Opinion
No. 37367.
May 28, 1969. Rehearing Denied June 26, 1969.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County, Hugh M. Taylor, J.
Charles S. Isler, Jr., and Larry G. Smith, of Isler, Welch, Bryant, Smith Higby, Panama City, and Ford L. Thompson, of Starry Thompson, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Leo L. Foster and Gayle Smith Swedmark, of Parker, Foster Madigan, Tallahassee, for respondents.
Edward McCarthy, Jr., of Bryant, Freeman, Richardson Watson, Jacksonville, for Container Corp. of America, amicus curiae.
The appellate court in this case has affirmed an order holding that evidence offered by plaintiff St. Joe Paper Company, petitioner here, failed to make out a prima facie case as to illegal excessiveness of the tax assessment on its forestry lands, but finding that assessment of pasture lands was excessive and should be reduced to a maximum of $300 per acre. Review by certiorari in this Court is based on certificate that the decision passes upon a question of great public importance.
Fla.App. 1968, 210 So.2d 725.
The trial court, at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, found that its version of the income approach to valuation of forestry lands ignored the value of standing timber and was therefore insufficient. The opinion on review here finds, in addition, that plaintiff's method of valuation based solely on income producing capacity did not comply with the requirements of F.S. Sec. 193.021, F.S.A., construed in Markham v. Blount to be applicable to agricultural property.
"193.021 Method of assessment of property. — The county assessor of taxes of the several counties shall assess all the real and personal property in said counties in such a manner as to secure a just valuation as required by Section 1, Article IX of the state constitution. In arriving at a just valuation, the county assessors of taxes of the several counties shall take into consideration the following factors:
(1) The present cash value of the property;
(2) The highest and best use to which the property can be expected to be put in the immediate future; and the present use of the property;
(3) The location of said property;
(4) The quantity or size of said property;
(5) The cost of said property and the present replacement value of any improvements thereon;
(6) The condition of said property;
(7) The income from said property; and
(8) The net proceeds of the sale of the property, * * *."
Fla. 1965, 175 So.2d 526.
Petitioner contends that its evidence or method of evaluation does in fact encompass all of the statutory criteria. Whether or not this is true, or essential in the present controversy, we conclude that the real issue in this case is the propriety of requiring evidence reflecting the value of standing timber on specific property, or evidence of market value of timberlands as to which the assessment is alleged to be excessive. Certainly there can be no question that fair market value is, under our Constitution and cases, the gauge by which all methods of valuation, statutory or otherwise, must be measured. And assessment of property on this basis does of course require multiple assessment, i.e. assessment anew each year, of all taxable property.
Walter v. Schuler, Fla. 1965, 176 So.2d 81, construing Sec. 1, Art. IX, of the Fla. Const.: "* * * we have concluded after earnest study * * * to adopt the chancellor's idea that `fair market value' and `just valuation' should be declared `legally synonymous' * * *."
The overriding constitutional mandate, together with the explicit statutory provisions that in assessing timberlands "the tax assessor shall ascertain by personal inspection * * * the value of the lands including the timber thereon," clearly sustain the conclusion below that the evidence was insufficient to show a prima facie excessive assessment because it was confined to a method of valuation which does not consider existing timber volume to be an appropriate item for valuation except perhaps as an average index to land productivity.
Sec. 193.22, F.S.
We are unable to find in the provisions of F.S. Sec. 193.11(3), F.S.A., any support for petitioner's position. The application of that statute in relation to general assessment procedures was fully considered in the Markham case, supra: "For example * * * `the present cash value of the property' as to agricultural property would be read and interpreted as if it stated `the present "agricultural" cash value of the property * * *.'" The problems inherent in this application of the agricultural use statute, in excluding value for other potential uses, cannot logically or lawfully be solved by reading into the statute an intent to restrict the method of valuation of such property. Nor does the statute prohibit distinctions between one agricultural use and another in determining whether evidence is prima facie sufficient to require proof in support of a presumptively valid assessment.
"(3) All lands being used for agricultural purposes shall be assessed as agricultural lands upon an acreage basis, * * *."
An alternative point urged by petitioner is that the administrative prescriptions governing assessment procedures promulgated under authority of F.S. Sec. 192.31, F.S.A., should be construed as providing one exclusive method of valuation, the capitalized net income method, for timberlands. That construction of the statute and implementing regulations must in our opinion be rejected. Sec. 192.31 expressly limits such promulgations to "standard measures of values not inconsistent with those standards provided by law," and does not purport to delegate authority to prescribe exclusive standards or methods of valuation. We therefore adhere to the conclusion in Burns v. Butscher that these provisions do not materially interfere with the right and duty of tax assessors to utilize varying information and methods of assessment in addition to those prescribed.
"192.31. Powers and duties of comptroller and state planning and budget commission as to uniformity. —
"* * * The comptroller shall, upon approval thereof by the state planning and budget commission, establish and promulgate standard measures of values not inconsistent with those standards provided by law to be used by tax assessors in all counties, including taxing districts, in arriving at assessments of all property, which standard measures of values shall be deemed and held prima facie to be the standard measures of just valuation contemplated by the constitution of this state in matters of taxation, and tax assessors and county boards of equalization shall follow and apply such standard measures of values in arriving at assessments of all property, and the burden shall be upon any assessor or county board of equalization refusing to follow such standard to overcome the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. * * *"
Fla. 1966, 187 So.2d 594.
For the reasons above stated we approve the decision as to forestry lands involved in this cause. Our review of the record with respect to the pasture assessment also sustains the judgment below.
See also the opinion filed Sept. 11, 1968 in Powell v. Kelly, Fla.App., 1st Dist., 214 So.2d 347.
The writ of certiorari is accordingly discharged.
ERVIN, C.J., and THORNAL and BARNS (Retired), JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents with opinion.
I must respectfully dissent.
The Trial Court found that the method used by Plaintiff's witnesses for the establishment of the taxable value of the forestry lands by their version of the "income approach" ignored "the value of the standing timber" and was therefore an insufficient basis standing alone for the valuation of forestry property. The Court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case as to the alleged excessive assessments on the forestry lands.
The majority opinion refers to Fla.Stats., § 193.22, F.S.A., requiring the assessor to ascertain by personal inspection "the value of the lands including the timber thereon."
Property itself is a creature of the law and the classification thereof for the purpose of taxation belongs exclusively to the Legislature. The purpose of § 193.22, Fla. Stats., F.S.A., was to classify timber as property subject to taxation so that the value of the land could be assessed independently from the value of the timber when some person purchases the standing timber from the owner of the fee.
In the instant case the productivity of the land depends upon the growth of the timber and an appraisal based upon the income approach takes into consideration, not only the timber standing on the land, but also the future growth. There is no statutory or constitutional provision which requires a valuation of each tree standing upon the land when the assessed value is determined.
The opinion of the District Court emphasizes that Plaintiff's evidence failed to show the inappropriateness of the other criteria in Fla.Stats., § 193.021, F.S.A.
The evidence discloses that there are three basic approaches in appraising real estate:
(1) The cost approach which deals primarily with the estimated replacement cost of physical improvements less depreciation;
(2) The market or sales comparison approach, where the value is shown by recent sales of comparable property;
(3) The income or economic approach in which the appraiser estimates the amount of income the property is capable of producing under good, competent management and estimates what expenses would be necessary to produce this amount of income. From this he arrives at an estimate of the amount of net annual income which the property is capable of producing. The value the property will produce is determined by capitalization of the net income.
Thus, the term "income" is used as signifying the income producing capacity of the land, not the income actually received by the owner.
The Trial Court, the District Court, and this Court in its majority opinion accepted the testimony of Plaintiff's witness concerning the farm property to the extent of holding that a prima facie case was made showing that the assessments were illegally excessive. This witness testified, "I think the income approach, or the economic approach, is the most applicable with regard to agricultural property." Forestry lands are classified as agricultural lands by taxing authorities.
It is true that the tax assessor is a "constitutional officer," but, just as other county officials, his powers and duties are "prescribed by law." Fla. Const., Art. VIII, § 6, F.S.A.
Fla.Stats., § 192.31, F.S.A., authorizing the preparation by the Comptroller of a "tentative manual of instructions for tax assessors" contains the following provisions:
"It is hereby declared to be the purpose and intent of this law to secure a just valuation and provide for a uniform and equal assessment as between property within each county or taxing district and as between property in each county and property in every other county or taxing district in this state." Fla.Stats., § 192.31 (8).
An all-age forest or tree farm devoted to the production of timber will, in most instances, extend into the area of several counties. One county may experience rapid growth and land value increase, prevalent in many areas of our great State, while an adjoining county may retain a steady, non-fluctuating value of real estate. If the pulpwood industry continues, there must be a uniform and equal assessment as between property in one county and property in every other county. By Legislative Act, the Comptroller, under the supervision of the Budget Commission, is vested with sufficient powers and duties of a county tax assessor to attain this goal of uniformity and equality.
Whatever powers and duties the Legislature may give the tax assessor under Fla. Const., Art. VIII, § 6, the Legislature may take away.
The section of the manual prescribing the valuation basis for woodland contains the following provision:
"This section describes a procedure for the appraisal of woodland on the basis of average annual growth from seedling to mature timber. Actually, this is a modified `sustained yield' method in that the annual increment of value represented by growth is recognized, rather than a `liquidation' value. The growth increment is converted into a dollar value. All expenditures including but not limited to management and protection are deducted and the resulting annual net income is capitalized in the same manner as that described for other agricultural lands."
Fla.Stats., § 193.021, F.S.A., setting forth seven criteria or factors affecting value, should be construed in pari materia with the manual prepared by the Comptroller as such manual is given the force of law by Fla.Stats., § 192.31, F.S.A. In fact, the income approach necessarily takes into consideration all factors bearing upon the value of the land for forestry or agricultural use.
Although the tax assessor is given a "wide discretion" in the valuation of property for purposes of taxation, this discretion is not unbridled. As stated in Graham v. City of West Tampa, 71 Fla. 605, 71 So. 926 (1916):
"While the law accords a range of discretion to the officer authorized to ascertain and determine valuations of property for purposes of taxation, when the officer proceeds in accordance with and substantially complies with the requirements of law designed to ascertain such values, yet, if the steps required to be taken in making valuations are not in fact and in good faith actually taken, and the valuations are shown to be essentially unjust or unequal abstractly or relatively, the assessment is invalid. Valuations of property for taxation must be ascertained in the manner required by law and must have relation to the actual value of the property; and there must be no substantial inequality in valuations." See also 23 F.L.P., Taxation, § 238.
Forestry lands are classified as agricultural lands, so the Court could not, consistently, accept the income approach method in weighing the evidence showing value of the farmland while rejecting the income approach method in weighing evidence showing value of forestry land.
In my opinion the evidence as to value based upon the income approach was sufficient to make out a prima facie case as to illegal excessiveness of the tax assessment. The duty of going forward with the evidence then rested upon the assessor, as the presumption of legality vanished.