Opinion
No. 5-966 / 05-0711
Filed January 19, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from the district court's dismissal of his suit seeking redress for denial of a veterans' preference. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
John Fatino of Whitfield Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Susan Fitzsimmons, Des Moines, for amicus curiae State Police Officers Council.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jeffrey Peterzalek, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
The plaintiff-appellant, Matthew Stammeyer, appeals from the district court's dismissal of his appeal pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 35C (2005) and application for writ of mandamus. He contends the dismissal improperly deprived him of the opportunity to raise his veterans' preference claim in his unsuccessful attempt to transfer from his state trooper position to a position with the Iowa Division of Narcotics Enforcement. He also contends the State denied his veterans' preference rights by hiring a new employee instead of granting his transfer request. The State contends it followed the collective bargaining statute over the more general veterans' preference statute because it is more specific. We reverse and remand.
Background Facts and Proceedings
The plaintiff is a senior trooper with the Iowa State Patrol. He is a member of a collective bargaining unit subject to a collective bargaining agreement governed by Iowa Code chapter 20. By virtue of his more than twenty years of service in the Iowa National Guard, he is a "veteran" for purposes of Iowa Code chapter 35C. See Iowa Code § 35.1(2)(b)(2). In 2003 Stammeyer transfer to the Division of Narcotics Enforcement (Division). During 2004 he interviewed for two open positions with the Division. The positions were awarded to other applicants. In December of 2004 the plaintiff wrote the Division requesting that (1) he be notified of the specific reasons he was not selected, (2) the reasons be filed for public review, and (3) the notice be sent within ten days of the successful applicant's selection. See id. § 35C.3. The Division failed to respond to his request.
In January of 2005 the plaintiff filed in district court an appeal and application for writ of mandamus. See id. §§ 35C.4 and 35C.5. In his appeal he alleged he was entitled to preference in employment as a veteran and asked the district court to set aside the appointment and to require the Division to allow him the veterans' preference. In his application for writ of mandamus he alleged chapter 35C imposed a duty on the Division, which the Division breached, and that a writ should lie to "right the wrong" as provided in section 35C.4. He asked the district court to set aside the appointment and to require the Division to allow him the veterans' preference.
The Division filed a motion to dismiss alleging the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the collective bargaining agreement and Iowa Code chapter 20 govern the plaintiff's transfer and provide a grievance procedure for resolving disputes. It also alleged the veterans' preference applies only to "appointment or employment," not inter-divisional transfers. See id. §§ 35C.1 and 35C.3.
The district court considered the relationship of the earlier, more general veterans' preference statute, Iowa Code chapter 35C with what it saw as the later, more specific collective bargaining statute, Iowa Code chapter 20. It noted that the veterans' preference created by section 35C.1 is "all-encompassing" as it relates to public employees, but the grievance procedures required by section 20.18 "apply only to that subset of public employees that are subject to a collective bargaining agreement." Applying the principle of statutory interpretation that says the provisions of a specific statute control over those of a general statute to the extent the differences between the two cannot be reconciled, the court concluded the grievance procedures set forth in section 20.18 controlled the dispute and deprived the court of jurisdiction over the action, which was filed under chapter 35C. In dismissing the action on jurisdictional grounds, the court expressly did not reach the question whether the veterans' preference applies to transfers.
Scope and Standards of Review
Review of a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is for correction of errors at law. Rees v. City of Shenandoah, 682 N.W.2d 77, 78 (Iowa 2004). The district court "has inherent power to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceedings before it." Tigges v. City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 512 (Iowa 1984) (citing Walles v. Int'l Bhd of Elec. Workers, 252 N.W.2d 701, 710 (Iowa 1977)). Our scope of review of rulings on subject matter jurisdiction is for correction of errors at law. Keokuk County v. H.B., 593 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1999).
Claims on Appeal
The plaintiff contends he was improperly denied the opportunity to raise his veterans' preference claim by the district court's dismissal of his appeal under Iowa Code section 35C.5. He further contends his veterans' preference rights were denied when the Department hired a person who was not a current state employee.
The State responds that the district court correctly determined the more-specific collective bargaining statute prevails over the older, general veterans' preference statute. It further responds that chapter 35C does not apply to transfers and that error was not preserved on this issue.
Discussion
Iowa Code chapter 35C entitles veterans "to preference in appointment and employment [in every public department] over other applicants of no greater qualifications." Iowa Code § 35C.1(1). It imposes a duty on the public employer to provide the reasons for appointing or refusing to appoint a veteran who applies for a position. Id. § 35C.3. A veteran denied the preference may seek a writ of mandamus "to right the wrong" or seek judicial review under chapter 17A. Id. § 35C.4. In addition to the remedy of mandamus, a veteran may appeal to the district court which, if it finds the veteran qualified for the position, "shall, by its mandate, specifically direct [the public employer] as to their further action in the matter." Id. § 35C.5. Section 35C.6 provides certain protections against removal and for review by a writ of certiorari. The veterans preference statute is a "general statute." Peters v. Iowa Employment Sec. Comm'n, 249 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Iowa 1976); Ervin v. Triplett, 236 Iowa 272, 276-77, 18 N.W.2d 599, 601 (1945).
Iowa Code chapter 20 permits public employees to organize into collective bargaining units that can negotiate agreements with public employers. Section 20.9 defines the scope of negotiations:
wages, hours, vacations, insurance, holidays, leaves of absence, shift differentials, overtime compensation, supplemental pay, seniority, transfer procedures, job classifications, health and safety matters, evaluation procedures, procedures for staff reduction, in-service training and other matters mutually agreed upon.
Collective bargaining agreements "may provide procedures for the consideration of public employee grievances and of disputes over the interpretation and application of agreements." Iowa Code § 20.18.
For purposes of interpretation, statutes traditionally have been classified as either general or special and are given a different effect on other statutes depending on their classification. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 355, at 474-75 (1999). A statute referring to persons or things as a class is classified as a general statute. Crawford v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 247 Iowa 736, 739, 76 N.W.2d 187, 189 (1956). A statute relating to a particular person of a class is a special statute. Id. When one statute deals with a subject in generally comprehensive terms and another statute deals with a part of the same subject in a more minute and definite way, to the extent a conflict exists between the two statutes, we give the special statute "precedence and authority" over the general statute absent any clear legislative expression to the contrary. Andreano v. Gunter, 252 Iowa 1330, 1336, 110 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa 1961); see Crawford, 247 Iowa at 740, 76 N.W.2d at 189. The special statute is considered to be an exception to the general statute. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 355, at 475.
When one statute deals with a subject in a general and comprehensive manner and another statute deals with part of the same subject in a more definite and minute way, . . . we attempt to harmonize both statutes if possible.
City of Des Moines v. City Dev. Bd., 633 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Iowa 2001).
The district court concluded "the more specific and later statute, Iowa Code § 20.18 would control over the provisions of chapter 35C, to the degree the differences in the two statutes cannot be reconciled or where the legislature intended to make the general act controlling. The court found the statutes at issue overlap and there is an "irreconcilable difference between the two." The court found the following analysis in Andreano compelling:
Many persons under civil service will also have rights under the soldiers' preference law, as has the plaintiff here. This must have been understood by the legislature when it enacted and amended the present section [400].19; yet, although it would have been easy to say that section [400].19 did not apply to those qualified under the soldiers' preference law, it did not do so.
Andreano, 252 Iowa at 1336, 110 N.W.2d at 651-52. Both the statute concerning preferences for veterans and the civil service statute contain sections on preferences and sections on removal. In Andreano, the issue was removal. Andreano, 252 Iowa at 1332, 110 N.W.2d at 649-50.
Iowa Code §§ 35C.1, 35C.6, 400.10, 400.18, and 400.19.
In the case at bar, however, neither chapter 20 nor the collective bargaining agreement covering the plaintiff specifically address preferences for veterans. Nor do they contain provisions providing procedures specifically for resolving conflicts concerning the application or enforcement of preferences for veterans. Although, under the statute, the agreement could have resolved how any preference is applied in transfer procedures, it does not. In contrast, the current civil service statute expressly provides qualifying veterans receive additional points in "all examinations and appointments under this chapter." Iowa Code § 400.10. The district court erred in finding there is an irreconcilable difference between the relief provisions of chapter 35C and section 20.18. Even if the collective bargaining agreement contained language concerning preferences for veterans, section 20.28 compels the opposite result from that in Andreano because the conflict would not be between a general and a specific statute, but between a statute and a collective bargaining agreement. Iowa Code § 20.28 (providing the Iowa Code supersedes any inconsistent provisions in agreements, and any provisions in conflict with the Code do not become provisions of the final agreement until the legislature amends the Code to remove the conflict). As the collective bargaining agreement covering the plaintiff does not address preferences for veterans in any context, the grievance procedure authorized in section 20.18 and set forth in the agreement does not apply. Furthermore, we read section 20.28 as a "clear legislative expression" of legislative intent contrary to the general rule that a more specific statute prevails over a more general. City of Des Moines, 633 N.W.2d at 311 n. 4 (citing Crawford v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 247 Iowa 736, 740, 76 N.W.2d 187, 189 (1956)). We hold Iowa Code chapter 20 does not preclude the plaintiff from availing himself of the specific remedies set forth in chapter 35C concerning the application of preferences for veterans. The district court erred in concluding it did not have jurisdiction over the dispute and dismissing the action with prejudice.
The plaintiff also contends the district court's dismissal precluded him from addressing the merits of his claim that the State's failure to award him the position, if the veterans' preference does not apply to transfers, creates an unfair distinction between a current employee and a new hire. The State argues error was not preserved. The plaintiff asserts "the issue was fully briefed . . . at the trial level, thus error is preserved."
It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal. When a district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the party who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for appeal. The district court never ruled on [the issue the plaintiff briefed], and he never filed a motion requesting the district court to do so. Accordingly there is nothing before us to review.
Wilson v. Liberty Mut. Group, 666 N.W.2d 163, 167 (Iowa 2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although both parties briefed this issue in the district court, the court expressly did not reach the issue. Neither party filed a motion seeking a ruling. Consequently, error was not preserved and there is nothing for us to review.
We have considered all the arguments of the parties. Those not expressly addressed in this opinion either were not properly preserved for our review or are without merit. We reverse the district court's grant of the State's motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Nothing in this decision should be construed as a ruling on the merits of the plaintiff's actions filed under chapter 35C.