Opinion
Civil Action 22-341E
11-21-2022
DANIEL L. SPUCK, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; JANE/JOHN DOE, Leader/Head of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendants.
Re: ECF Nos. 3 and 4
MAUREEN P. KELLY, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CATHY BISSOON, DISTRICT JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint, ECF No. 3, be dismissed with prejudice, sua sponte, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as frivolous, malicious, and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. It is further recommended that Plaintiffs Motion for Injunction of all Costs Collection of Restitution in the Above Matter, ECF No. 4, should be denied under the doctrine set forth in Younger v Harris, 401 U.S. 37(1971).
II. REPORT
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Daniel L. Spuck, (“Plaintiff') is a frequent civil litigant. He initiated the instant matter by filing an Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“In Forma Pauperis Motion” or “IFP Motion”) along with a Complaint for a Civil Case (the “Complaint”) on November 8, 2022. ECF Nos. 1 and 1-1. The IFP Motion was granted on November 15, 2022, and the Complaint was filed on the following day. ECF Nos. 2 and 3.
The factual allegations in the Complaint are sparse and difficult to follow. As best as this Court can discern, Plaintiff is facing contempt proceedings resulting from his failure to pay restitution relative to a 1995 criminal conviction in the Court of Common Pleas for Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. See generally ECF No. 3. See also ECF Nos. 4 at 1 and 4-1 at 1. See also Docket, Com. v. Spuck, No. CP-17-CR-0000396-1995 (available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-17-CR-0000396-1995&dnh=whB0fapkaBVPLmrm%2FlqTcQ%3D%3D (last visited Nov. 21, 2022)). Plaintiff alleges evidence was not disclosed to him by the prosecution during his state criminal trial, and that his counsel was ineffective. ECF No. 3 at 5-6. Plaintiff seeks an injunction against the order requiring that he pay restitution as well as money damages. Id. at 4-6. Plaintiff also has moved for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 4.
B. Applicable Legal Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915 establishes the criteria for allowing an action to proceed IFP. Section 1915(e) requires the federal courts to review complaints filed by persons that are proceeding in forma pauperis and to dismiss, at any time, any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, a court must dismiss, sua sponte, a complaint that lacks arguable merit in fact or law. Stackhouse v. Crocker, 266 Fed.Appx. 189, 190 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).
The standard for reviewing a complaint under Section 1915(e)(2)(B) is the same as that for determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the F ederal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tourscherv. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Banks v. Mozingo, No. 08-004, 2009 WL 497572, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2009). Under that Rule, dismissal is appropriate if, reading the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accepting all factual allegations as true, no relief could be granted under any “reasonable reading of the complaint” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).
A complaint must be dismissed even if the claim to relief is “conceivable,” because a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, when determining whether to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a district court should apply a two-part test in order to determine whether a pleading's recitation of facts is sufficient. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009). “First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-11 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “‘plausible claim for relief.'” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
A court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In a Section 1983 action, a court must liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings and “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). “Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.” Higgins, 293 F.3d at 688 (quoting Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)).
That said, it is not proper for a court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the ... laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Assoc.'d Gen. Contractors of California, Inc, v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). A court further need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys, v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004).
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, in civil rights cases, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend a deficient complaint - regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so - when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp, v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
C. Legal Analysis
Plaintiffs claims lack merit for various reasons, as set forth herein.
1. Defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is immune from suit.
Defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enjoys immunity from Plaintiff s Section 1983 claims for damages under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-341 (1979). Culkin v. Kuhn, No. 13-431, 2014 WL 1414804, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 11,2014).
Further, in order to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege: that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person amenable to suit under Section 1983 and acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). But the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (state not person under Section 1983).
Based on the facts that are alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff s claims against Defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are meritless. Moreover, amendment these claims would be futile, and dismissal of the same should be with prejudice. Fletcher-Harlee Corp., 482 F.3d at 251.
2. Plaintiff fails to plead personal involvement of Defendant Jane/John Doe.
Plaintiff names “Jane John Doe, Leader/Head of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” as a second defendant. ECF No. 1 at 1. However, he does not explain how the “Leader/Head of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” is personally involved with the facts underlying the Complaint.
In order for Section 1983 liability to attach, a plaintiff must show that a defendant was personally involved in the deprivation of his or her federal rights. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged personal involvement from any named Defendant, and thus fails to state a claim. It further appears that leave to amend with respect to the “Leader/Head of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” would be futile based on the allegations in the Complaint. Simply put, there is no well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint for this Court to infer the plausible possibility that the “Leader/Head” of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has any personal involvement with Plaintiffs claims. Accordingly, dismissal of the same should be with prejudice. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp., 482F.3dat251.
3. This Court should abstain from granting injunctive relief under Younger.
This Court should abstain from interfering in Plaintiffs ongoing contempt proceedings pursuant to the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger, 401 U.S. at 37, and deny Plaintiffs preliminary injunction motion. ECF No. 4.
The Younger abstention doctrine is based on basic considerations of comity that are fundamental to our federal system of government. As recognized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:
Younger abstention is a legal doctrine granting federal courts discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a claim when resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding. See Younger v. Hanis, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (“[W]e have concluded that the judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant Younger from prosecuting under these California statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.”).Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009).
“The Younger doctrine . . . reflects a strong policy against federal intervention in state judicial processes in the absence of great and immediate irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979) (citing Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69, (1971)). Younger abstention is appropriate when three requirements are satisfied. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm, v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (collecting and summarizing authorities to establish a three part test). First, the federal plaintiff must be a party in an ongoing state proceeding of a judicial nature subject to interference by continued federal court action. Second, the state proceeding must implicate important state interests. Third, the federal plaintiff must have an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in the state court proceedings.
The Supreme Court made clear in Younger that even the injuries typically suffered by criminal defendants did not rise to the legal definition of “irreparable” in this context, and thus did not justify a federal court's intervention in a state judicial proceeding. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (“Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered ‘irreparable' in the special legal sense of that term.”).
Applying the three-part test to the present matter reveals that abstention under Younger is appropriate. First, Plaintiff alleges that he is subject to contempt proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Pennsylvania regarding unpaid restitution from his criminal conviction. ECF Nos. 3 at 6, 4 at 1, and 4-1 at 1. The state court docket of Commonwealth v. Spuck, Docket No. CP-17-CR-396-1995, cited above, does not indicate that the issue of contempt has been disposed of as of the date of this writing. Thus, Plaintiff is a party to ongoing state judicial proceedings.
Second, the state has a legitimate and important interest in conducting criminal trials, reviewing state trial court judgment for errors and correcting the same, and enforcing judgements. Accord Smithson v, Rizzo, No. 14-CV-1866,2015 WL 1636143, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2015).
Third, Plaintiff has an opportunity to raise his claims through the contempt proceedings and, if necessary, on appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court and Supreme Court.
Plaintiff s underlying contempt proceedings satisfy the three part test for abstention under Younger. Additionally, Plaintiff has not established any type of immediate, irreparable injury that is required to enjoin a state court proceeding under that case and its progeny. Accordingly, this Court should abstain from enjoining Plaintiffs state contempt proceedings, and deny injunctive relief.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint, ECF No. 3, be dismissed with prejudice, sua sponte, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as frivolous, malicious, and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. It is further recommended that Plaintiffs Motion for Injunction of all Costs Collection of Restitution in the Above Matter, ECF No. 4, should be denied under the doctrine set forth in Younger v Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v, Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).