal court intervention in the state criminal proceedings (internal citations omitted)). Additionally, the petitioner's challenge to Georgia's jurisdiction over her based on her extraditions from Tennessee and South Carolina must be raised in the pending state court proceedings. See Presley v. South Carolina, C/A No. 8:13-cv-00952-RMG, 2013 WL 6193361, at *7 (D.S.C. Nov. 26, 2013) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, once a fugitive has been brought within the custody of the demanding state (which here is Georgia), the fugitive may no longer challenge the legality of the extradition; thus, because the petitioner in this matter has already been extradited to Georgia, any habeas claim regarding her extradition is moot. As such, in the interests of justice, the undersigned recommends that this matter be dismissed instead of transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
To the extent the petitioner asserts a false arrest claim in this action, it is not properly brought as a habeas claim. Moreover, the indictments of the petitioner's pending charges bar her false arrest claim. See Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that “an indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause” and bars false arrest claim (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975)); see also Provet v. South Carolina, etal., C/A No. 6:07-cv-001094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (section 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded because of indictment).
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the petitioner cannot cure the defects identified above by amending her petition. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 2022 WL 3590436 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (mem.) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).