Opinion
No. 16–P–0095.
12-09-2016
Deborah A. STACY v. Iana A. STACY.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Deborah A. Stacy, the personal representative of the estate of David E. Stacy (decedent), appeals from a judgment of dismissal of her amended equity complaint in its entirety by a judge of the Probate and Family Court. In her five-count amended complaint, she claimed that Iana A. Stacy, the decedent's wife, improperly took possession of assets belonging to the decedent's estate and the decedent's parents. The judge determined that the wife's actions were not prohibited by the decedent and the wife's prenuptial agreement. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
"We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc., 469 Mass. 752, 754 (2014), quoting from Harrington v. Costello, 467 Mass. 720, 724 (2014). Prior to their marriage, the decedent and his wife signed a prenuptial agreement providing that, "in the event of a divorce," the wife's property shall remain the wife's and the husband's shall remain the husband's. The agreement listed many items of personal property as belonging to the husband, including the marital home.
After her husband's death, the wife moved out of the marital home and removed several furnishings and personal belongings from the home. The marital home was sold, and in due course, the decedent's sister was appointed as the personal representative of the estate. The personal representative sent a written demand to the wife seeking to recover the estate's assets and the parent's assets. After the wife failed to comply, the personal representative commenced this action to recover assets of the estate and of the decedent's parents alleging the following claims: (1) constructive trust, (2) conversion, (3) unjust enrichment, (4) violation of G.L. c. 190B, § 3–709, and (5) declaratory judgment.
The wife filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Mass .R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 755 (1974) stating that the prenuptial agreement "made no provision for ownership or disposition of marital assets in the event of the death of either party.". The judge agreed and granted the wife's motion after concluding that the prenuptial agreement was not intended to apply to the death of a spouse based on the agreement's caption referring to G.L. c. 208, § 34, and language in the agreement that referred to "in the event of a divorce."
This statute governs alimony and the assignment of the estate in the event of divorce.
We review the legal import of contractual provisions de novo. See Buchanan v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 65 Mass.App.Ct. 244, 247 n. 5 (2005), and cases cited. We conclude that the contract suggests that the reference to divorce did not exclude the applicability of the agreement to other events, such as death. To the extent that the personal representative wishes to argue the prenuptial language is ambiguous, she is free to make the argument and proffer extrinsic evidence on remand. At this stage of the case, as stated, our opinion is limited to the determination that the language of the agreement does not preclude the applicability of its provisions to the death of a spouse.
The agreement provides that it is "a final and complete settlement of all matters relating to the interest and obligations of each [party] with respect to all future property matters, including but not limited to alimony, support, maintenance, property assignment, and the rights of the parties under G.L. c. 208, § 34, as amended, in the event of a divorce" (emphasis supplied).
Additionally, the personal representative has authority separate and distinct from the effect of the prenuptial agreement, to seek property that is improperly removed from an estate. A "personal representative may maintain an action to recover possession of property or to determine the title thereto." G.L. c. 190B, § 3–709. See Clabburn v. Phillips, 245 Mass. 47, 48, 49 (1923) ("This is an action of tort by an administrator against the defendants for the conversion of personal property of the intestate after his death.... The defendants in taking possession of the property of the intestate and in selling it acted without authority of law and became ... executors in their own wrong."). The facts set forth in the complaint were sufficient to establish a cause of action under G.L. c. 190B, § 3–709.
The alleged facts were also sufficient to state claims of a conversion, unjust enrichment, and a constructive trust. The personal representative has an ownership or possessory interest in a decedent's property in order to effectuate a proper disbursement of the decedent's estate. See § 3–709. She has asserted that interest in her complaint and attached a list of items that were allegedly improperly removed; the list includes, among other things, household furnishings, pieces of jewelry, and artwork. Dismissal of the declaratory judgment count was error.
"One who intentionally or wrongfully exercises acts of ownership, control or dominion over personal property to which he has no right of possession at the time is liable for the tort of conversion." Abington Natl Bank v. Ashwood Homes, Inc., 19 Mass.App.Ct. 503, 507 (1985).
Unjust enrichment is the "retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience." Santagate v. Tower, 64 Mass.App.Ct. 324, 329 (2005). A constructive trust may be imposed, regardless of fraudulent intent, as a remedy for unjust enrichment. See Cavadi v. DeYeso, 458 Mass. 615, 627 (2011).
We distinguish, however, property of the estate from property belonging to the husband's parents that were stored at the marital home. The personal representative does not represent the parents' rights. Claims brought on the parents' behalf were properly dismissed.
We reverse the judgment of dismissal of the amended complaint with the exception of allegations related to property belonging to the decedent's parents, and remand for proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.
So ordered.