Opinion
NO. 2012-CA-000538-MR
11-09-2012
DAVID STANFIELD APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CORRECTIONS CABINET APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: David Stanfield, Pro Se Henderson, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Allison Brown Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 11-CR-00068
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: CAPERTON, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, David Stanfield, appeals the February 17, 2012, order of the Franklin Circuit Court setting aside a January 18, 2012, order granting Stanfield's motion to be transferred to a state penal institution. On appeal, Stanfield argues that the court erred in denying his CR 60.02 motion to reconsider because it failed to consider Stanfield's medical and mental issues, and that the court erred in failing to carry out the final judgment it imposed. The Commonwealth disagrees. Upon review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm.
On November 18, 2011, Stanfield pled guilty to five counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree, a Class D Felony pursuant to KRS 508.060. Stanfield was sentenced to five years on each offense, to run concurrently. Court records indicate that on January 17, 2012, Stanfield filed a pro se motion requesting the Franklin Circuit Court to issue an order requiring the Department of Corrections to transfer Stanfield from the Woodford County Jail to a state institution. The Department of Corrections has no record of being served with notice of the motion and, apparently, did not become aware of the motion until receiving a copy of the court's January 18, 2012, order granting Stanfield's motion.
Following receipt of the court's January 18th order, counsel for the Department of Corrections filed a motion to reconsider pursuant to CR 60.02, asserting that the court had mistakenly concluded that Stanfield qualified to serve his sentence in a state penal institution. The circuit court entered an order setting aside the January 18, 2012, order requiring the Department of Corrections to transfer Stanfield to a state institution and holding that Stanfield is required to serve his sentence in a county jail. It is from this order that Stanfield now appeals.
On appeal, Stanfield argues that the court did not err in ordering that he be transferred to a state penal institution, despite the clear mandate of KRS 532.100 that he serve his time in a county jail. In making this assertion, Stanfield argues that the current method used to classify newly convicted felons is improper because it fails to account for evidence that may warrant higher security treatment. Stanfield offers issues of mental and physical health, parole programs, and "family ties" as examples of factors that he feels should be considered. Thus, he argues that KRS 532.100(7) should be changed.
More specifically, Stanfield asserts that the court erred in failing to consider his medical and mental health issues. Stanfield asserts that he has obsessive compulsive disorder, manic depression and bipolar disorder, for which he takes medication and does not have access to a psychiatrist because he is in the county jail. He also asserts that at present, in the county jail, he cannot obtain soap, underwear, or medical treatment without paying ten dollars, whereas these items would be free in a state penal institution. Stanfield asserts that the court erred in failing to conduct a hearing on these issues.
In response, the Commonwealth argues that the court's order granting the CR 60.02 motion filed by the Department of Corrections should be affirmed. It asserts that the court's order of January 18th, 2012, was mistaken because KRS 532.100(4)(a) clearly mandates that Class D inmates serve their sentences in county jail. Thus, the Commonwealth asserts that the court appropriately set this order aside, and urges this Court to not reinstate the January 18 order.
In reviewing the arguments of the parties, we note that the standard of review from an order granting or denying relief under CR 60.02 is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Dull v. George, 982 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Ky.App. 1998), citing Bethlehem Minerals Company v. Church and Mullins Corp., 887 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Ky. 1994). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court's decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal principles. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).
Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we are ultimately in agreement with both the Commonwealth and the court below that the January 18, 2012, order was properly set aside. CR 60.02 states, in relevant part, that, "On motion, a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a party or his legal representative from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following grounds: (a)mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect ..." Further, KRS 532.100(4)(a) states that:
The provisions of KRS 500.080(5) notwithstanding, if a Class D felon is sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of five (5) years or less, he shall serve that term in a county jail in a county in which the fiscal court has agreed to house state prisoners ... (emphasis added).
Sub judice, there is no question that Stanfield was convicted of wanton endangerment in the first degree, which is a Class D felony pursuant to KRS 508.060. Likewise there is no dispute that he received a five-year sentence for same. Accordingly, KRS 532.100 clearly mandates that he serve that time in a county jail. As the court was in error to order otherwise, it appropriately set aside that order pursuant to CR 60.02. While Stanfield argues that KRS 532.100 should be revised, that is an argument more appropriately made to the legislature and not to this Court. The statute is clear in its mandate and the court below realized its error in ordering that Stanfield be transferred in contravention of same. Accordingly, we find no error, and we affirm.
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the February 17, 2012, order of the Franklin Circuit Court setting aside the January 18, 2012, order requiring the Department of Corrections to transfer Stanfield to a state institution and holding that Stanfield is required to serve the remainder of his sentence in a county jail.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: David Stanfield, Pro Se
Henderson, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Allison Brown
Frankfort, Kentucky