Opinion
No. 2-12-1415
2013-09-20
SAINT MARK'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAULINE BOYLE, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of Lake County.
No. 11-CH-23
Honorable
Luis A. Berrones,
Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Zenoff and Hudson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court erred by granting permanent injunctive relief to plaintiff where the trial court held that plaintiff had not proven the essential element of damages on its underlying tort claim, because an injunction is a remedy and not a cause of action in itself. ¶ 2 Following a bench trial on plaintiff, Saint Mark's Episcopal Church's, complaint alleging tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and seeking money damages and injunctive relief, the circuit court of Lake County held that plaintiff had not proved sufficiently the element of damages. The trial court denied plaintiff monetary relief but nevertheless granted plaintiff injunctive relief, requiring defendant, Pauline Boyle, to remove a sign she had erected on her property. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting permanent injunctive relief where plaintiff was unsuccessful on the merits of the tortious interference claim. We agree and reverse.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage and requested both damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiff was attempting to sell its property that lay between its and defendant's property. During the time plaintiff was trying to sell its property, defendant erected a sign facing plaintiff's property that read, "buyer beware." At least one potential buyer was influenced to abandon her purchase of plaintiff's property. In an agreed order, the trial court granted defendant's preliminary injunction requiring defendant to remove her sign. ¶ 5 After a bench trial, the trial court held "that there was an interference with the prospective business relationship of [plaintiff's]; however, [plaintiff] has not proven damages." The court therefore entered judgment in favor of defendant. The court then proceeded to orally issue a permanent injunction against defendant "ordering her to cease and desist from erecting any signs on the property with respect to the-directed to the sale of the property that is owned by [plaintiff]." The court also issued a written order stating, pertinently, "[p]laintiff's claim for permanent injunctive relief is granted so that [d]efendant is prohibited from erecting the Buyer Beware sign on her property." Defendant timely appeals; plaintiff did not appeal the adverse judgment on the tortious interference claim.
¶ 6 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 7 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting a permanent injunction as a remedy for plaintiff's underlying tort claim. Before taking up this issue on appeal, we must first address the discrepancy between the written order and the oral pronouncement. ¶ 8 It is beyond peradventure that, when a trial court's oral pronouncement is inconsistent with its written order, the oral pronouncement controls. E.g., Danada Square, LLC v. KFC National Management Co., 392 Ill. App. 3d 598, 607 (2009). Defendant acknowledges the discrepancy in the trial judge's oral and written pronouncements, but makes no argument as to which is controlling. Plaintiff, on the other hand, tells us that the written order is controlling and directs us to other jurisdictions which "have clearly pointed out what may be obvious to this court." Keeping in mind that the barest, cursory search of Illinois authority immediately reveals the controlling rule (e.g., id.; In re Tr. O., 362 Ill. App. 3d 860, 868 (2005) ("[i]f there is a conflict between a trial court's written and oral orders, the oral order controls")), we believe that plaintiff's counsel, Eric Anderson of Staub Anderson Green LLC, has intentionally attempted to mislead the court concerning the proper controlling authority. Our belief is founded on the citation to foreign authority (the Tennessee Court of Appeals and the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals) and the fact that counsel does not attempt to couch his argument in terms suggesting that the law in these jurisdictions should replace current Illinois authority, and giving reasons therefor. In light of this, we entered a rule to show cause why Mr. Anderson should not be sanctioned for this misrepresentation in his written argument. Mr. Anderson was unable to offer a satisfactory explanation for his conduct, but he acknowledged the severity of the misconduct and promised that he would take pains to make sure he never repeated it. Consequently, we ordered no further sanction for this conduct, but we do direct Mr. Anderson to carefully read and consider Rule 3.3(a)(2) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (eff. Jan 1, 2010): "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly * * * fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." ¶ 9 We return to the issue at hand: the appropriateness of the trial court's order of an injunction. Typically, we would review the order under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Sparks v. Gray, 334 Ill. App. 3d 390, 395 (2002). However, because the questions before us are purely legal, we review de novo the merits of the permanent injunction. Butler v. USA Volleyball, 285 Ill. App. 3d 578, 582 (1996). Regardless, the outcome is the same under either standard of review. ¶ 10 Here, the trial court held in favor of defendant on the tortious interference claim, yet nevertheless granted relief, in the form of a permanent injunction, to plaintiff. However, an injunction is only a remedy for an underlying cause of action and is not a cause of action in itself. See Town of Cicero v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 2012 IL App (1st) 112164, ¶ 46 ("[a] permanent injunction * * * is not a separate cause of action[,] * * * it is an equitable remedy"). Just as a temporary injunction may not be granted where a cause of action is insufficiently pleaded (see e.g., Ware v. D.R.G., Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 758, 763-64 (1974) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that she need not state a cause of action to be entitled to a temporary injunction)), a permanent injunction cannot be granted where the underlying cause of action is ultimately unsuccessful at trial. Rather, the issuance of a permanent injunction is contingent on the plaintiff prevailing at trial on the merits of its claim. Cicero, 2012 IL App (1st) 112164, ¶ 46 (citing City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 213 Ill. 2d 351, 431 (2004)). ¶ 11 Here, plaintiff's cause of action was the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. The elements of this tort are: (1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's relationship or expectancy; (3) the defendant's purposeful interference that prevents the plaintiff's legitimate expectancy from ripening into a valid business relationship or termination of the relationship; and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulting from such interference. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 352 Ill. App. 3d 365, 380 (2004). The trial court determined that plaintiff failed to prove the essential element of damages, and thus, held in favor of defendant. ¶ 12 As plaintiff was unsuccessful on the merits of its underlying tort claim, it did not meet the requirements for the issuance of a permanent injunction. See Alpha School Bus Co., Inc. v. Wagner, 391 Ill. App. 3d 722, 743-44 (2009) (quoting Hasco, Inc. v. Roche, 299 Ill. App. 3d 118, 126 (1998)) (" '(1) a clear and ascertainable right in need of protection; (2) irreparable harm if injunctive relief is not granted; (3) no adequate remedy at law; and (4) success on the merits' "); see also, People ex rel. Fahner v. Steel Container Corp., 102 Ill. App. 3d 369, 374 (1981) ("[t]he merits which are viewed are those of the underlying cause of action, and not the merits of the preliminary injunction motion"). Because we hold that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff injunctive relief when plaintiff was unsuccessful in its cause of action, we need not address defendant's arguments concerning the injunction as a prior restraint on speech or, alternatively, as overly broad.
¶ 13 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 14 For the foregoing reasons, the portion of the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County granting injunctive relief is reversed. ¶ 15 Reversed in part.