Opinion
Case No. CIV-16-619-F
03-24-2017
TOM STANLEY, JR., Plaintiff, v. ROBERT BALOGH, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Tom Stanley, Jr., a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking redress for the alleged withholding of pain medication. United States District Judge Stephen P. Friot has referred the matter for proposed findings and recommendations consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). Pending before the Court is Defendant Robert Balogh's Motion to Dismiss (Def.'s Mot.) [Doc. No. 15]. Plaintiff has responded to the Motion and Defendant filed a reply. See Plaintiff's Response (Plf.'s Resp.) [Doc. No. 22]; Def.'s Reply Brief [Doc. No. 23]. For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion be denied.
I. Background
Plaintiff is a state prisoner confined at the Joseph Harp Correctional Center. Compl. [Doc. No. 1], 4. Plaintiff contends he is a bone cancer patient who received opioid medication for his pain until Defendant cancelled his pain medication, resulting in severe pain. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff alleges his cancer progressed such that he "was no longer able to walk due to the pain." Id. at 7. He further asserts that he has been off of his medication and would need an injunction to get the medication started again. Id. Plaintiff filed the underlying action in an effort to obtain relief for the alleged wrong. Defendant filed this Motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the basis that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Page references to court filings are to the CM/ECF page number.
II. Standard of Review
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2010). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991).
A pro se plaintiff's complaint must be broadly construed under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The generous construction to be given the pro se litigant's allegations "does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). The court "will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf." Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997).
III. Analysis
Defendant contends Plaintiff did not link the allegations lodged in the Complaint to any constitutional right violation. Def.'s Mot. 3. While it is true that Plaintiff did not reference a specific right—constitutional or otherwise—in the Complaint that he contends Defendant violated, he is not required to make such an identification in order to proceed. Indeed, for pro se plaintiffs, "if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements." Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110; see also Waugh v. Dow, 617 F. App'x 867, 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hall and finding district court did not err by construing the plaintiff's complaint to include a legal theory when the complaint did not expressly invoke it). As such, the pertinent issue is not whether Plaintiff utilized a particular label to describe his claim, but instead whether the Complaint can be reasonably read as stating a valid claim.
Defendant also states that Plaintiff cited an incorrect statute as the basis of jurisdiction. To the extent Defendant asserts such error is grounds for dismissal, he is incorrect. See Walden v. Bartlett, 840 F.2d 771, 775 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[Rule 8(a)(1)] does not require that a litigant cite the statute section conferring jurisdiction, as long as facts sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction are alleged.")
The Court finds that Plaintiff's contentions—made on a form civil rights complaint—can be read to state a claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs under the Eighth Amendment. Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to an inmate's "serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The Tenth Circuit has succinctly defined the two components of a claim based on deliberate indifference to a serious medical need:
The Court notes that Plaintiff also references an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim in his response brief. Plf.'s Resp. 5.
A prison official's deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment. "Deliberate indifference" involves both an objective and a subjective component. The objective component is met if the deprivation is "sufficiently serious." A medical need is sufficiently serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention. The subjective component is met if a prison official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted). The relevant question for the objective component is "whether the alleged harm . . . is sufficiently serious"—not "whether the symptoms displayed to the prison employee are sufficiently serious." Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 753 (10th Cir. 2005). At this stage, Plaintiff must only plead facts from which the Court can conclude Plaintiff has stated a claim which is plausible on its face.
Plaintiff pleaded facts which, if true, support both the objective and subjective components. With regard to the objective component, Plaintiff asserts that he received pain medication from a cancer doctor and could not walk because of the pain. Compl. 6-7. Stated differently, Plaintiff contends his condition was diagnosed by a physician and his mandated treatment included pain medication. Thus, the objective prong can plausibly be met. Plaintiff's assertion that Defendant "cancelled" the pain medication plausibly supports the subjective component—the term "cancelling" implies that Defendant knew of Plaintiff's medical need. Therefore, based on the facts pleaded in the Complaint, the Court concludes that Plaintiff states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
Further, if a plaintiff alleges harm was caused by a delay in treatment, "when the pain experienced during the delay is substantial, the prisoner sufficiently establishes the objective element of the deliberate indifference test." Al-Turki v. Robinson, 672 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). --------
Defendant also claims Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead an ongoing constitutional violation, which is necessary to obtain injunctive relief. Def.'s Brf. at 4. The Complaint, however, contends Plaintiff was taken off of his medication and he has "been off of his medications for such an extent" that an injunction would be required to "start his medication." Compl. 6-7. In other words, Plaintiff asks that his pain medication be reinstated because he claims he has not received medication since Defendant cancelled it. As addressed above, Plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment claim. Based on the allegations contained within the Complaint, the claim appears to be ongoing, as Plaintiff asserts he has not received pain medication and his pain has progressed. Therefore, his claim for injunctive relief should not be dismissed at this stage in the proceedings.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 15] be denied. Plaintiff pleaded facts in the Complaint from which the Court can plausibly infer he has stated a claim for relief.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
The parties are advised of their right to object to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed with the Clerk of the District Court by April 14, 2017. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of the factual and legal issues addressed herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991).
STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation does not terminate the referral by the District Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 24th day of March, 2017.
/s/_________
BERNARD M. JONES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE