Opinion
No. 05-08-00502-CV
Opinion Filed July 28, 2009.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Grayson County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2007-1-142CV.
Before Justices FITZGERALD, LANG, and FILLMORE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a bench trial, Chancy Sproul appeals from a take nothing judgment against her and in favor of appellees Steve Sasser, Deanna Sasser, and Sasser Trucking in a suit involving a breach of contract claim. In two issues, Sproul asserts the trial court erred when it (1) found Sproul did not establish her breach of contract claim, and (2) found Sassers met their burden of proof to show mutual mistake. We conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's implied finding that Sproul did not prove her breach of contract claim. We need not review her issue regarding Sassers' affirmative defense of mutual mistake. Because all dispositive issues are well settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
We note the county court's judgment in trial cause no. 2007-1-142CV is styled Chancy Sproul v. Steve Sasser, Deana Sasser, and Sasser Trucking. However, the record reflects Deanna spells her name with a double "n" rather than a single "n." Because we affirm the trial court's judgment in favor of Sassers, we do not modify the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 3, 2002, Steve Sasser entered into a written lease agreement with Capital Alliance Financial Services for a delivery van. Then, on November 23, 2005, Steve and Deanna Sasser subleased the van to Sproul. The sublease agreement identified by Sassers stated Sproul would pay $28,500 to Sassers in "38 monthly installments of $733.85 and 1 payment of $613.70" and that if Sproul wanted to purchase the vehicle, "then at that time a balloon payment of $5,386.20 is due and payable." Finally, the sublease agreement specifically stated: "All taxes and upkeep are the responsibility of the lessees. Property taxes of $750.00 are due June of every year."
Prior to signing the sublease agreement, Sproul made an initial "down payment" of $1,417, which consisted of $1,000 in "good faith money" and a $417 payment. Sproul testified the $417 included half of a "truck payment" for November 2005 and $50 to "have a tire put on or mounted or something." Steve Sasser testified the $417 was for half of a 2005 property tax payment. The "down payment" was not described in or required by the written sublease agreement.
In addition to the monthly installment payments, Sproul made property tax payments of $186.15 in December 2005 and $188.15 in January 2006. According to Sproul, these property tax payments were for the property taxes for the period from December 2005 to June 2006. Sassers asserted these property tax payments were for 2005 taxes.
In March 2006, the parties began to argue about whether and when property taxes were due. After an argument about Sassers' claim additional taxes for 2005 were due, Sproul paid Sassers $806 for "taxes for 2005." Then, according to Steve Sasser, additional property taxes were due in July 2006. Although Sasser stated he was "sure" he asked Sproul for payment for those property taxes, he could not unequivocally state he advised Sproul additional property taxes were due in July. Sproul stated she was unaware of any taxes due in July at that time and she acknowledged she did not make any property tax payments after March 2006.
Sproul made all her monthly installment payments provided by the sublease to Sassers through November 2006. However, in December 2006, Steve Sasser told Sproul additional property taxes were due on the van. She allegedly replied: "I've got to buy Christmas for my daughter, and I'm not paying them." Sproul testified she told Steve Sasser, "I don't know what I'm going to do. I've got no money. I've got to think of something." Later the same day, Deanna Sasser informed Sproul the van was going to be repossessed "because it's three months behind" due to a failure to pay all property taxes and the resulting penalties. Also, at that point Deanna Sasser told her the leasing company wanted "full payment" of "[t]wenty something thousand dollars." Sproul testified because of what Deanna Sasser told her, she did not pay the property taxes she was advised to pay in December 2006 or make her December installment payment. Sproul sought financing to allow her to keep the van, but was unsuccessful. In late December 2006, the van was repossessed by Capital Alliance. Then, in April 2007, Sproul filed suit against Sassers for breach of contract and conversion of property. According to the record at trial, Sproul conceded it was her responsibility under the sublease agreement to pay all of the taxes.
After the conclusion of the trial, the trial court signed a judgment that Sproul take nothing. The judgment states the court found "that the plaintiff has failed to prove her claim for Breach of Contract. . . ." The trial court did not make findings of fact and conclusions of law and Sproul did not request them.
II. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In her first issue, Sproul contends she established all of the elements required to prove her breach of contract claim as a matter of law. Sassers assert the trial court did not err when it rendered judgment in their favor because, among other things, Sproul did not make all property tax payments and failed to prove Sassers breached the terms of the sublease agreement.
A. Standard of Review
The general rule is that, in a nonjury trial, where no findings of fact or conclusions of law are requested or provided by the trial court, the court's judgment will be upheld if there is any factual basis to do so supported by the facts and the pleadings. First Trust Corp. TTEE FBO v. Edwards, 172 S.W.3d 230, 241-42 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied). In the absence of findings and conclusions, the judgment of the trial court implies all necessary fact findings in support of the judgment. G.T. Mgmt., Inc. v. Gonzales, 106 S.W.3d 880, 883 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). When a reporter's record is brought forward, these implied findings may be challenged by factual sufficiency and legal sufficiency points the same as jury findings or a trial court's findings of fact. Id. (citing Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam)).
Although the trial court's judgment includes a statement that could be interpreted as a finding of fact, such a "finding" does not meet the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 299a, which provides findings of fact must be filed separately from the judgment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 299a; Casino Magic Corp. v. King, 43 S.W.3d 14, 19 n. 6 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied). Accordingly, we use the standard of review applicable to cases where no findings have been requested or filed. Casino Magic Corp., 43 S.W.3d at 19 n. 6.
When a party challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence on an issue it had the burden of proof on at trial, it must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence conclusively established the facts in its favor as a matter of law. See Johnson v. Kindred, No. 05-07-01395-CV, 2009 WL 1492996, at *2 (Tex.App.-Dallas May 29, 2009, no pet. h.). We indulge every reasonable inference to support the judgment, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable jury could and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable jury could not. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807, 822 (Tex. 2005).
B. Applicable Law
A breach of contract occurs when a party fails to perform an act that it has expressly or impliedly promised to perform. Stewart v. Sanmina Tex. L.P., 156 S.W.3d 198, 214 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). The elements of a claim of breach of contract are (1) the existence of a valid contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance or tendered performance, (3) the defendant's breach of the contract, and (4) damages as a result of the breach. Paragon Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Larco Constr., Inc., 227 S.W.3d 876, 882 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.). "[A] party to a contract who is himself in default cannot maintain a suit for its breach." RE/MAX of Tex., Inc. v. Katar Corp., 989 S.W.2d 363, 365 n. 4 (Tex. 1999) (quoting Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Nearen, 135 Tex. 50, 138 S.W.2d 1065, 1068 (1940)).
C. Application of the Law to the Facts
To maintain her suit for breach of contract, Sproul had the burden to prove she performed by making all of the payments due to Sassers pursuant to the terms of the sublease agreement. Sproul asserts she presented "undisputed evidence" she made all monthly payments due to Sassers as described in the sublease agreement and "even went beyond the basic terms of the contract" by paying more in property taxes than the "fixed number that was specified in the contract itself."
The plain language of the sublease agreement states: "All taxes and upkeep are the responsibility of the lessees." Then, the sublease agreement states "[p]roperty taxes of $750.00 are due June of every year." Sproul argues this language stipulates the maximum amount of property taxes she was required to pay under the sublease agreement. We disagree.
Sproul conceded at trial the sublease states she was responsible for paying all taxes due on the van. The language that states $750 in property taxes are due in June of each year does not excuse her from responsibility as specified in the sublease agreement to pay "all taxes." The record reflects Sproul made property tax payments in December 2005, January 2006, and March 2006. The record also reflects she failed to make any property tax payments after being advised in December 2006 that additional property taxes were due. Also, Sproul testified she chose not to pay the property taxes in December 2006 after learning Capital Alliance intended to repossess the van. A party to a contract who is in default cannot maintain a suit for breach of contract. See RE/MAX of Tex., Inc., 989 S.W.2d at 365 n. 4. On this record, the evidence reflects Sproul did not pay "all taxes." Accordingly, she, herself, was in default of the terms of the sublease agreement on which she sued.
Considering only the evidence that supports the trial court's implied finding that Sproul did not prove her breach of contract claim, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding. Sproul's first issue is decided against her.
III. MUTUAL MISTAKE
In her second issue, Sproul asserts the trial court erred when it "based its ruling on [Sassers'] defense of mutual mistake of fact." Because we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's implied finding that Sproul did not prove her breach of contract claim, we need not review her claim regarding Sassers' affirmative defense of mutual mistake.
IV. CONCLUSION
The evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's implied finding. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.