Opinion
2012 CA 1588
2013-09-18
CHARLENE GUILLAUME ST. ROMAIN v. GERALD WAYNE ST. ROMAIN
C. Jerome D'Aquila New Roads, LA Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee Charlene Guillaume St. Romain Deborah Carriere Cifreo New Roads, LA Attorney for Defendant-Appellant Gerald Wayne St. Romain
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the 18th Judicial District Court
Parish of Pointe Coupee, Louisiana
Docket No. 41,479, Division "D"
Honorable William C. Dupont, Judge Presiding
C. Jerome D'Aquila
New Roads, LA
Attorney for
Plaintiff-Appellee
Charlene Guillaume St. Romain
Deborah Carriere Cifreo
New Roads, LA
Attorney for
Defendant-Appellant
Gerald Wayne St. Romain
BEFORE: PARRO, WELCH, AND KLINE, JJ
Judge William F. Kline, Jr., retired, is serving as judge ad hoc by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
PARRO, J.
Gerald W. St. Romain challenges the judgment of the trial court ordering him to pay certain hospitalization insurance premiums and uncovered medical expenses for his ex-wife. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Gerald W. St. Romain (Gerald) and Charlene Guillaume St. Romain (Charlene) were married in Pointe Coupee Parish on February 1, 1975. Charlene filed a petition for divorce on April 14, 2008, and on July 16, 2008, the parties entered into an agreement in which they immediately partitioned certain funds on deposit at Merrill Lynch. In that same agreement, Gerald agreed to pay for Charlene's hospitalization insurance, and Charlene waived any request for interim or permanent spousal support. Furthermore, although the parties intended to remain married at that time, they also planned to move to a separate property regime in the future and to enter into a formal property settlement concerning the property belonging to the community. On July 22, 2008, the trial court signed a stipulated judgment in accordance with this agreement.
Nevertheless, the parties were ultimately divorced by a judgment signed on February 26, 2010.
A separate stipulated judgment, which simply lifted the injunction in reference to the Merrill Lynch account so that the funds could be divided between the parties, was signed on July 16, 2008.
On May 8, 2009, the parties participated in a mediation session at which they entered into an agreement that purportedly terminated the legal community property regime existing between them and provided that the parties were entering into a separate property agreement. The parties stated that this agreement was to be effective on June 1, 2009, and they agreed to timely sign any and all documents reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the agreement. Despite so agreeing, Gerald did not sign the necessary documents until October 23, 2009, and Charlene did not sign the necessary documents until November 3, 2009. The trial court approved the agreement on November 3, 2009.
This agreement did not specifically address the issue of Charlene's hospitalization insurance, which Gerald was required to pay pursuant to the earlier stipulated judgment that had been signed on July 22, 2008. However, beginning with the premium due in May 2009, Gerald required Charlene to reimburse him for her hospitalization insurance premiums, and on July 31, 2009, he dropped her from his insurance entirely. Charlene was subsequently able to obtain hospitalization insurance on her own; however, she was unable to obtain coverage for her pre-existing anxiety condition as a result of the lapse in coverage.
Thereafter, on March 16, 2010, Charlene filed a rule for contempt against Gerald, seeking to have him held in contempt for violating the July 22, 2008 judgment by failing to pay her hospitalization insurance premiums. In addition, she sought reimbursement for hospitalization insurance premiums she had paid, as well as reimbursement of certain medical bills, which her insurance policy had not covered due to her pre-existing anxiety condition and her annual deductible.
After a hearing, the trial court determined that Gerald was responsible for Charlene's hospitalization insurance premiums between the dates of July 22, 2008, the date of the stipulated judgment, and November 3, 2009, the date by which both parties had signed the separate property agreement. In addition, the trial court determined that Gerald was responsible for any deductible or other uncovered amounts Charlene had been required to pay during that same time period, since he had improperly dropped her from his insurance and she had not been able to obtain coverage for her pre-existing anxiety condition.
As noted previously, the trial court also signed an order approving the separate property agreement on November 3, 2009.
On January 30, 2012, the trial court signed a judgment expanding on this ruling and providing specific amounts for the hospitalization insurance premiums and medical expenses to be paid by Gerald. The trial court did not, however, find Gerald in contempt of court for his failure to pay for Charlene's hospitalization insurance. Rather, the trial court determined that his failure to pay the premiums was not a deliberate or willful violation of a court order. It is from this judgment that Gerald has appealed.
The date actually written on the judgment is January 30, 2012; however, this date is in error.
DISCUSSION
A court of appeal may not overturn a judgment of a trial court absent an error of law or a factual finding that is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Morris v. Safeway Ins. Co. of Louisiana, 03-1361 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/17/04), 897 So.2d 616, 617, writ denied, 04-2572 (La. 12/17/04), 888 So.2d 872. In order to affirm the factual findings of the trier of fact, the supreme court posited a two-part test for the appellate review of facts: (1) the appellate court must find from the record that there is a reasonable factual basis for the finding of the trier of fact; and (2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is not clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous). Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La. 1987). Thus, if there is no reasonable factual basis in the record for the trier of fact's finding, no additional inquiry is necessary to conclude there was manifest error. However, if a reasonable factual basis exists, an appellate court may set aside a factual finding only if, after reviewing the record in its entirety, it determines the factual finding was clearly wrong. See Stobart v. State, through Dep't of Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993); Moss v. State, 07-1686 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/8/08), 993 So.2d 687, 693, writ denied, 08-2166 (La. 11/14/08), 996 So.2d 1092.
If the trial court's findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse those findings even though convinced that, had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Hulsey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 96-2704 (La. App. 1st Or. 12/29/97), 705 So.2d 1173, 1176-77. However, an appellate court may find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination, where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness's story. Id. at 1177.
In his first assignment of error, Gerald contends that the trial court erred in holding that he was responsible for paying Charlene's hospitalization insurance premiums from July 2008 through November 2009. According to Gerald, the trial court should have found that his obligation to pay Charlene's hospitalization insurance premiums had ended, effective June 1, 2009, pursuant to the agreements the parties had entered into at the May 8, 2009 mediation conference.
At the mediation conference, the parties signed a settlement memorandum, in which they acknowledged their desire to enter into a separate property regime and set forth their general understanding of how their community property would be divided. Although the settlement memorandum contemplated that these changes would be effective June 1, 2009, the parties clearly stated that this was simply a general outline of their settlement and that additional documents would need to be signed in order to complete the transfers and other agreements set forth in the settlement memorandum. These additional documents were not signed by both parties, and no judgment was signed confirming them, until November 3, 2009.
Furthermore, nothing in the settlement memorandum specifically addressed Gerald's obligation, as established by the trial court's July 22, 2008 judgment, which required him to pay Charlene's hospitalization insurance premiums. Nevertheless, after the hearing on the motion for contempt, the trial court determined that the parties had intended for Gerald's obligation to pay Charlene's hospitalization insurance premiums to end once they had completed the settlement of the property and the separate property agreement. However, the trial court concluded that these were not completed until both parties had signed the documents detailing the terms of the settlement and the separate property agreement on November 3, 2009, because until that date, there was no agreement. We find no error in this conclusion. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
In his second assignment of error, Gerald contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to reimburse Charlene for certain sums he allegedly withheld from rental proceeds due her. According to the judgment in this matter, Gerald was ordered to reimburse Charlene for hospitalization insurance premiums in the total amount of $6,318.35. In addition to other reimbursement amounts, this sum included: (1) the amount of $1,160, which represented four months of health insurance premiums at $290 per month and which were deducted by Gerald from Charlene's portion of the proceeds of the rental property; and (2) the amount of $1,200, which represented health insurance premiums deducted by Gerald from Charlene's portion of the proceeds of the rental property. Gerald contends that Charlene is not entitled to both amounts, as they are duplicate awards.
After the hearing on the motion for contempt, the parties apparently came back to the trial court in a status conference to address certain unsettled issues, including the specific amounts due Charlene. According to Charlene's brief to this court, the trial court reviewed numerous documents in chambers at this status conference; however, most of these documents were never introduced into the record and, therefore, have not been provided to us for review.
The judgment makes reference to letters dated March 19, 2009, and October 13, 2009, which purportedly provide support for the two awards challenged by Gerald in this assignment of error. However, neither letter is in the record before us. Nevertheless, Gerald has conceded in his brief to this court that he withheld hospitalization insurance premiums in the amount of $290 per month for a four month period, for a total deduction of $1,160, from the rental proceeds due Charlene. Accordingly, we find no error in this award.
In his brief, Gerald acknowledges that he deducted these amounts for the months of January, February, March, and April 2009. He further stated that he rounded the exact monthly cost of the premium down from $292.60 to $290 when making the deductions.
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However, we find no support in the record for the award in the amount of $1,200. According to the trial court judgment, the award is based on a letter dated March 19, 2009; nevertheless, that letter is not in the record before us, as it was apparently never entered into the record after being considered by the trial court in chambers during the status conference. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court judgment as it pertains to the award of $1,200, and, because the record is not complete, we remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
In his third assignment of error, Gerald contends that the trial court judgment is manifestly erroneous in that it ordered him to pay Charlene's uncovered medical expenses from July 2008 through November 2009. Gerald asserts that there is no legal or factual authority for this order by the trial court and that there was no order or judgment in the record that required him to pay Charlene's uncovered medical expenses.
Charlene testified at trial that, when she was covered under Gerald's health insurance policy, she did not have to pay a deductible. However, when she was forced to obtain her own policy after Gerald improperly dropped her from his, she was only able to afford a policy with a $1,900 deductible. Furthermore, because she was without insurance for a period of time, she was subsequently unable to obtain coverage for her pre-existing anxiety condition, which had been covered under Gerald's policy. Because Gerald improperly dropped Charlene from his policy in violation of the earlier trial court judgment, and his actions led to Charlene's incurring these charges, we find no error in the trial court's finding that Gerald is responsible for these uncovered medical charges. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, that portion of the trial court judgment awarding Charlene Guillaume St. Romain the specified sum of $1,200 is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. Each party is to bear his or her own costs in this matter.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.