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Stacks v. Kerr-McGee Chemical, L.L.C.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division
Oct 15, 2002
No. 1:00CV473-D-D (N.D. Miss. Oct. 15, 2002)

Opinion

No. 1:00CV473-D-D

October 15, 2002


OPINION GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT


Presently before the court is the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be granted.

A. Factual Background

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a lab technician at the Defendant's Hamilton, Mississippi, facility. In early 2000, while working the night shift, the Plaintiff exited the ladies' restroom and discovered one of her co-workers, Greg Sims, standing in the hallway completely undressed except for his socks. On June 26, 2000, the Plaintiff reported Sims' behavior to her supervisors. The Defendant immediately suspended Sims, launched an investigation into the incident, and then terminated Sims' employment on June 30, 2000.

The Plaintiff filed a complaint with the court on November 28, 2000, alleging that Sims' conduct constituted sexual harassment by subjecting the Plaintiff to a hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII. On August 12, 2002, the Defendant filed the pending motion for summary judgment, seeking judgment as a matter of law as to the Plaintiff's claims.

B. Summary Judgment Standard

A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to go beyond the pleadings and "by . . . affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. That burden is not discharged by mere allegations or denials. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

While all legitimate factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

C. Discussion

1. General Principles

A plaintiff may establish a Title VII violation by proving that sex discrimination has created a hostile or abusive working environment. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405-06, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); Woods v. Delta Beverage Group, Inc., 274 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2001). In order to establish a hostile working environment claim based on the actions of a co-worker, a plaintiff must establish the following:

(1) that she is a member of a protected class;

(2) that she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment;

(3) that the harassment was based on sex;

(4) that the harassment affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment; and
(5) that the employer knew of should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.
Woods, 274 F.3d at 298-99; Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 509 (5th Cir. 1999).

Here, the court finds that even assuming, arguendo, that the Plaintiff has satisfied the first four elements of her claim, summary judgment is appropriate because the Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendant failed to take prompt remedial action once it learned of the harassing conduct. See Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs. of North Texas, P.A., 139 F.3d 532, 538 (5 th Cir. 1998) (stating that "when an employee complains of a hostile work environment, an employer may insulate itself from Title VII liability by taking prompt action to remedy the complaint.").

2. The Plaintiff's Hostile Environment Claim

As noted above, in order to establish a hostile working environment claim under Title VII, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that her employer failed to take prompt remedial action once the employer knew or should have known of the alleged harassment. Woods, 274 F.3d at 301. Whether the employer's response to the discriminatory conduct qualifies as prompt remedial action "necessarily depend[s] on the particular facts of the case — the severity and persistence of the harassment, and the effectiveness of any initial remedial steps." Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 479 (5th Cir. 1989). The Fifth Circuit has made clear, however, that an employer's actions may insulate it from liability as a matter of law when it "t[akes] the allegation seriously, conduct[s] a prompt and thorough investigation, and immediately implement[s] remedial and disciplinary measures based on the results of such investigation." Carmon v. Lubrizol Corp., 17 F.3d 791, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1994); see Hirras v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 95 F.3d 396, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that employers who take immediate action and successfully stop any harassing conduct have met their burden as matter of law).

Here, it is undisputed that, upon learning of Sims' conduct, the Defendant immediately suspended him, conducted an investigation, and then terminated his employment, all within four days after the date the Plaintiff reported the incident. The Plaintiff does not dispute that these actions qualify as prompt and effective remedial action, nor does the Plaintiff assert that any further harassment occurred between the time she reported the incident and Sims' termination four days later. Based on the above-cited Fifth Circuit authority, the court holds that such a quick and effective response constitutes prompt remedial action as a matter of law, and insulates the Defendant from Title VII liability.See, e.g., Hirras, 95 F.3d at 399-400 (collecting cases). The court finds, therefore, that the fifth element of the Plaintiff's prima facie case cannot be established and the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be granted.

D. Conclusion

In sum, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted. The Defendant has shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of the Plaintiff's claims.

A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that

(1) the Defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket entry 25) is GRANTED;
(2) the Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and

(3) this case is CLOSED.

All memoranda, depositions, declarations and other materials considered by the court in ruling on this motion are hereby incorporated into and made a part of the record in this action.


Summaries of

Stacks v. Kerr-McGee Chemical, L.L.C.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division
Oct 15, 2002
No. 1:00CV473-D-D (N.D. Miss. Oct. 15, 2002)
Case details for

Stacks v. Kerr-McGee Chemical, L.L.C.

Case Details

Full title:KIMBERLY STACKS PLAINTIFF v. KERR-McGEE CHEMICAL, L.L.C. DEFENDANT

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division

Date published: Oct 15, 2002

Citations

No. 1:00CV473-D-D (N.D. Miss. Oct. 15, 2002)