Opinion
NO. 1:01-CV-85
December 20, 2001
Ricky G. Stafford, Beaumont, TX (pro se), For Plaintiffs
Alcatel USA, Inc., Christine Lynne Stetson of Germer Krish A. Prabhu Bernsen Gertz, Beaumont, TX, For Movants, ESA Services, Inc., Tanner Truett Hunt, Jr., and Emily Jo Annette Luck Linker of Wells, Peyton, Greenberg Hunt, LLP Beaumont, TX, For Movants A+ Storage JDR Steve Charles Dollinger of Preston Cowan Storage Houston, TX, For Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Hon. Thad Heartfield, United States district judge to whom this action is assigned for trial, referred pretrial matters to the undersigned United States magistrate judge. See order titled "Referral of Pretrial Matters to United States Magistrate Judge," May 4, 2001, Docket No. 17.
Defendants jointly move for summary judgment. Judge Heartfield's referral order directs the undersigned to submit a written report addressing the motion and recommending its disposition. This report fulfills that requirement. Succinctly, this report concludes:
Referral of pretrial case management to United States magistrate judges is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and E.D. Tex. R. app. B (Rule 1(D)(1)). Generally, such references contemplate that magistrate judges rule on all pretrial matters that Congress authorizes magistrate judges to hear and determine. For all other pretrial motions, the reference contemplates that magistrate judges conduct hearings, if necessary, and submit written reports containing proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for disposition. Unless all parties consent to trial before a magistrate judge, trial and entry of final judgment must be handled by the district judge to whom the case is assigned.
1. The only asserted claims over which this court has original jurisdiction are employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
2. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Title VII employment discrimination claims;
3. Under governing circuit law, this court lacks justification to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and entertain plaintiff's remaining claims governed by state law; and
4. This court should, therefore, (a) grant partial summary judgment to defendants on Title VII claims, and (b) dismiss all remaining claims for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to their reassertion in an appropriate state court.
I. Parties and Nature of Suit
Plaintiff is Ricky Gene Stafford ("Stafford"). He resides in Beaumont, Jefferson County, Texas, within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. Proceeding pro se, he instituted this action on February 13, 2001.Stafford alleges he was wrongfully terminated from employment with Alcatel USA as a TSM Systems Engineer I, Network Engineer I on April 28, 2000. Stafford alleges unlawful employment discrimination prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). He also appends numerous state law claims for defamation of character, assault, attempted murder, harassment, blackballing, invasion of privacy, and wiretapping.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
Stafford's original complaint lists three defendants. Alcatel USA ("Alcatel USA"), plaintiff's former employer, is a corporation headquartered in Plano, Texas. Alcatel USA also operates a facility in Raleigh, North Carolina, where Stafford worked. The second defendant, Alcatel, is the parent corporation of Alcatel USA, and is headquartered in Paris, France. The third defendant, Krish A. Prabhu ("Prabhu"), formerly was Chief Executive Officer of Alcatel USA. Prabhu resides in Plano, Texas.
Recently, Stafford proposed to amend his complaint in several respects. In the proposed amendments, he seeks to name as defendants the following:
See (1) "Plaintiff's Motion to File Third Party Complaint Against Krish A. Prabhu in this Matter as Referenced Above", Docket No. 58; (2) "Plaintiff's Motion to File Third Party Complaint Against Patrick Vogeler in this Matter as Referenced Above", Docket No. 59; (3) "Plaintiff's Motion to File Third Party Complaint Against Julie A. Liptak in this Matter as Referenced Above", Docket No. 60; (4) "Plaintiff's Motion to File Third Party Complaint Against Michael A. Dobbs in this Matter as Referenced Above", Docket No. 61; (5) "Plaintiff's Motion to File Third Party Complaint Against Jack Taylor in this Matter as Referenced Above", Docket No. 62; (6) "Plaintiff's Motion to File Third Party Complaint Against Christopher A. Cole in this Matter as Referenced Above", Docket No. 63; (7) "Plaintiff's Motion to File Third Party Complaint Against George Brunt in this Matter as Referenced Above", Docket No. 64; (8) (9) "Plaintiff's Notice of 'Complaint' to Adjoin Extended Stay America (ESA) and Annette Luck as Third Party in the Matter as Referenced", Docket No. 68; (10), (11) (12) "Plaintiff's Notice to Adjoin Third Party 'Complaint' against A+ Self Storage, JDR Self-Storage, LLC and DBA+ Self Storage/Cary, N.C. in the Matter as Referenced", Docket No. 69; (13) "Plaintiff's Notice of Complaint to adjoin Sprint PCS as Third Party in this Matter as Referenced", Docket No. 70.
Krish A. Prabhu
Patrick Vogeler
Julie A. Liptak
Michael A. Dobbs
Jack Taylor
Christopher A. Cole
George Brunt
Extended Stay America
Annette Luck
A+Self Storage [sic]
JDR Self-Storage, LLC
DBA+ Self Storage/Cary, N.C. [sic]
Sprint PCS
Stafford's recent submissions regarding Krish A. Prabhu, Patrick Vogeler, Julie A. Liptak, Micheal A. Dobbs, Jack Taylor, Christopher A. Cole, and George Brunt do not articulate new causes of action. Rather, they simply supplement Stafford's description of his termination and subsequent events. Regarding the remaining proposed new defendants, Stafford alleges: (i) Extended Stay America and Annette Luck committed invasion of privacy; (ii) A+ Self Storage, JDR Self-Storage, LLC and DBA+ Self Storage/Cary, N.C. fraudulently sold his property stored in a storage unit in North Carolina; and (iii) Sprint PCS participated in a conspiracy with Alcatel USA to track Stafford's movements across numerous states by means of Stafford's cellular phone.
II. Factual Background
This report generally adopts the version of facts advocated by plaintiff (the non-movant), or as recited by defendant without opposition from plaintiff. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986).
Stafford applied for employment with Alcatel Networks Systems on February 26, 1997. In his written application, Stafford represented that he had served in the United States Marine Corps, and had never been convicted of a felony.
Defendants represent that Alcatel Networks Systems has since been merged into Alcatel USA and ceases to exist as a separate entity.
Alcatel USA hired Stafford as a Manufacturing Technician I on April 21, 1997, to work at its Raleigh, North Carolina facility. On or about January 19, 1998, Stafford was transferred to TSM Systems Engineer I, Network Engineer I. In this position, Stafford was responsible for development of system-related documents and application drawings for use in Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line customer documentation accessory manuals.
Stafford began to express interest in the company's business and marketing strategies. He volunteered advice on these subjects to senior company officials via electronic messages ("e-mail"). Specifically, Stafford sent e-mail to senior officials at both Alcatel USA and Alcatel titled "ALCATEL's MARKETING STRATEGIES GOING INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM" and "BTS TO OrBiT TRANSFORMATION." Defs.' Mot. Summ J. Ex. B.
In February, 2000, Stafford received a salary increase. He was displeased with the amount of his raise, and complained via e-mail to Prabhu and also to Serge Tchuruk ("Tchuruk"), Chief Executive Officer of Alcatel. That message, transmitted on March 6, 2000, stated in part:
If this 4% inflationary annual merit increase is in anyway, form or fashion Corporate's evaluation of my net worth, I am truly insulted and most offended, that's not a good thing. For I have gone above and beyond the call of duty in the promotion of ADSL and customer satisfaction among others, which is now number one globally, in doing so I have literally put myself at great risk. That's an unfortunate hazard of the underlying scope of my position, one that I was fully aware of and accepted in my indoctrination with respect to the shareholders and corporate perspectives. Needless to say that I did not sign-on to be insulted, offended, blackballed or have my efforts sabotaged by any entity of Alcatel.
Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C.
Attached to the foregoing e-mail messages were two documents authored by Stafford. The first was titled "APPEALING THE APPLIED ANNUAL MERIT INCREASE." It further explained Stafford's perception that he had been insulted and blackballed. The second, titled, "PERSONAL ASSESSMENT WHILE AT ALCATEL — RALEIGH," listed Stafford's own evaluation of his accomplishments while at Alcatel USA.
Stafford's complaint was not addressed to his satisfaction. Thereafter, he sent a series of communications, all via e-mail, to Prabhu and Tchuruk. These messages, described more fully in Part I of the appendix, were extraordinary. Generally, they referred to alleged corporate documents titled: (1) "The Executive Order," (2) "X27," (3) "The Red Eagle Clause," and (4) "Isles of the Dragon." They also referred to a "Memorandum of Action To Be Taken" wherein Stafford's views of remedial action required under the above-listed documents and policies were stated.
Upon reviewing these communications, Alcatel USA management thought Stafford was either making physical threats or had become deranged. Alcatel USA decided to investigate. First, Alcatel USA hired retired police officer Ken Johnson ("Johnson") to approach Stafford and discuss with him the e-mails. Johnson also spoke with Stafford's mother and brother to gain insight into Stafford's conduct and determine whether he was an unpredictable security risk.
Next, on April 27, 2000, Julie Liptak ("Liptak"), Human Resources Director at Alcatel USA's Raleigh facility, discussed the possibility of filing criminal charges against Stafford with Wake County Assistant District Attorney, Howard Cummins. During that meeting, Liptak learned that Stafford had a criminal background, having been incarcerated in the North Carolina Department of Corrections from 1982 through 1985 on charges of kidnapping, common law robbery, carrying a concealed weapon and possessing marijuana.
Stafford contends he has never been incarcerated. In support, Stafford provides an apparent copy of a June 26, 2000, one-page letter from G. "Rick" Hodges II in the Mecklenburg County Court Services Identification Section of North Carolina, that states Stafford "has never been arrested in North Carolina in which fingerprints were obtained and submitted to the S.B.I. in Raleigh North Carolina." Pl. Resp. to Defs.' Reply to Pl. Resp. to Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1A. (Docket No. 56).
On April 28, 2000, Alcatel USA gave Stafford options to resign or be terminated due to what Alcatel USA characterized as a "perceived threat posed by his e-mail messages." Two letters were prepared: a letter of resignation and a letter of termination. The letter of termination stated the reasons for termination were: (1) violation of Alcatel USA's Inappropriate Conduct Policy, specifically, paragraph B(6) prohibiting "[a]cts or threats of verbal or physical violence to self or others, intimidation, or coercion;" and (2) providing false information on Stafford's employment application, specifically, failure to disclose criminal background. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. G.
Johnson delivered both letters to Stafford on April 28, 2000. Stafford refused to sign either one. Instead, Stafford denied his criminal background, and became "agitated" at the mention of the alleged felony record. Accordingly, a second letter of termination was prepared by Alcatel USA, removing the mention of the criminal background. The second letter was delivered to Stafford, and he was terminated on that basis.
Defendants contend this was done to diffuse a "dangerous situation."
Stafford alleges that after his termination defendants continued to harass him via seduction attempts, wiretapping and even attempted murder by and through Barbara Vogeler, an individual who Stafford identifies as a daughter of Alcatel USA's Senior Vice-President of Human Resources, Pat Vogeler. Stafford alleges that these harassing and threatening actions were extensive, and his account of them is described more fully in Part II of the appendix. Stafford bases his claims of assault, attempted murder, harassment, invasion of privacy, and wiretapping on these actions.
Defendants admit that Pat Vogeler is Alcatel USA's Senior Vice-President of Human Resources, but deny that he has a daughter named Barbara, or that anyone named Barbara Vogeler has ever worked at Alcatel USA or Alcatel.
III. Proceedings
Several months after his termination, Stafford sought legal recourse. First, on August 26, 2000, he filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Raleigh Area Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. J. Therein, Stafford claimed unlawful employment discrimination prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, Stafford alleged discrimination based on race and religion.
The EEOC issued its decision on November 29, 2000. The EEOC "Dismissal and Notice of Rights" stated that based on its investigation, the EEOC was unable to conclude that the information obtained established violations of federal anti-discrimination statutes. Pl. Compl. at 5. (Docket No. 1). The dismissal further contained a customary notice of right to commence suit in United States district court within 90 days from receipt.
Stafford filed the instant complaint on February, 13, 2001 and defendants responded. Subsequently, Stafford submitted numerous documents which he asks that the court accept as evidence. Little further action has taken place. No depositions have been taken; no scheduling order has been issued; no hearings have occurred; and no trial date is set. The only other significant actions are that defendants have moved for entry of a summary judgment, and Stafford has moved for sanctions in an amount exceeding $4.4 billion because of what Stafford perceives as improper objections filed by defendants in the course of this litigation.
IV. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; Plaintiff's Response
Defendants move for summary judgment on separate grounds for each defendant. First, Alcatel USA argues it is entitled to judgment regarding Stafford's Title VII claim of employment discrimination because: (1) Stafford has no evidence that he was treated differently than similarly situated, non-protected employees and therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination; and (2) in any event, defendants' stated basis for terminating Stafford was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, and Stafford has no evidence demonstrating that the articulated reason was pretext.
Regarding Stafford's other claims, Alcatel USA contends that Stafford has no admissible evidence supporting his state law claims of defamation of character, assault, attempted murder, harassment, blackballing, invasion of privacy, and wiretapping.
Defendant Prabhu argues he is entitled to judgment because officers of corporations are not liable personally for acts of the corporation. Finally, Alcatel argues it is entitled to judgment because a parent corporation is not automatically responsible for acts of its subsidiary.
Stafford opposes the motion. Pl. Resp. to Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. (Docket No. 53). Therein, Stafford abandons any Title VII claim of race discrimination and repeatedly denies filing this lawsuit on the basis of racial discrimination. Rather, Stafford contends that his employment discrimination claim is based on his religious beliefs — the "Seven Principles of God." More specifically, Stafford contends that he was wrongfully discharged on the basis of his "intellectual abilities, skills, talents and his God given natural ability to get things done, and achieving the anticipated results in the time allotted." Id. at 8 (italics added). Regarding the other asserted claims, Stafford's response provides no new evidence other than conclusory allegations or denials of defendants' pleadings.
". . . Plaintiff made no such claim of 'racial discrimination' in any aspect of his 'original complaint', nor has Plaintiff amended his 'original complaint' to portray the likeness thereof."
Pl. Resp. to Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 2.
Defendants replied to Stafford's response (Docket No. 54), claiming Stafford's opposition does not contain proper controverting evidence sufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment successfully. Defendants further argue that Stafford's assertions are disingenuous. Specifically, defendants argue that Stafford has suddenly switched claims from race discrimination to religious discrimination, a claim defendants contend was not in Stafford's original complaint or charge to EEOC.
Stafford answered defendants' reply. (Docket No. 56). Therein, Stafford again affirms that his suit is not based on racial discrimination. Further, Stafford states,
"It does not take a rocket scientist or a genius to see that Plaintiff made no such claim of racial discrimination in any respect with the EEOC or otherwise in his pleadings. Plaintiff merely stated the circumstances revolving around the matter as they unfolded, no more and certainly no less."
Pl. Resp. to Defts.' Reply to Pl. Resp. to Defts.' Mot. Summ. J. at 2-3.
"the 'Notice Of Rights To Suit [sic] does not imply a right to sue on the basis of racial discrimination. On the contrary, the . . . document clearly states Plaintiff's rights to sue under the EPA and the ADA and ADEA provision of the Fairness Employment Act."
Pl. Resp. to Defs.' Reply to Pl. Resp. to Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 9. However, nowhere does Stafford actually allege causes of action under the Equal Pay Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, or Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Therefore, the undersigned construes Stafford's reply as simply arguing that the EEOC notice of right to sue did not restrict him to making claims based solely on alleged racial discrimination.
Finally, Stafford claims in his reply that defendants paid off the EEOC to dismiss Stafford's claim, and also suggests that the United States Postal Service is cooperating with defendants by not properly delivering mail to Stafford. Again, however, Stafford does not provide any evidence other than allegations or denials of defendants' pleadings.
V. Principles of Analysis
American society is fully committed to the goal of providing equal justice for all. Thus, courts are available to both rich and poor, and to represented and unrepresented litigants. Litigants unable to pay customary court costs may proceed in forma pauperis, and therefore have the ability to sue without liability for costs. Similarly, self-represented litigants may proceed pro se (in their own behalf).Osborn v. President, Dirs., and Co. of the Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 829 (9 Wheat. 738)(1824) (stating natural persons may appear in court, either by themselves, or by their attorney).
To further insure equal access to the courts, courts interpret pleadings of lay litigants proceeding pro se liberally. United States v. Robinson, 78 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1996). Moreover, pro se actions will not be dismissed based on technical pleading defects. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Rather, such actions must proceed toward a trial unless it is clear that pro se litigants can prove no set of facts that will entitle them to relief. Id.
This munificent treatment notwithstanding, pro se litigants' efforts to remedy what they perceive as injustices often resemble the impossible task of fitting a square peg into a round hole. Because pro se litigants are not skilled in the law, they may unwittingly file actions in courts lacking jurisdiction. Similarly, a pro se action may be filed too late and therefore be barred by passage of time. Further, the law in its wisdom may not recognize that the particular circum stances alleged by a pro se litigant as conduct violative of a legal right and, therefore, not warranting a legal remedy. Finally, pro se litigants may run afoul of various procedural rules.
Generally, the legal maxim, ubi jus ibi remedium, applies. Thus, when there is a legally-recognized right, the law provides an appropriate remedy. However,
"[t]he rule, that for every right or wrong there is a remedy, is restricted to those rights and wrongs which the law recognizes as legal, in the sense of giving rise to a cause of action, and does not apply to every species of loss or injury that an individual may sustain by the act of another. The rule cannot be invoked where the right itself fails; nor can it be invoked for the purpose of procuring a remedy for a merely moral wrong which does not invade any legal right, or in any case within the rule of damnum absque injuria."
1A C.J.S. Actions § 11 (1985).
Fortuitously, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide courts with effective mechanisms to identify and weed out claims that have no possible chance of success before they proceed to full-scale trials. Rules 12(b), 12(c) and 56 specify certain defenses that may be asserted by pretrial motion. Generally, Rule 12 motions to dismiss argue that there is some substantive defect in the plaintiff's case such that defendant is entitled to judgment even if plaintiff's factual allegations are true. In a similar vein, Rule 56 motions for summary judgment argue that plaintiff has no admissible evidence supporting an essential element of an alleged cause of action, and, therefore, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Essentially, Rule 12 motions focus on principles of law whereas Rule 56 motions focus on an alleged lack of supporting evidence.
Defenses included in Rule 12(b) motions include: lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter or person, improper venue, insufficiency of process or service of process, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and failure to join a party under Rule 19. Rule 12(c) motions move for a judgment based on the pleadings, similar to a summary judgment under Rule 56, but without considering evidence outside of the pleadings.
In this case, defendants submit a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment to expose what defendants assert as being fatal infirmities in Stafford's claims. To identify and properly analyze these asserted infirmities, it is first necessary to outline briefly the core concepts of original and supplemental jurisdiction, summary judgments, and essential elements of federal Title VII claims.
A. Jurisdiction
When the current form of American government was established, there was an intense debate over the role of federal courts. Some thought that establishment of lower federal courts, i.e., trial courts, should be constitutionally mandatory, while others thought there should be no federal courts at all except for a Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction to review state court judgments. Richard H. Fallon, et al.,Hart Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System 348 (4th ed. 1996). Ultimately, these philosophical differences were settled with what is now known as the "Madisonian Compromise." That compromise resulted in local state courts having exclusive jurisdiction over most legal claims, and concurrent jurisdiction over most federal issues. Federal trial courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 2420, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976).
Consequently, federal courts may entertain only cases and controversies specified in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. There must be both constitutional and statutory authority before federal jurisdiction attaches. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). The end result is that while state courts may generally entertain claims based on federal or state law, federal courts ordinarily may not entertain actions based on purely on state law.
1. Original Jurisdiction
The term, "subject-matter jurisdiction," pertains to the court's authority over the category of the claim in suit. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 1566, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999). Subject-matter jurisdiction must be established as a threshold matter, inflexibly and without exception. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). No action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court. Similarly, a federal trial court not only may, but must raise lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion when the issue appears. Insurance Corp. of Ireland Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982) (quoting Mansfield, C. L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 511, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884)).
For most routine civil litigation, federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists only when a "federal question" is at issue, or when there is "diversity of citizenship" between the parties. For "federal question" jurisdiction to exist, the action must arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001). For "diversity jurisdiction" to exist, the controversy must be between citizens of different states, or citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, and must also exceed the sum or value of $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2001).
Diversity jurisdiction rules are specialized. First, diversity must be "complete." When there are numerous parties, it is not sufficient that a plaintiff and one defendant are citizens of different states. The plaintiff must show each defendant is a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff. If any one defendant is a citizen of the same state as any plaintiff, diversity jurisdiction does not exist. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806) (overruled on other grounds);Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388, 118 S.Ct. 2047, 2052, 141 L.Ed.2d 364 (1998).
Second, a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of any state by which it has been incorporated, and also of the state where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). Basically, the court looks to the "nature, location, importance, and purpose of a corporation's activities and the degree to which those activities bring the corporation into contact with the local community." Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2001).
When determining a corporation's principal place of business, the Fifth Circuit has adopted the "total activity" test, a test which calls for a review of the total corporate activity that incorporates both the "place of activities" test (focusing on production or sales activities) and the "nerve center" test (focusing on the locus of the managerial and policy-making functions of the corporation). Toms v. Country Quality Meats, Inc., 610 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1980); Aland v. Faison Assocs. et al., No. CIV.A.3-97-CV2482, 1998 WL 355468, at *2 (N.D.Tex. June 22, 1998).
Finally, "[t]he burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum." Stafford v. Mobil Oil Corp., 945 F.2d 803, 804 (5th Cir. 1991). That party must distinctly and affirmatively allege the citizenship of the parties, and failure to adequately allege the basis for diversity jurisdiction mandates dismissal as federal courts cannot presume the existence of federal jurisdiction.Howery, 243 F.3d at 919.
2. Supplemental Jurisdiction
While federal trial courts ordinarily cannot entertain actions over which they do not have original, subject-matter jurisdiction, there is an exception called "supplemental jurisdiction." Title 28 United States Code § 1367 provides:
"[D]istrict courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Section 1367 codified the judge-made doctrine of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction that began with United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
The Court held:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim 'arising under (the) Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . .,' U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, and the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case.' . . . The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.Id.
Even when claims are so closely related to claims within the original jurisdiction that they can be viewed as forming part of the same case or controversy, federal district courts may elect to not entertain them. Thus, the statute expressly provides that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law;
(2) The claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the court has original jurisdiction;
(3) The court has dismissed all claims for which it had original jurisdiction; or
(4) In exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
In this circuit, the general rule is to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when all federal claims are dismissed or eliminated prior to trial. Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989). However, this rule is neither mandatory nor absolute. Id. Rather, the Fifth Circuit reviews a district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion. Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 226 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Robertson v. Neuromedical Center, 161 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[D]istrict court has wide discretion").
In determining whether a district court acted within its discretion, the Fifth Circuit considers "both the statutory provisions of [Section 1376(c)], as well as the Supreme Court's articulation of the scope and nature of district courts' discretion in exercising jurisdiction over pendent state law claims." McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 1998). Thus, the Fifth Circuit considers both the provisions of Section 1376(c) and "the balance of the relevant factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity that the Supreme Court outlined . . ." Batiste, 179 F.3d at 227.
Federal district courts do not have unfettered discretion to reject claims asserted under supplemental jurisdiction. In Batiste, the governing circuit court of appeals, in an opinion written by Chief Judge King, held that the district court abused its discretion in not exercising supplemental jurisdiction. First, the district court erred by not properly balancing factors of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties. Id. The case had been pending in the district court for almost three years, and trial was scheduled to begin one month later. Id. The case had produced "more than sixteen volumes of record, numerous depositions and discovery disputes, and significant consideration by the district court of multiple motions to dismiss claims or grant summary judgment." Id. at 228. The familiarity of the district court with the merits of the claims demonstrated that further proceedings in the district court would prevent redundancy and conserve scarce judicial resources. Id. Second, Judge King noted that the absence of any "novel or complex" issues of state law weighs towards the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion. Id.
The court compared two cases indicating when the district court abuses its discretion and when it does not. Batiste, 179 F.3d at 227-28. First, the court quoted Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., as an example when the district court abused its discretion:
[A]fter four years of litigation produced 23 volumes and thousands of pages of record, the preparation of a pretrial order exceeding 200 pages, over a hundred depositions, and according to counsel nearly two hundred thousand pages of discovery production, the declining to hear this case on the eve of trial constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion.941 F.2d 302, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1991). The court then quotedCarnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, as an instance where the district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction was not an abuse of discretion:
When the single federal-law claim in the action was eliminated at an early stage of the litigation, the District Court had a powerful reason to choose not to exercise jurisdiction.484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988).
B. Summary Judgments
As mentioned earlier, a party may move a court to enter a summary judgment before trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) and (b). Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is genuine if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986). The admissibility of evidence is subject to the same standards and rules that govern the admissibility of evidence at trial. Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 650 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1992).
Summary judgment is proper after "adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of evidence supporting the non-movant's case. Id. at 325. The moving party accomplishes this by affirmatively offering evidence which undermines one or more of the essential elements of the nonmoving party's case, or the moving party may simply demonstrate that the evidence in the record falls short of establishing an essential element of the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 323. However, when the state of mind of the moving party at the time of the moving party's conduct is an essential element or determining factor of the nonmoving party's cause of action, it is less fashionable and not well-suited to grant summary judgment. Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1265 (5th Cir. 1991). A party's state of mind is inherently a question of fact which turns on credibility determinations that are within the province of the fact-finder. Id.
After the movant meets its burden, the non-movant must designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Although the court considers the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the non-movant may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings, but must respond by setting forth specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial. Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs. of North Texas, P.A., 139 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 1998). However, "[a]ny reservations the court has concerning the evidence will preclude summary judgment." Int'l Shortstop, Inc., 939 F.2d at 1264.
Local court rules also govern consideration of motions for summary judgment. Local Rule CV-56(b) states:
Any party opposing the motion should serve and file a response that includes in the text of the response or as an appendix thereto, a "Statement of Genuine Issues." The response should be supported by appropriate citations to proper summary judgment evidence as to which it is contended that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Proper summary judgment evidence should be attached to the response in accordance with the procedure contained in section (d) of this rule.
C. Title VII Employment Discrimination Claims
1. Generally
In the federal statute commonly known as Title VII, Congress declared
"it shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The plain purpose of Title VII is to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate discriminatory practices and devices that foster stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973). However, Title VII does not guarantee employment to everyone, nor did Congress authorize federal courts to address and remedy every conceivable form of unfair, arbitrary, petty or even unlawful action by employers against prospective, existing or former employees. Rather, Title VII provides a legal remedy only for limited and specific forms of invidious discrimination. As succinctly stated in one case:
"[t]he list of impermissible considerations within the context of employment practice is both limited and specific: 'race, color, religion, sex or national origin.'"Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 825-26 (4th Cir. 1989).
To promote this limited objective of equal employment opportunity, Congress also established a comprehensive regulatory scheme administered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") which has numerous enforcement powers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4. Finally, Congress specifically granted to individuals the right to bring private causes of action in federal court to remedy unlawful employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Before filing a private suit, a plaintiff must first file a complaint with the appropriate administrative agency, usually EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), (f)(1); see also Vielma v. Eureka Co., 218 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2000). Exhaustion of this administrative remedy is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a viable private cause of action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 798; see also Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1995); Tolbert v. United States of America, 916 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1990). Consequently, when a litigant attempts to bring suit without first exhausting available administrative remedies, the federal court is powerless to act. Id.
The administrative complaint must be submitted within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). If the matter is not resolved administratively to a complainant's satisfaction, the agency will issue a decision or other notice of its disposition of the matter. The agency will also advise the complainant of a right to bring suit in federal district court. The federal action must then be filed within ninety days from receipt of the agency's "right to sue" notice. Id.
Once an action is properly filed, courts follow a well-established analytical framework. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court "established an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof in Title VII discriminatory-treatment cases." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). TheMcDonnell Douglas framework sets up a three-part burden shifting process for analysis of a claim of discrimination.
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. A prima facie case consists of four elements:
the individual was a member of a protected class;
the individual was qualified for the position;
the individual was subject to an adverse employment action; and
the individual was replaced by someone outside the protected class, or in the case of disparate treatment, the individual was treated less favorably than others similarly situated.Okoye v. The Univ. of Texas Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 512-13 (5th Cir. 2001).
Once a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. "This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509).
Finally, when a defendant provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, all inference of discrimination drops from the picture, and the fact-finder must decide whether the plaintiff has proved intentional discrimination. That is, the fact-finder determines whether plaintiff has proved the proffered explanation by the employer was merely a pretext, and that prohibited bias actually motivated the employer's decision and had a determinative influence on the outcome. Id. at 142-43.
2. Race Discrimination McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green was a case involving alleged employment discrimination on the basis of race. Consequently, the burden-shifting process stated in the preceding section is applicable to race discrimination claims. Specifically, to prove a prima facie case of race discrimination, Title VII plaintiffs must show: (i) they are members of a protected minority, (ii) they were qualified for the job from which they were discharged, (iii) they were discharged, and (iv) after the discharge, the position they held was filled by a member of a nonminority. Lindsey v. Miss. Research and Dev. Ctr., 652 F.2d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 1981).
3. Religion-based Discrimination
Although the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green model is generally applicable to Title VII claims of employment discrimination on the basis of religion, the elements of a prima facie case are slightly reformulated to better suit the context. For a Title VII claim of religious discrimination, a prima facie case consists of three showings:
the individual had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement;
the individual informed the employer of this belief; and
the individual was discharged for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.Daniels v. City of Arlington, Texas, 246 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2001). Once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it was unable reasonably to accommodate the religious needs without undue hardship. Id.
Determining what is a bona fide religious belief can be an onerous task. Title VII defines religion as "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). The Supreme Court when attempting to define the term states:
'Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.' Local boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them 'incomprehensible.' Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious.United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184, 85 S.Ct. 850, 863, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965) (citing to United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86, 64 S.Ct. 882, 886, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944)). The Fifth Circuit more succinctly notes that "all forms and aspects of religion, however eccentric, are protected. . . ." Cooper v. General Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., Fort Worth Operation, 533 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 2972, 53 L.Ed.2d 1091 (1977). Accordingly, an alleged belief is a bona fide religious belief if the "belief" for which protection is sought is (1) "religious" in the person's own scheme of things, and (2) is "sincerely held." Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n. 12 (7th Cir. 1978).
VI. Application and Analysis
With the foregoing principles of analysis identified and stated, Stafford's causes of action may now be examined. This section first discusses whether Stafford has successfully invoked the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. The analysis then turns to whether Stafford's complaint survives defendants' motion for summary judgment. Finally, the analysis considers whether this federal court should in the proper exercise of discretion entertain Stafford's state law claims under its supplemental jurisdiction.
A. Jurisdiction
Subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue that this court must investigate sua sponte. Construing Stafford's complaint liberally, Stafford alleges causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Thus, this civil action arises under the laws of the United States.
Stafford's pro se complaint complains of wrongful termination without specifically alleging Title VII claims. However, this court must liberally construe pro se complaints. United States v. Robinson, 78 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. AMX, Int'l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1993). In this context, Stafford's action is based at least in part on Title VII. Stafford filed the pending action after receiving a Notice of Suit Rights from the EEOC following dismissal of an administrative complaint wherein Stafford claimed discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Moreover, the record reflects that before filing suit, Stafford presented a complaint to the EEOC and obtained an adverse ruling and a "right to sue" notice. He commenced this action within ninety days after receiving that notice. Consequently, all jurisdictional prerequisites are satisfied, and Stafford has successfully invoked subject-matter jurisdiction under the "federal question" doctrine.
Given that Stafford has successfully invoked federal question jurisdiction, it is not necessary for the court to consider whether diversity jurisdiction exists. However, the court clearly could not adjudicate Stafford's claims under its diversity jurisdiction. First, Stafford has not distinctly and affirmatively alleged citizenship of the parties. Second, Stafford alleges that at least one defendant, Alcatel USA, is based in Plano, Texas, and the record reflect that defendant Prabhu also is a Texas resident. Thus, two defendants are citizens of Texas, like Stafford. Complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants does not exist.
B. Federal Employment Discrimination Claims
The next logical step in the analysis is to determine whether Stafford's pleadings and other submissions regarding Title VII allegations of unlawful employment discrimination weather defendants' motion for summary judgment. In this undertaking, the court is not free to search for evidence of arbitrary, unfair or callous treatment generally. Rather, the court's examination must be confined to determining whether Stafford has proffered admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact supporting the assertion that his termination was based on discrimination of the type specifically prohibited by Title VII.
First, Stafford explicitly disavows any claim that his termination was based on unlawful racial discrimination. Consequently, he does not even attempt to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination prohibited by federal law. All defendants, therefore, are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Stafford vigorously prosecutes his claim that his termination was based on religion-based discrimination. While Stafford did not provide a detailed factual description of alleged religious discrimination in his administrative complaint presented to the EEOC, both race and religion grounds are checked on his formal Charge of Discrimination filed on August 26, 2000. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. J.
The inquiry then must turn to whether Stafford has presented sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of religion-based employment discrimination. He fails because he identifies no bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement of Alcatel USA. He neither alleges nor presents competent evidence to show that he informed his employer of that belief. Finally, he fails to present competent evidence to show that he was discharged for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. At best, Stafford harbors a subjective belief that he was terminated because of his religion. An employee's subjective belief that he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of unlawful discrimination, without more, is not enough to survive a summary judgment motion. Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996). Under such circumstance, Stafford's claim of religious discrimination also must be dismissed.
Stafford contends that he articulated his "'religious beliefs' — the Seven Principles of God" when interviewed by Alcatel USA's investigator, Ken Johnson. He alleges that in that interview, he disclosed "his moral sense of character, his intellectual abilities, skills, talents and his God given ability to get things done, achieving the anticipated results in the time allotted." He contends that thereafter defendants "found an overwhelming need to immediately remove Plaintiff Mr. Ricky G. Stafford from the Company and if necessary from all physical and natural existence as we know it." Pl. Resp. to Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 8. Stafford does not enumerate his religious beliefs, nor does he explain their meaning.
Stafford does not contend that further discovery is needed to identify an Alcatel USA employment requirement that conflicted with his own sincerely held religious belief, or that he was discharged due to that requirement. Hence, summary judgment is appropriate at this point although extensive discovery has not occurred.
Because the employer, Alcatel USA, is entitled to summary judgment on both of Stafford's Title VII claims, it is unnecessary to address the other defendants' arguments. If Stafford has no viable employment discrimination claim against his employer, whether a parent corporation or corporate officer is liable for the same conduct is a moot issue. When Stafford's Title VII employment discrimination claims against his employer fails, so do his complaints against Prabhu and Alcatel based on the same alleged wrongful conduct.
C. State Law Claims
Stafford's remaining causes of action — including the claims of fraud, privacy invasion and conspiracy contained in his recently-proposed amendments — are not based on federal law. Since all federal claims must be dismissed, the court must next decide whether to entertain the remaining state law claims under supplemental jurisdiction.
The general rule in this circuit is to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when all federal claims are dismissed or eliminated prior to trial. No exceptions to that general rule surface in this case. This case has not been pending for an extended amount of time. No depositions have been taken; no pretrial case management orders have been entered; and no trial date is imminent. Thus, deferring these claims to the appropriate state court will not impinge upon judicial economy, convenience and fairness. In this respect, this case is akin to Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill. The single federal-law claim will be eliminated at an early stage, a circumstance providing a "powerful reason to choose not to exercise jurisdiction."
Moreover, some of these proposed claims, e.g., "blackballing," "harassment" and "wiretapping" raise novel issues. Comity requires that state courts be permitted to first address these proposed new causes of action. Federal courts should not guess as to what Texas or other applicable state law will be when it is imminently reasonable to require the litigant advancing the theory to first present such claim to the appropriate state courts.
In addition, Stafford's state law claims do not directly arise out of the decision to terminate his employment. While the alleged blackballing and some of the alleged defamation took place while Stafford was employed at Alcatel USA in North Carolina, all other claims allegedly occurred after termination while Stafford traveled through North Carolina, Virginia, Ohio and Texas. As a result, the state law claims are not so intertwined with the Title VII claims as to make dismissal unduly prejudicial to Stafford in the interests of economy, convenience, and fairness.
Finally, Stafford will suffer no unfair prejudice if the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Texas law specifically provides that when an action is dismissed for want of jurisdiction of the federal district court in which it was filed originally, and, within a specified period after the dismissal, the plaintiff re-files the action in a Texas court of proper jurisdiction, the period between the date of first filing and that of commencement in the second court is not counted as a part of the period of limitations unless the opposite party shows in abatement that the first filing was in intentional disregard of proper jurisdiction. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 16.064 (Vernon 1997). Consequently, Stafford will remain free to commence a timely action in state court urging his federally-dismissed state law claims.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted with respect to Title VII claims alleging unlawful employment discrimination based on race and religion;
2. This court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state law claims; and
3. The court should dismiss the state law claims for want of jurisdiction and without prejudice to their being timely re-filed in a Texas court, or other state court, of proper jurisdiction.
OBJECTIONS
Objections must be: (1) specific, (2) in writing, and (3) served and filed within ten days after being served with a copy of this report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 1(a), 6(b), and 72(b).
A party's failure to object bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by a district judge of proposed findings and recommendations, Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
APPENDIX
Part I
This part describes various e-mails and attachments transmitted to Alcatel USA by Stafford while protesting the amount of his raise. Italicized portions designate statements that Alcatel USA managment might reasonably have perceived as constituting physical threats.Stafford sent e-mails to Krish A. Prabhu and Serge Tchuruk on March 6, 2000, April 6, 2000, and April 22, 2000, each mentioning "The Executive Order" and "X27." Stafford sent an e-mail to to Krish A. Prabhu and Serge Tchuruk on April 26, 2000, wherein he references "The Red Eagle Clause" and "Isles of the Dragon."
A. "The Executive Order" "X27"
Stafford provides a copy of "The Executive Order" as exhibit A to his pretrial disclosures (Docket No. 19). It is a self-authored document that, according to its terms, is executed in "the event that acts of bias, malice, sabotage of gross proportion — profit affecting and/or blackballing is practiced by employees in management positions, to include employees of influence, any members of Human Resources and/or third parties against any employee with executive power. . . ." "The Executive Order" is executed with respect to "the stipulations as outlined in the lateral sections of X27."
Under "The Executive Order," all expenditures must be fully accounted for within a predetermined time frame. In the event of failure to comply, the "Executor of the Executive Order" may immediately remove all personnel who contributed to the gross violations. Finally, if non-compliance persists, "The Red Eagle Clause" is "automatically activated as predetermined as a last course of action to shed light on the severity of the situation that initiated the Executive Order as defined in X27 under the Executive Order section. . . ."
"X27" is not further described by Stafford, but merely referred to as some sort of authoritative document. B. "The Red Eagle Clause"
Stafford explains "The Red Eagle Clause", another self-authored document, in exhibit C of his pretrial disclosures. "The Red Eagle Clause" is short for: The Readiness to Evaluate and Deliberate theEffective Activation of Goals through Logistics then Execute that, whichCan Logically Affect oUr Successful Earning potential. Stafford further explains that the clause is used to prevent acts of imprudent misconduct by management, that it bears "A Code of Honor" — a gentleman's agreement to uphold the collectively agreed upon perspectives of derived Corporate Policies to govern the mass of its people (employees), and " Failure to do so is not an option !!!"
C. "Isles of the Dragon"
The reference to "Isles of the Dragon" was in the April 26, 2000, e-mail sent by Stafford to Krish A. Prabhu and Serge Tchuruk. The entire e-mail sent is reprinted below:
Serge and Krish:
When we first conversed over half a decade ago a pact was made, an allegiance formed in two parts, which I have honored the first in four folds and I will honor the second with the same intensity.
In the event of non-compliance to follow through on the Memorandum Of Action To Be Taken in order to comply with the execution of an Executive Order, the "Red Eagle Clause" is automatically activated and the "Isles Of The Dragon" is called out.
The phrase "Isles Of The Dragon" is an ancient legend of times long past that entitled the disciplinary actions to be taken for acts of treasons, defiance-insubordination, duplicity-betrayal-treachery, deception-disloyalty and fraudulence; all of which are closely related, however, viewed differently and the penalties for which are severe in nature respectively .
The failure to comply is considered to be an act of defiance and absolute betrayal of the oath taken when inducted into the position you are currently holding. The repercussions of your actions will unfold in a similar manner, though the penalty will fit the actions undertaken . "Red Eagle Clause" states "As one walk out of the shadows into the light to start anew, one must also be forthwith and adherent unto the policies as setforth [sic] without disregard or deception of intent." There are no exceptions to the clause and it will be enforced to the maximum extent of the code you took not so long ago .
Remember the events of the Fall of 1998 through the Winter of 1999, the document that vindicated you and the company of deception among other allegations — remember the seal on it and don't ever forget it, for it is mines [sic] to give and mines [sic] to take away . I exercised my influence and my authority within the confounds of the code, I supported your efforts even when I did not agree them [sic], yet you choose to defy me, the penalty will justify the contempt, let's be clear on that. For I am the light and the light is me, when you hear the aforesaid phrase again your time to act would have ceased to exist.
With that being said friendship and business rarely mix in an effective and lucrative relationship. It will also pay to know that inquisitiveness destroys enchantment. It is not good or wise to know the consequences of every action before acting, for time may not allow the opportunity to act upon that action. Time is of the essence with a closely monitored window and the gap is narrowing with each passing minute .
With the same exertion that the policies were written so will they be enforced, without exclusion or exception to the party and/or parties in violation of them. It is of the utmost importance that you take the "Red Eagle Clause" seriously for once it is activated it can not [sic] be recalled, it must follow due course.
All arrangements of engagements to counter actions taken against members of the corporate can become relevant, if the aforementioned clause is activated. On April 27th, 2000 some time before the 17:00th hour is the activation start time of the "Red Eagle Clause" and it will reach maximum affectability [sic] by 20:00th hour your (European) time.
With the power invested in me ,
Ricky Stafford
Ex. VP — CBMEA
CN-RED
The line immediately following Stafford's name in the above e-mail are the initials "Ex. VP — CBMEA." Stafford had claimed in an earlier, April 6, 2000, e-mail, he was an Executive Vice-President of Corporate Business Marketing Evaluation and Analysis for all product lines across the industry. Stafford further stated in the April 6, 2000, e-mail he wanted his salary "commensurate with title, effective the date of grievance as the Executive Order so states." Id.
D. "Memorandum Of Action To Be Taken"
The "Memorandum Of Action To Be Taken," referenced in the second paragraph of the e-mail quote in Part C above and in various other documents provided by Stafford, is another self-authored document that called for the removal of all Human Resources personnel, stated that "The Executive Order" allowed for the immediate appointment and/or firing of key personnel only, and called for the removal of five other, specified individuals. Additionally, this document made references to "The Red Eagle Clause." Pl. Pretrial Disclosures Ex. B.
Part II
This part describes actions allegedly undertaken by an individual Stafford identified as Barbara Vogeler. The majority of these actions took place after Stafford's employment was terminated with Alcatel USA. Stafford claims these actions were undertaken by Barbara Vogeler at the behest of defendants.
The following is a list of harassing and threatening actions Stafford claims to have occurred. It is a summary of actions alleged by Stafford in "CORRUPTION IN ITS FINEST HOUR DIRECTED SOLELY AT ITS MOST EARNEST" (Docket No. 13), "CONSTANT HARASSMENT, INVASION OF PRIVACY, MOTIVATE AND OPPORTUNITY" Pl. Notice of Dep. by Written Questions Ex. T. (Docket No. 52), and Pl. Objections to Defs.' Resp. to Pl. Second Mot. to Compel Ex. 4. (Docket No. 57).
A. Pre-Termination
B. Post-Termination
1. While Stafford lived at Extended Stay of America when working for Alcatel USA. Stafford claims that Extended Stay of America, collaborating with Barbara Vogeler, installed video cameras in Stafford's ceiling and walls, and smoke-alarm unit to monitor him.
Alcatel USA and Barbara Vogeler attempted to kill Stafford by poisoning his store-bought bottled water with arsenic and cyanide while Stafford lived at Extended Stay of America.
Barbara Vogeler made sexually explicit videos and had sexual relations with numerous individuals in the Raleigh, North Carolina area, including residents of apartments around Stafford's apartment, in order to make Stafford jealous and want to marry her. She wished to marry Stafford in order to acquire Stafford's "better than ten figures" inheritance.
From March, through August, 1998, Barbara Vogeler would disguise herself, meet Stafford and claim to be "Pamela", "Sandra", or "Deana", while following Stafford.
Since May, 2000, Stafford has been constantly followed across numerous states by Barbara Vogeler and other Alcatel USA employees.
Around June 26, 2000, Barbara Vogeler and defendants set fire to vehicles on a highway in order to stop Stafford from consulting with an attorney.
On July 13, 2000, Alcatel USA and Barbara Vogeler attempted again to kill Stafford by poisoning his store-bought bottled water with arsenic and cyanide while Stafford was staying with relatives in Ohio.
On July 17, 2000, Barbara Vogeler and defendants used highway troopers to impede Stafford's travel from Cleveland, Ohio to Raleigh, North Carolina, and back.
Around July, 2000, Barbara Vogeler propositioned leaders of Stafford's church, located in Ohio, by offering sex and money to both male and females, in order to get them to arrange a marriage between her and Stafford.
Since July, 2000, Barbara Vogeler and defendants have interfered with Stafford's ability to find other employment by telling other prospective employers, including Ameritech-Cleveland, Ohio, that Alcatel USA intends to rehire Stafford.
While traveling in and around Ohio and West Virginia during September and November of 2000, and January, 2001, Stafford was shot at multiple times by Barbara Vogeler's constituents and Alcatel affiliates. During the November, 2000, incident, Stafford overheard his assailants state that, after having missed Stafford earlier in the day, they could not make another attempt for lack of a clear, open shot.
In and around December, 2000, Barbara Vogeler attempted to obtain and finally bought from Stafford's "blood related second cousin, Sharron Napier (sic)" an open-heart, seventeen-diamond pendant that Barbara Vogeler had seen Stafford wearing at World's Gym and Fitness in June of 1998, and that Stafford had later given to Sharron Napier. Barbara Vogeler "felt that if she could have possession of the open-heart, 17-diamond pendant that Mr. Stafford would have to marry her by the inherent power of God as it was promised to be." Vogeler's plan was foiled for several reasons, including her failure to comply with the requirement that, "one must remove the said pendant from the holder's neck [Stafford] and survive its torment for seven consecutive days to inherit its power and the gift of marriage under God's law, the Supreme Law of all laws."
Stafford has won state lotteries three times. Barbara Vogeler thwarted repeated attempts by Stafford to cash-in lottery tickets worth hundreds of thousands of dollars in Virginia, Ohio, and Texas by promising large sums of money or sexual favors to lottery organizers in order to change the winning numbers.
Alcatel USA used its business relationships with Sprint (the cellular phone service) to monitor Stafford's movements.
Barbara Vogeler has influenced Stafford's family to turn against him by offering money or other material things of value to family members.