" In S.S. v. D.M., 597 A.2d 870 (D.C. 1991), we considered an identical challenge to the trial court's "judicial notice of and rel[iance] on findings of fact in a prior neglect proceeding where the evidentiary standard was only a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 871.

E.g., In re L.W., 613 A.2d 350, 356 (D.C. 1992); S.S. v. D.M., 597 A.2d 870, 883 n. 35 (D.C. 1991). Finally, when this court has considered an issue of law which is dispositive of the case before it, as in H.R. I, that precedent must be followed unless and until it is overruled by the court en banc. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971). Appellant vigorously maintains that Planned Parenthood v. Casey, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), effected a change in the law requiring us to reconsider the court's decision in the prior appeal.

However, while the Article 13(b) and 20 exceptions must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, subsidiary facts relevant to those exceptions need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See Application of Walsh, 31 F. Supp.2d 200, 204 n. 3 (D.Mass. 1998), rev'd on other grounds Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 (1st Cir. 2000); Care and Protection of Laura, 414 Mass. 788, 794, 610 N.E.2d 934 (1993); S.S. v. D.M., 597 A.2d 870, 882 n. 32 (1991). As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has written, "there may be twenty facts, each proved by a preponderance of the evidence, that in the aggregate create clear and convincing evidence.

However, "[t]he definition of the precise roles of the attorney and the guardian ad litem for children is still evolving and not without difficulty." S.S. v. D.M., 597 A.2d 870, 877 (D.C.App. 1991). In Wyoming, the role of an attorney or guardian ad litem in custody cases is not addressed by statute, and like many jurisdictions, case law has failed to clearly delineate the parameters of the duties incumbent upon appointment.

D.C. Code § 16-2304(b)(3). The statute contemplates an advocacy role for the GAL. S.S. v. D.M., 597 A.2d 870, 875 (D.C. 1991) (citing REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, TITLE IV, BILL 2-48, THE PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT ACT OF 1977, at 16 (Mar. 29, 1977)). There may also be some overlapping factfinding function for the guardian ad litem to perform.

Both the statute and the case law are silent on the proper course to be followed when a child's legal guardian has abandoned her, as Doe's mother did. Furthermore, the grandmother's obligation to send a Section(s) 12-309 letter is unclear inasmuch as the conditional release order of August 11, 1989, placed Doe in her grandmother's care only after the grandmother received training at a rehabilitation center in Charlottesville, Virginia. As Doe points out, the Superior Court did not appoint the grandmother as legal guardian. Further, as the district court noted, it is unclear whether, under District of Columbia law, Doe's attorney in the neglect proceeding had an ethical obligation also to protect her tort claims under District of Columbia law. Cf. S.S. v. D.M., 597 A.2d 870, 875-78 (D.C. 1991). In Hill, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals expressly left open the question "whether we would construe our statute as providing an additional period for compliance where the fault of the government makes timely compliance unreasonable or impossible."

Other courts have had concerns regarding how the guardian ad litem’s role in a proceeding affects other parties’ rights. For example, in S.S. v. D.M. , 597 A.2d 870, 878 (D.C. App. 1991), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that error arose when a guardian ad litem was allowed to act as both the child’s attorney and as a witness in an adoption proceeding; although the appellate court ultimately concluded that there was no miscarriage of justice, it stated that "because the guardian ad litem, who had been appointed as an advocate for the child, was called as a witness for one of the opposing parties, new counsel should have been appointed to represent the child." (Emphasis omitted.)

However, ‘[t]he definition of the precise roles of the attorney and the guardian ad litem for children is still evolving and not without difficulty.’ S.S. v. D.M., 597 A.2d 870, 877 (D.C. App. 1991). In Wyoming, the role of an attorney or guardian ad litem in custody cases is not addressed by statute, and like many jurisdictions, case law has failed to clearly delineate the parameters of the duties incumbent upon appointment.

However, we granted appellee's motion for the Court to take judicial notice of these Superior Court Records. SeeS.S. v. D.M. , 597 A.2d 870, 880 (D.C. 1991) (the court may "take judicial notice of the contents of court records."); D.C. Code § 17-305 (2012 Repl.) (the appellate court "shall review the record on appeal"). On this record, it is clear that the detective's effort to physically examine and obtain identifying information for the cell phone was a permissible warrantless search incident to arrest.

However, when terminating parental rights, the trial court may consider relevant facts found in a prior related proceeding where the interested parent was a party and represented by counsel, provided that the decision to terminate parental rights is ultimately based on clear and convincing evidence. In re J.M.C. , 741 A.2d 418, 424 (D.C. 1999) (allowing trial court to consider relevant facts found in prior neglect proceeding when terminating parental rights); see alsoS.S. v. D.M. , 597 A.2d 870, 882 n.32 (D.C. 1991). Although it is generally proper for a court to take notice of factual findings made in a prior related proceeding, Judge Bouchet merely considered testimony from the Ta.L. hearing as evidence when making her decision on P.D.J.K.'s adoption petition.