Discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the same standards of proof and use the same analytical framework as claims brought under Title VII. See Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1433 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Where, as here, a plaintiff predicates liability under Title VII on disparate treatment and also claims liability under . . . [§ 1983], the legal elements of the claims are identical."). To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him of a federal right.

Allegations of violations of these provisions are analyzed under the same framework as Title VII claims. See Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1433 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Where, as here, a plaintiff predicates liability under Title VII on disparate treatment and also claims liability under sections 1981 and 1983, the legal elements of the claims are identical"); Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (suggesting that a claim under Chapter 760 of the Florida statutes is analyzed under the same standards as a claim under Title VII). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

See Larkin v. Pullman-Standard Div., Pullman, Inc., 854 F.2d 1549, 1561 (11th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Swint v. Pullman-Standard, Inc., 493 U.S. 929, 110 S.Ct. 316, 107 L.Ed.2d 307 (1989) (where plaintiff proceeded on a theory of disparate impact, plaintiff is limited to Title VII and cannot seek the broader § 1981 remedies and longer liability period). Cf. Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1433 (11th Cir. 1985) (where plaintiff claims only disparate treatment under both Title VII and § 1981, courts may analyze claims together). The test for intentional discrimination in suits under § 1981 is the same as the formulation used in Title VII discriminatory treatment cases.

Walters also brought out, through the cross examination of Mayor Young, testimony regarding the extreme frustration experienced by victims of discrimination. In Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431 (11th Cir. 1985), we held that a trial court had not erred by awarding compensatory damages of $100,000 to a plaintiff who, though qualified, had been repeatedly passed over for promotions because of his race. Id. at 1435.

However, although the standards for Title VII and § 1981 race discrimination are the same, the Court here will only address Plaintiff's claims under § 1981 because the Court dispensed with Plaintiff's Title VII claims on exhaustion grounds. See Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that the substantive standards of liability under Title VII and § 1981 are the same). Defendants point to several cases from within the Eleventh Circuit that rely on the Supreme Court's burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.

Compensatory damages are available under § 1981 to compensate Collins for the emotional distress that resulted from Andrews' discriminatory conduct. See Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985). However, “[u]nder Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-64, 98 S.Ct. 18 1042, 1052-53, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), compensable damage may not be presumed but must be proven.” Id.

. Compensatory damages also cover “humiliation and emotional distress.” Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-64 & n.20, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1052-53 & n.20, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)).

For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees and GRANTS their Amended Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 44]. Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1433 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[w]here, as here, a plaintiff predicates liability under Title VII on disparate treatment and also claims liability under [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983], the legal elements of the claims are identical . . . [and] [the Court] need not discuss . . . Title VII claims separately" from claims brought under §§ 1981 and 1983.). Further, § 1981 claims may only be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 given that the alleged violators, two county tax commissioners, acted under color of state law.

Compensatory damages also cover "humiliation and emotional distress." Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985). Where a defendant engaged in unlawful discrimination under Title VII, punitive damages also are available if the plaintiff "demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."

Therefore, for a time, Dismukes avoided being seen with him or showing affection for him in public. It is clear from Dismukes's testimony, as well as her demeanor on the stand, that the discriminatory treatment directed at Dismukes's relationship with her fiancé/husband has significantly contributed to Dismukes's emotional distress and suffering. Cf. Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that compensatory damages for emotional pain and suffering were supported in a §1981 cases where "[t]he district court . . . received testimony that the plaintiff suffered emotional stress, loss of sleep, marital strain and humiliation because of violation of his civil rights"). Dismukes's husband attended the August 23, 2012 hearing in this case but did not testify.