Finally, we note that courts in at least two other states have addressed the issue here presented on essentially the same facts, and held in each case that the defendant was required to register as a sex offender under the state's statutory scheme for sex offender registration. See Spivey v. State, 274 Ga.App. 834, 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005); and Michigan v. Meyers, 250 Mich.App. 637, 649 N.W.2d 123 (2002). The computer solicitations in both Spivey and Meyers were charged as attempt crimes (like Hix as to the attempted indecent liberties offense).
An offense that "consists of ... [c]riminal sexual conduct toward a minor" is a "criminal offense against a victim who is a minor," OCGA § 42–1–12 (a) (9) (A), and child molestation and aggravated child molestation are "criminal offense[s] against a victim who is a minor." See Spivey v. State, 274 Ga.App. 834, 837 (2) (a), 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005). Yelverton is, therefore, subject to the registration requirements.
By requiring sex offenders to register, the legislature intended to notify the public of individuals who may pose a threat. Spivey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 834, 837 ( 619 SE2d 346) (2005). It also intended the sex offender registry statute to have broad applicability by "design[ing] [the statute] to require registration for a wide array of offenses."
Further, OCGA § 16-12-100.2 (d) (1) "explicitly provides for liability[,] even whe[n] there is no child[,] if the mens rea exists." Spivey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 834, 840 (2) (b), 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005). When construing the meaning of a statute, this Court affords "the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, [viewing] the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and [reading] the statutory text in the most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would."
The trial court's suggestion that OCGA § 42-5-15 should not apply to individuals who would otherwise be misdemeanor offenders "creates an unreasonable exception from liability, which is not supported by the language ... of the statute." Spivey v. State , 274 Ga.App. 834, 837 (2) (b), 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005). Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the charge.
(punctuation omitted) ); Inagawa v. Fayette Cty ., 291 Ga. 715, 717 (1), 732 S.E.2d 421 (2012) (explaining that when interpreting statutes, "we are required to give all words in the enactment due weight and meaning and are forbidden from disregarding any legislative language unless the failure to do so would lead to an absurdity manifestly not intended by the legislature [as evinced by the relevant statutory text]." (punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied) ); Spivey v. State , 274 Ga. App. 834, 835 (1), 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005) (noting that when interpreting a statute, "we begin with the literal text ; where the literal text of a statute is plain and does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, we apply the statute as written without further inquiry.") (emphasis supplied); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 239 (1st ed. 2012) ("The doctrine of absurdity is meant to correct obviously unintended dispositions, not to revise purposeful dispositions that, in light of other provisions of the applicable code, make little if any sense.").Chase v. State , 285 Ga. 693, 695 (2), 681 S.E.2d 116 (2009) ; see supra note 13 & accompanying text.
(Citation omitted.) Spivey v. State, 274 Ga.App. 834, 835(1), 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005). Here, although “relevant similar transaction” is undefined, the Legislature's intent is clear.
Initially, we note that the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo on appeal.Spivey v. State, 274 Ga.App. 834(1), 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005). In interpreting a statute, we must give effect to the legislature's intention, looking diligently for the intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view at all times the
(Emphasis supplied.) Hill v. State, 309 Ga.App. 531, 533, 710 S.E.2d 667 (2011), citing Spivey v. State, 274 Ga.App. 834(1), 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005). Ga. L. 2006, p. 172 § 2/SB 135.
OCGA § 1–3–1(a). FN49. Spivey v. State, 274 Ga.App. 834, 835(1), 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005) (citations omitted). See Whaley v. State, 175 Ga.App. 493, 494, 333 S.E.2d 691 (1985) (affirming conviction for obstruction of an officer, holding, inter alia, “It is not necessary for the State to prove the underlying offense that causes the officers to act; it is only necessary to prove the elements of the obstruction statute, i.e., that the act constituting obstruction was knowing and wilful, and that the officer was lawfully discharging his official duties.”).