Opinion
F080597
06-01-2020
In re P.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JENNIFER R., Defendant and Appellant.
Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Boze, County Counsel, and Maria Elena Ratliff, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. Nos. JVDP-18-000162 & JVDP-18-000163)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Ann Q. Ameral, Judge. Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Boze, County Counsel, and Maria Elena Ratliff, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Franson, Acting P.J., Smith, J. and Snauffer, J.
-ooOoo-
Jennifer R. (mother) appeals from a summary denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and from orders of the juvenile court after a section 366.26 hearing, terminating her parental rights to minors P.G. and S.G. Mother contends the juvenile court failed to order a hearing on the section 388 petition, and failed to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Referral
Mother and father were arrested on drug charges in April of 2018, when they were found "loaded" and "passed out" in a vehicle with drugs and paraphernalia, including a loaded syringe. Five-month-old S.G. was in the vehicle with them. Mother and father were living with maternal grandparents at the time, along with their other two children, 16-month-old P.G. and 12-year-old Z.L. Maternal grandfather believed mother and father were attending counseling classes and were substance free. The children were released to the grandparents and a voluntary family maintenance plan opened.
Father is not a party to this appeal.
Z.L. is not a subject of this appeal as he was placed into the custody of his father.
In June of 2018, mother and father were again arrested, this time for child endangerment, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Mother and father were seen engaging in drug sales in a high crime area, and stopped by officers. The two were driving under the influence and had S.G. and P.G. in the vehicle with them. They also had methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia in the vehicle within reach of the children. Both mother and father reported long time drug abuse. Detention
A section 300, subdivision (b)(1) petition filed July 2, 2018, by the Merced County Human Services Agency, alleged the parents were unable to provide regular care for S.G. and P.G. due to substance abuse. The children were detained and placed in the care of maternal grandparents. Jurisdiction/Disposition
The report prepared for jurisdiction/disposition indicated that, since their release from jail, mother and father were homeless, living in Modesto because they were participating in a methadone maintenance program, counseling, AA/NA meetings, and parenting classes there. They did not want to go to Merced for services and paternal grandmother was renting motel rooms for them in Modesto daily. Mother also reported that she was pregnant.
Mother told a Merced County social worker that she had been "sober" for nine months prior to her arrest in June 2018, but later, in the same conversation said she had used an illegal substance one month prior to her arrest. Later still she said it was one week prior to her arrest. She denied being under the influence when they were arrested in June 2018, claiming they had taken their daily dose of methadone, which made them appear as if they were under the influence.
Mother reported she was diagnosed with depression and anxiety in 2014 and prescribed medication, but did not remember why she stopped taking it.
A hair follicle test done on mother August 2, 2018, was positive for codeine (a metabolite of heroin), morphine, and methamphetamine. Father tested the same day and was positive for morphine, methamphetamine, and amphetamine.
The report recommended that mother and father receive reunification services and that the case be transferred to Stanislaus County.
A jurisdiction/disposition hearing was held October 3, 2018. The juvenile court found the petition true and elevated father from alleged to presumed father. The matter was transferred to Stanislaus County with a transfer in hearing set for October 10, 2018.
At the October 10, 2018, hearing, both mother and father appeared and were appointed counsel. Each filed an ICWA-020 form indicating possible Indian heritage: mother claimed Sioux heritage and father Cherokee heritage. The hearing was continued to November 27, 2018, to allow for ICWA noticing.
The acceptance of transfer report prepared by the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) stated the children remained with maternal grandparents. Mother and father's reunification plan included mental health services, parenting education, substance use assessment, and drug testing, and they were given referrals.
As of November 7, 2018, neither parent had utilized the referrals to attend a substance use assessment. They were, however, still receiving methadone treatment.
Following a number of ICWA notice issues, the hearing was held January 29, 2019. At that time the juvenile court found mother and father's progress was "good" and gave the social worker discretion to allow community or overnight visits until the six-month review, scheduled for March 21, 2019. Six-Month Review
The six-month review report recommended that the children remain in out-of-home placement and that mother and father receive additional reunification services until the 12-month review. The children remained with maternal grandparents.
The report indicated that both mother and father were convicted of Penal Code, section 273a, child cruelty, as a result of the June 27, 2018 events. Each was sentenced to 60 days in jail and 48 months of probation.
Mother and father had been living with paternal grandmother and stepgrandfather. Mother had given birth to a boy, N.G., and he resided with them with family maintenance services. On February 21, 2019, father was admitted into a residential treatment program and felt he was doing well. He continued to receive daily methadone treatment.
Mother was to begin outpatient treatment in April of 2019. She continued to receive daily methadone dosing. Mother was taking parenting classes, and had begun individual counseling on February 27, 2019.
On March 5, 2019, per agreement in the family maintenance case for infant N.G., mother was referred for day treatment with a possible admit to a clean and sober living facility. She was to begin interim groups on March 7, 2019, but did not because N.G. was ill. She said she would start the following week.
Visits between mother and P.G. and S.G. were at the maternal grandparents' home. The agency stated it was inclined to start overnight visits at one of the grandparents' homes after mother began her treatment program and got a positive progress report. Father's participation in the visits would depend on his completion of his treatment program and beginning counseling.
An addendum report filed before the review hearing stated that father was discharged from his treatment program on March 30, 2019, for drinking alcohol. He said he did not want to re-admit because there was more temptation to drink in the treatment program that in his parents' home. He was referred for another substance use assessment.
At the May 2, 2019, hearing, the juvenile court continued services, but "admonished" mother and father for their lack of progress. The 12-month review hearing was set for August 19, 2019, with an interim review set for June 20, 2019. Interim and 12-Month Review
A report filed for interim review June 20, 2019, reported that the children were still placed with maternal grandparents. Service logs and substance abuse reports attached to the report noted mother's resistance to entering a drug treatment because she would not be allowed to have her telephone, which was her means of contacting her son, Z.L. She had not yet started the day program, and father had not been reassessed for treatment. Mother failed to attend counseling sessions.
After testing positive for THC on May 16, 2019, father was referred to a residential treatment center. On June 4, 2019, he was caught drinking, but allowed to stay in the program.
Mother began a day program, but felt she was ahead of her peers in recovery, and began missing classes. She did not attend her June 18, 2019, counseling appointment, resulting in her standing weekly appointment being cancelled until approved for restart by a social worker.
Mother tested positive for THC in May and June 2019. She claimed it was from CBD oil she used for her migraines. She was reminded that participants in treatment were to refrain from all substance use, and was referred for a hair follicle test.
On June 25, 2019, an incident involving a whiskey bottle and cell phone resulted in father being discharged from one treatment center. Another treatment center agreed to give him one "last chance." Mother admitted giving father the cell phone, which was against the rules.
On June 25, 2019, an emergency referral was generated for N.G. On that day, mother tested positive for THC, and admitted smoking marijuana, but said she did so outside after N.G. was asleep. Mother said she was now interested in going into a clean and sober facility with N.G., and a bed was put on hold for her.
On June 26, 2019, at a staff meeting regarding N.G., it was decided that, if mother entered the clean and sober facility, it would close the referral. Mother acknowledged that, if father did not follow through on his treatment, she would have to choose the children over him. Within days of agreeing to go into the clean and sober facility, mother was trying to convince the staff at day treatment that she did not need to.
As of July 8, 2019, mother had attended one counseling session but cancelled another.
At the July 11, 2019, hearing, the juvenile court was informed that father had been discharged from his treatment center the previous day for refusing to drug test.
The report prepared for the 12-month hearing recommended termination of services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. The report stated that, shortly after the interim hearing, it was reported to the agency that mother and father were not living in the paternal grandmother's home, as believed. Rather, for the last several months, they had been living in the home of maternal grandparents who had placement of P.G. and S.G. Mother admitted this. Due to the maternal grandparents allowing mother to live in the home, a violation of the placement agreement, the children were removed and placed into a foster home.
A social worker visited the home of paternal grandmother and stepfather. Stepfather stated that they had not answered the door in previous attempts by the social worker to visit because mother had told them not to, as it would reveal that she had not been living there for three or four months. He also reported that, when mother and father did live with them, maternal grandparents would drop off S.G. and P.G. there for days at a time. Stepfather reported that mother would sleep with N.G. next to her and, after she received a dose of methadone, would be "out of it." In addition, father received a DUI after wrecking his truck several months earlier, and had not reported it to the agency.
When interviewed, maternal grandparents said that they paid for mother and father to stay in hotels, but when that got expensive, they allowed them to move in with them. They acknowledged dropping the children off at the paternal grandparents, but did not think mother was there. They thought mother was doing well in her case plan.
As of July 19, 2019, mother had moved into a clean and sober living home. She reported she was still in a relationship with father and that they got married. She continued to receive methadone daily.
The agency recommended termination of services, based on the lack of progress during the reporting period, and mother and father's lack of insight into their situation.
The 12-month hearing was continued to September 17, 2019. An addendum report stated that mother had now attended six individual counseling sessions and was attending drug treatment sessions, but tested positive for amphetamines. She claimed the positive test was due to a prescribed diet pill. The diet pill made it impossible for the treatment center to accurately test mother for amphetamines. They advised her to stop taking the diet pill, but she continued to do so and they were unable to force her to stop.
Father had started counseling and had attended one session. He was in intensive outpatient treatment, but tested positive for opiates on August 14 and 16, 2019. On August 30, 2019, he tested positive for morphine.
At the hearing on September 17, 2019, mother, through counsel, presented an offer of proof that she had completed six counseling sessions and "expected" to be moved to the next phase in treatment on September 20, 2019. She stated she was no longer taking diet pills. Counsel stated that mother loved her children and asked that the juvenile court not follow the recommendation to discontinue services.
Counsel for the agency, noting only three months were left before the 18-month hearing, argued it was unlikely mother and father could finish their case plan and be in a position to safely parent their children, even if given the opportunity.
In its ruling, the juvenile court noted that, at one point, it looked like mother and father were doing well, but that, in the current reporting period, "things have really, really gone downhill significantly" and both parents had been "dishonest" in many ways. The juvenile court also noted that mother and father had significant substance abuse issues 14 months earlier, and still did. The court emphasized that mother taking diet pills was an indication she did not understand or take seriously her addiction to methamphetamines. Finding the progress of both mother and father "poor," the court terminated services and a section 366.26 hearing was set. Writ Petition
Mother filed a timely writ petition, which was denied by this court in a written opinion December 17, 2019, case No. F080014. Section 366 .26 Hearing Report
The report prepared for the section 366.26 hearing recommended termination of parental rights. Both P.G. and S.G. were described as healthy and on target developmentally. Neither child qualified for mental health services. The children had been in their current placement since August 7, 2019. They appeared happy and content and the caretakers wished to adopt them.
The report stated that mother had visited P.G. and S.G. twice monthly at the agency offices. Visitation logs for the visits were attached to the report. Most of the visits were uneventful. For the first several months, mother visited together with father. N.G. often sat on her lap while P.G. and S.G. played by themselves or with father. Most of the visits ended with hugs and kisses, but no reaction was noted from the children. Notes from N.G.'s case stated that both P.G. and S.G. cried when separated from the caregiver at the start of the visits and upon being returned to the caregiver, although they were easily comforted by the caregiver when upset.
Mother continued reunification services in N.G.'s case while living at the recovery home. Father tested positive for amphetamines and alcohol on October 4, 2019.
On October 9, 2019, mother asked to be placed into a clean and sober facility. But she got sick in the car of the transport driver and did not enter the facility until approximately 10 days later.
Father left his treatment facility on November 14, 2019, rather than submit to a urine test. He told the social worker that, while he and mother were still married, he only saw her at visits with the children.
On November 26, 2019, mother told the social worker that she was picked up for an appointment by the same car as father and noticed that he was "spiraling." She said she told father she would not talk to him until he got back into a program. Mother now said she recognized her codependence in her relationship with him and wished she had started treatment sooner.
After speaking with mother, the social worker contacted mother's treatment counselor, and found out that mother was now 18 weeks pregnant. Confronted with this information, mother admitted to being pregnant, but that she had not told father.
On December 4, 2019, mother was reported doing well at the clean and sober facility. She was complaint with her program and testing negative. Section 388 Petition
On January 6, 2020, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting reunification services be reopened for P.G. and S.G. She attached a letter she wrote regarding her progress. She stated that the request was in the best interests of P.G. and S.G. because she had a good chance of reunifying with N.G. and could raise the children together. The attachment from her counselor stated that mother was in the "middle to late stages" of therapy addressing her service plan for N.G.
The juvenile court summarily denied mother's petition on January 8, 2020, checking the box indicating that mother had not stated a change of circumstances. The juvenile court wrote: "At best there are changing circumstances. S[.G.] and P[.G.] were removed more than 18 months ago. As recently as 8/16/2019, mother was testing positive for amphetamines. Further, mother has a history of being untruthful. There is no evidence of a complete reformation." Section 366 .26 Hearing
At the section 366.26 hearing January 14, 2020, mother was present, but father was not. Mother testified that she had not missed a visit since services were terminated. She testified that, at visits, the children greet her and get excited, they call her "mommy," and say that they miss and love her. She feeds them snacks and they play. When visits are about to end, the children cry and whine.
When questioned about the discrepancies between mother's version of the end of visits and those in the visitation reports, mother stated she did not remember a specific date when it happened, but maintained that it did.
In its ruling, the juvenile court found that the children were adoptable. It found that mother had not met her burden to establish either the beneficial parent-child relationship exception or sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights. The court noted that the children were ages two and three and had been out of their parents' care for over 18 months. The juvenile court terminated mother and father's parental rights, finding mother had not shown there would be a detriment to the children if parental rights were terminated.
DISCUSSION
I. SECTION 388 PETITION
Mother claims the juvenile court erred when it denied her an evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petition because the denial was based on an incorrect standard and was not supported by the evidence. We disagree.
A petition to modify a juvenile court order under section 388 must allege facts showing new evidence or changed circumstances exist and changing the order will serve the child's best interests. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1); In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1235.) A petitioner must make a prima facie showing of both elements to trigger an evidentiary hearing. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.) " 'A "prima facie" showing refers to those facts which will sustain a favorable decision if the evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is credited.' [Citation.] " (In re Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403, 418.) Courts must liberally construe a section 388 petition in favor of its sufficiency. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309-310.) In determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. (In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258.)
We review the juvenile court's summary denial of mother's section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. (In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1079.) The denial must be upheld unless we can determine from the record that the juvenile court's decisions "exceeded the bounds of reason by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination." (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 642.) When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, we have no authority to substitute our decision for that of the juvenile court. (In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505.)
Here, mother's reunification services were terminated at the September 17, 2019, 12-month review hearing as her progress was "poor." The juvenile court found that, although it looked at one point like mother was doing well, things had "significantly" gone down hill and the issues that plagued mother 14 months earlier, when dependency began, were still apparent. The juvenile court also found that mother failed to understand the seriousness of her addiction.
In mother's January 6, 2020, section 388 petition, the only change from the 12-month status review hearing was that mother was now attending a perinatal program, individual counseling, 12-step meetings and substance abuse classes. She was living in a sober facility and drug testing negative, except for methadone.
The juvenile court denied mother's petition, finding that there was "no evidence of a complete reformation," and her circumstances were "changing" and not "changed."
Mother asserts that the juvenile court applied an incorrect standard when it found there was no "complete reformation." According to mother, the correct standard for granting a hearing on a section 388 petition is if there is "any evidence of changed circumstances," citing, in particular, In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424. However, as noted by respondent, not only is In re Aljamie D. completely different factually from mother's case, but mother omits an important concept. In Aljamie D., the court was discussing California Rules of Court, rule 1432, which provides that a juvenile court may deny a section 388 petition ex parte " 'If the petition fails to state a change of circumstance or new evidence that might require a change of order ....' " (In re Aljamie D., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 431.) Thus, the court determined, " ' "[I]f the petition presents any evidence that a hearing would promote the best interest of the child, the court will order the hearing." ' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 432.) The standard requires that a hearing be granted for any evidence " 'that might require a change of order.' " (Id. at p. 431.) To find that any evidence is sufficient without that qualifying factor would negate the necessity of making a prima facie showing.
Furthermore, we have no issue with the juvenile court's use of the term "complete reformation." In In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th 295, our Supreme Court addressed the ability to bring a section 388 petition on the eve of a termination of parental rights hearing. Noting that, when a parent is given a reasonable length of time to reunify and fails to do so, the child's interest in permanency and stability takes priority. However, even after focus has shifted from reunification, a section 388 petition provides a means for the court to address a legitimate change of circumstances while protecting the child's need for prompt resolution of his custody status. (In re Marilyn H., supra, at p. 309.) In In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, the court found such a hearing provides an "escape mechanism," but only for a parent who "completes a reformation" after termination of reunification services, but before the actual permanency planning hearing. (Id. at p. 528.)
Thus, we find the juvenile court did not utilize an incorrect standard in denying mother a hearing on her petition.
Furthermore, we find the juvenile court's denial of a hearing was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd so as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Mother's participation in, at most, four months of treatment services does not constitute "changed circumstances." (See, e.g., In re Clifton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423-424 [affirming denial of section 388 petition filed on the day of the section 366.26 hearing; father's seven months of sobriety since most recent relapse "while commendable, was nothing new" and "was not enough to reassure the juvenile court that the most recent relapse would be his last," in light of long history of drug use and recurrent pattern of relapses]; In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223 [similar holding; "To support a section 388 petition, the change in circumstances must be substantial"].) And, we note, in In re Aljamie D., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 424 the parent seeking the return of her children had tested clean in random weekly drug tests for over two years. (Id. at p. 432 [reversing denial of evidentiary hearing]; see also In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413 [mother entitled to evidentiary hearing based on changed circumstances where petition alleged, inter alia, abstinence from substance abuse for more than a year].) The facts alleged here are not at all comparable. At best, her circumstances are "changing," which is not sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 48.)
It is unnecessary to address mother's argument as to whether the petition sufficiently alleged that a change in the court's order was in P.G. and S.G.'s best interests. Because the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that mother failed to allege changed circumstances, there was no error in denying her a full evidentiary hearing on her petition.
II. BENEFICIAL PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION
Mother also contends the juvenile court erred by declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to the termination of parental rights. We disagree.
At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence the child is adoptable, it is generally required to terminate parental rights and order the child be placed for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) There are statutory exceptions which " 'permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.' " (In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 122, fn. omitted.)
One of the statutory exceptions to the general preference of termination of parental rights is the "beneficial parent-child relationship exception." Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) provides the court shall terminate parental rights unless "[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child ... [¶] ... [where] [t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) It is the parent's burden to show that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because of the exception to termination of parental rights and adoption. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573-574.)
" '[B]ecause a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement.' [Citation.]" (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621.)
Appellate courts are divided over the appropriate standard of review to apply to an order determining the applicability of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. Some courts have applied the substantial evidence test (e.g., In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1166), while others have applied the abuse of discretion standard (e.g., In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351). Still other courts have adopted a mixture of both standards, applying the " 'substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child.' " (In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68, 76.)
The question is currently pending review in the California Supreme Court in In re Caden C. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 87, review granted July 24, 2019 (S255839).
Our conclusion in this case would be the same under any of these standards because the practical differences between them are "not significant," as they all give deference to the juvenile court's judgment. (See In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) " '[E]valuating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling.... Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge. The reviewing court should interfere only " 'if [it] find[s] that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court's action, no judge could reasonably have made the order that he [or she] did.' " ' " (Ibid.) Moreover, a substantial evidence challenge to the juvenile court's failure to find a beneficial parental relationship cannot succeed unless the undisputed facts establish the existence of those relationships, since such a challenge amounts to a contention that the "undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion." (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1529; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314.)
There does not appear to be a dispute among the parties that mother maintained regular and consistent visits with the children throughout the dependency proceedings. Thus, the issue before us is whether the parents met their burden with regard to the second prong, which is that the children would benefit from continuing the parent-child relationship. We do not find evidence favoring mother's position compelled the court to find the exception applied or that this is one of the extraordinary cases where this exception should have been applied.
"The 'benefit' prong of the exception requires the parent to prove his or her relationship with the child 'promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.' " (In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.) "[T]he court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) "The balancing of competing considerations must be performed on a case-by-case basis and take into account many variables, including the age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs." (In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 811.)
" 'A biological parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child may not derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent.' [Citation.] Evidence that a parent has maintained ' "frequent and loving contact" is not sufficient to establish the existence of a beneficial parental relationship.' " (Marcelo B., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 643.) Rather, the preference for adoption is overcome if severing the relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed. (Ibid.)
As to P.G. and S.G., there is no evidence in the record that they would receive any benefit that would go beyond the normal incidental benefits that results from continuing the parent-child relationship. Nor was there evidence either would be greatly harmed from terminating parental rights. Although mother claimed otherwise, both appeared unemotional toward mother and went with their caregivers after visits with little to no distress. Even taking mother's testimony as uncontradicted, it still shows only that the children had pleasant visits with mother. S.G. was only seven months old at removal and spent the majority of his life from mother's custody. P.G. was only 18 months old when removed and spent half his life in the care of someone other than mother. Both minors relied on the caregivers for safety and stability.
The juvenile court was not unreasonable in determining P.G. and S.G. would not derive benefit from continuing a relationship with mother. None of the evidence mother cites compels the juvenile court to have found the children would suffer detriment that would outweigh the stability of adoption. Based on the evidence before it, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude that mother had not met her burden of proving P.G. and S.G. would benefit from continuing the relationship.
We find no error.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.