Opinion
23-35338
09-22-2023
CLINTON SPROLES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JIM SALMONSEN; ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA, Respondents-Appellees
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted September 12, 2023 [**]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00018-BMM Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Montana state prisoner Clinton Sproles appeals pro se from the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging his 25-year sentence under Montana's persistent felony offender ("PFO") statute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review the district court's decision to deny habeas relief de novo, see Fox v. Johnson, 832 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
Sproles contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to challenge the timeliness of the state's notice of its intent to seek Sproles's designation as a PFO. However, the record shows that counsel researched the issue and explained to Sproles why a claim regarding the timeliness of the PFO notice lacked merit. Given the governing caselaw interpreting the applicable PFO statute, counsel's decision to forego that claim and raise one that presented a novel legal issue was neither deficient nor prejudicial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 694 (1984); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy.").
We need not determine whether to apply deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), to the Second Judicial District Court's resolution of this claim because we agree with the federal district court that the claim fails even under de novo review. See Fox, 832 F.3d at 986.
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).