Opinion
FSTCV156024935S
11-13-2015
Stamford Yellow Cab, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, State of Connecticut
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
EDWARD R. KARAZIN, JR., JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
On March 31, 2015, the plaintiffs, Stamford Yellow Cab, Inc., and Westport Star Taxi, LLC, filed with the court an application for an order in the nature of a mandamus (the application). In the application, the plaintiffs allege that Uber Technologies, Inc., and Lyft, Inc. (the transportation network companies) began operating " for hire taxicab services" in Connecticut in May 2014. The plaintiffs allege that the transportation network companies have violated and continue to violate various statutes and regulations pertaining to the operation of taxicabs in the state, including General Statutes § § 13b-97 et seq. and 14-29. The plaintiffs further allege that, despite their many requests, the defendants, the Department of Transportation and the Department of Motor Vehicles, failed to take any action to enforce such statutes and regulations upon the transportation network companies. In their prayer for relief, the plaintiffs seek the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the defendants " to properly exercise their function to prevent a failure of justice." The plaintiffs also seek attorneys fees and costs, and such other relief that the court deems just and necessary.
On May 14, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' application on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because (1) the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the plaintiffs' suit, and (2) the plaintiffs lack standing. The defendants filed a memorandum of law in support of their motion. On June 30, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court heard oral argument concerning the motion on July 13, 2015.
" A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stotler v. Dept. of Transportation, 313 Conn. 158, 166, 96 A.3d 527 (2014). " [A] trial court ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . may decide that motion on the basis of: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Town of Rocky Hill v. Securecare Realty, LLC, 315 Conn. 265, 277, 105 A.3d 857 (2015). " If the court decides the motion on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The defendants first contend that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the plaintiffs' application for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, and, thus, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants further argue that the plaintiffs cannot meet any of the three recognized exceptions to the doctrine. In opposition, the plaintiffs argue that they are able to meet the third exception because the defendants acted in excess of their statutory authority by repeatedly failing or declining to enforce the applicable statutes and regulations against the transportation network companies.
" [T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic R.R. Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011). As explained by the Supreme Court, " [t]he principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law . . . [T]he practical and logical basis of the doctrine [of sovereign immunity] is today recognized to rest . . . on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds, and property . . . Not only have we recognized the state's immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state . . . Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Markley v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 301 Conn. 56, 65, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).
Nevertheless, the sovereign immunity doctrine does not serve to protect the state from suit " (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity . . . (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights . . . and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Servs. v. DOT, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636 (2009). The first exception to the doctrine, rather than the second or third, applies in the present case because the named defendants are state agencies and not state officers; see General Statutes § § 4-38c and 4-141; and in their application the plaintiffs have not clearly alleged that the defendants' conduct was in violation of their constitutional rights. See Columbia Air Servs. v. DOT, 293 Conn. at 350.
The Supreme Court has stated the third exception to the doctrine in a slightly different manner as well: " [A] litigant that seeks to overcome the presumption of sovereign immunity must show . . . in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, [that] the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C.R. Klein Northeast, LLC v. Fleming, 284 Conn. 250, 258, 932 A.2d 1053 (2007).
General Statutes § 4-38c provides in relevant part that " [t]here shall be within the executive branch of state government the following departments . . . Department of Transportation, Department of Motor Vehicles . . ."
General Statutes § 4-141 provides in pertinent part that " 'state agency' includes every department, division, board, officer, commission, arm, agency and institution of the state government, whatever its title or function . . ."
The Supreme Court has explained that " [for a claim made pursuant to the second exception, complaining of unconstitutional acts, we require that [t]he allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Servs. v. DOT, supra, 293 Conn. 350.
" For a claim made pursuant to the first exception, [the Supreme Court] . . . has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed . . . Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity . . ." Columbia Air Servs. v. DOT, supra, 293 Conn. 349-50. " Even when there is an express statutory waiver of immunity, however, the plaintiff's complaint must allege a claim falling within the scope of that waiver." Stotler v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 313 Conn. 165.
In the instance where " sovereign immunity has not been waived, the claims commissioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary claims against the state and determine whether the claimant has a cognizable claim. See General Statutes § § 4-141 through 4-165b. The claims commissioner, if he deems it just and equitable, may sanction suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable. General Statutes § 4-160(a). This legislation expressly bars suits upon claims cognizable by the claims commissioner except as he may authorize, an indication of the legislative determination to preserve sovereign immunity as a defense to monetary claims against the state not sanctioned by the commissioner or other statutory provisions." Bloom v. Gershon, 271 Conn. 96, 107-08, 856 A.2d 335 (2004).
In the present case, the plaintiffs have neither cited to any statute waiving the state's sovereign immunity nor alleged that the claims commissioner has authorized their action. Furthermore, as noted above, in spite of the plaintiffs' application for what may or may not properly qualify as a form of injunctive relief, see C.R. Klein Northeast, LLC v. Fleming, 284 Conn. 250, 257, 932 A.2d 1053 (2007) (assuming without deciding that application for writ of mandamus properly qualifies as suit for injunctive relief); the plaintiffs have filed their action against two state agencies, thereby making it unnecessary for the court to address the third exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Hanna v. Capitol Region Mental Health Center, 74 Conn.App. 264, 270-71 n.7, 812 A.2d 95 (2002) (explaining why analysis of third exception is irrelevant as to defendant state agency). Accordingly, the court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss.
Because the court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity, it need not address the defendants' second ground of lack of standing.
SO ORDERED.