Opinion
H036448
10-18-2012
LORI SPINKS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. EQR-BRIARWOOD et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. CV043401)
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Lori Spinks entered into an employment agreement with Mobile Medical Staffing, LLC (Mobile Medical), a temporary medical staffing agency, in which she agreed to a 13-week assignment as a sterile processing technician at Stanford University Health Sciences (Stanford Hospital). The employment agreement provided that Mobile Medical would furnish housing (including furniture and utilities) to Spinks, a Texas resident, and required her to vacate the housing within 48 hours of the date that her assignment terminated. While Spinks was working at Stanford Hospital, she lived rent-free in an apartment leased by Mobile Medical in a complex managed by respondents EQR-Briarwood and Equity Residential Properties Management Corp.
Spinks did not complete her 13-week assignment at Stanford Hospital because she sustained an injury to her hand during the course of her employment. While she underwent medical treatment, she remained in the apartment leased by Mobile Medical. On February 17, 2005, about six weeks after the date of Spinks' injury, Mobile Medical advised her that it no longer had a temporary staffing agreement with her and Stanford Hospital, and for that reason Mobile Medical would cease paying the rent on the apartment. Mobile Medical also advised Spinks that it would have the utilities turned off and the rental furniture picked up on February 22 or 23, 2005.
On the morning of February 22, 2005, Spinks made a reservation at a nearby hotel and began removing her belongings from the apartment. At Mobile Medical's direction, on that day the electricity was turned off and the rental furniture was removed. The apartment manager had the locks changed in the late afternoon after receiving a work order from Mobile Medical. By that time, Spinks had removed all of her belongings and had arranged for transportation to the hotel.
Spinks subsequently filed a lawsuit against defendants EQR-Briarwood and Equity Residential Properties Management Corp. that proceeded to a jury trial on her claims of wrongful eviction, trespass, and lock out in violation of Civil Code section 789.3 After finding, among other things, that Spinks had abandoned the apartment by the time of defendants' alleged wrongful conduct, the jury returned special verdicts in favor of defendants. The amended judgment provides that Spinks take nothing from defendants and awards attorney fees and costs to defendants in the amount of $15,419.
Hereafter, all statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.
Section 789.3, subdivision (b)(1) provides in pertinent part, "[A] landlord shall not, with intent to terminate the occupancy under any lease or other tenancy or estate at will, however created, of property used by a tenant as his or her residence, willfully: [¶] Prevent the tenant from gaining reasonable access to the property by changing the locks . . . ."
On appeal, Spinks seeks reversal of the judgment on the grounds that (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support the finding that she abandoned the apartment; (2) the evidence showed that defendants' conduct was a substantial factor in causing Spinks to leave the apartment; (3) the jury finding on trespass is not supported by substantial evidence; (4) the jury instructions and special verdict regarding wrongful eviction misstated the law; (5) the evidence was not sufficient to support the finding that defendants did not violate section 789.3; and (6) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the employment agreement and the deposition testimony of Richard Brown, Mobile Medical's representative.
For the reasons stated below, we find no merit in Spinks' contentions and therefore we will affirm the judgment.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Our summary of the facts is taken from the reporter's transcript of the jury trial and the exhibits admitted into evidence.
Mobile Medical is an Ohio-based temporary medical staffing agency that contracts with hospitals nationwide to provide nurses for 13-week assignments. Mobile Medical pays for the traveling nurses' housing, utilities, and furniture during their assignment. It is Mobile Medical's custom and practice to lease and furnish the apartments where the traveling nurses are housed.
In 2004, Spinks was employed as sterile processing technician. After investigating companies that offer traveling positions to sterile processing technicians, Spinks decided to enter into an employment agreement with Mobile Medical. The employment agreement provided that Spinks would be assigned to work at Stanford Hospital for 13 weeks, beginning October 25, 2004, and ending January 22, 2005. Attachment A to Spinks' employment agreement, captioned "Housing Agreement-Private[,]" states: "Traveler will be housed individually in housing provided by [Mobile Medical] and will provide furniture, (water and electricity up to $75 a month). . . . Housing will be provided at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to the start of an Assignment. Traveler will have to pay $0.00 each month for Private Housing. [¶] . . . [¶] Traveler must vacate the housing within 48 hours of the termination date of his/her assignment." Spinks was aware that she would be returning to her home in Texas when her assignment terminated.
To provide housing for Spinks during her Stanford Hospital assignment, Mobile Medical entered into a lease agreement with defendants for apartment 502 at the Briarwood Apartment Homes in Sunnyvale. The lease agreement identified the residents as "Corporate Mobile Medical Staff and stated that the lease for apartment 502 would commence on October 20, 2004, and expire on January 24, 2005. Spinks filled out an Equity Residential Properties document entitled "Corporate Occupant Application" that indicated her move-in date was October 25, 2004.
About one month after Spinks began working at Stanford Hospital, the hospital asked Mobile Medical to extend her contract for another 13 weeks. The second 13-week assignment at Stanford Hospital was to begin on January 31, 2005. However, Spinks did not complete her initial 13-week assignment because on January 6, 2005, she fell at work and injured her hand. After being seen in the emergency room and by a Stanford physician, Spinks began treating with Dr. Gordon in San Francisco.
Spinks spoke with Richard Brown, the director of Mobile Medical, on January 12, 2005, when he called her regarding her injury. At that time, Spinks told Brown that she had an appointment with Dr. Gordon on January 31, 2005. Brown asked her to call him after the appointment to determine "what to do." Spinks insisted that it was Mobile Medical's responsibility to take care of her.
On January 21, 2005, Stanford Hospital advised Mobile Medical that although the hospital could not provide a light duty position for Spinks since she was not a regular employee, she would be considered for additional placements after her surgery "provided she can meet the essential functions of the assignment with or without reasonable accommodation." Mobile Medical then sent a letter to Spinks dated January 25, 2005, informing her that her job extension was no longer available unless she was able to return to full duty following her January 31, 2005 doctor's appointment. The January 25, 2005 letter also stated: "If further treatment is required, namely surgery or prolonged rehab, there is no provision for your continued stay at Stanford with the hospital or our company, until you are able to perform full duty. [¶] Please inform us of the outcome of your Dr[.] appointment on the 31th [sic]immediately! Our lodging facilities and car rental will need to be terminated if you can't return to work."
After receiving the January 25, 2005 letter, Spinks knew that her Mobile Medical assignment had been terminated and that she would have to move from apartment 502 within 48 hours. Despite this knowledge, she did not look for other housing. At some point, Brown told Spinks that she could stay in California but she would have to pay for her own lodging. Spinks responded that her attorney had advised her not to move, her surgeon did not want her to move, and she was not going to move from her apartment or give up the rental car that Mobile Medical had provided. According to Brown, Mobile Medical offered to have someone pack up Spinks' belongings and also offered to fly her back to her home in Texas, but Spinks refused. In her trial testimony, Spinks denied that Mobile Medical had made those offers of assistance.
Spinks did not contact Mobile Medical regarding the outcome of her January 31, 2005 appointment with Dr. Gordon and did not inform Mobile Medical that she was going to have surgery. Surgery was performed on Spinks' hand on February 17, 2005.
Brown sent Spinks a letter dated February 17, 2005, stating that Mobile Medical had been advised that she was now receiving funds from the Ohio Bureau of Workers Compensation. The letter further stated: "Because we no longer have a temporary staffing agreement with you and Stanford Medical Center, let this letter act as our notification that [Mobile Medical] will no longer be providing the housing, utilities, furniture, nor automobile that you [are] presently using. [Mobile Medical] has no means by which to pay for your accommodations. [¶] We will notify PG&E to turn off the utilities as of Monday February 21, 2005. We will instruct Brooks Furniture to 'pick up' the furniture on February 22 or 23, 2005. We have notified the landlord that our staffing agreement has concluded for this assignment and we will no longer be paying the rent. We have notified Enterprise and they will be picking up the car. [¶] In the event, you wish to stay in the apartment or rent the car, please notify Enterprise and the Apartment community of your intentions. Thank you and wishing you a speedy recovery." The rent for apartment 502 had been paid by Mobile Medical through the end of February 2005.
Annette Tauala was the manager of the Briarwood Apartment Homes at the time Spinks was occupying apartment 502. Mobile Medical informed Tauala that Spinks' employment was terminated. Mobile Medical also faxed Tauala a work order directing her to change the locks on apartment 502 on February 22, 2005. Tauala was aware that Mobile Medical was going to have the furniture removed from the apartment, since Mobile Medical had sent her an authorization for the rental furniture company to enter apartment 502. She did not call PG&E and ask that the electricity be turned off.
After receiving the February 17, 2005 letter from Mobile Medical on February 21, 2005, Spinks was "distraught." She asked Tauala "if she knew what was going on." Tauala told Spinks that she had a work order for the locks on the apartment to be changed, but she would contact an outside group regarding the issue. The next day, February 22, 2005, Tauala informed Spinks that she was going to comply with Mobile Medical's work order to change the locks. Tauala offered to find an apartment for Spinks but Spinks replied that she had already made a hotel reservation at the Tropicana Lodge in Palo Alto. Tauala also offered to look into obtaining government assistance for Spinks, but Spinks declined that offer.
After speaking with Tauala during the morning of February 22, 2005, Spinks returned to her apartment. After arriving, she opened the door for the rental furniture company that had arrived before noon to remove the furniture. Spinks' mother, who was staying with Spinks after her surgery, was also present in the apartment. Before the apartment locks were changed at about 4:30 p.m., at her request Spinks' friends from her church had helped her pack her belongings and remove them from the apartment. By then, the apartment's electricity had been turned off. Spinks was present when the locks to the apartment were changed and gave her key to the maintenance man who changed the locks.
Tauala checked on Spinks after the lock change to see how she was doing. She saw Spinks pulling a vacuum outside the apartment. When Tauala asked Spinks if she had a place to stay, Spinks said yes, since she had made the reservation to stay at the Tropicana Lodge that morning. After the locks were changed on February 22, 2005, Spinks did not request a new set of keys. Spinks' church friends took Spinks and her mother to the Tropicana Lodge. Spinks stayed there until March 5, 2005, when she returned home.
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Spinks filed a complaint on June 20, 2005, alleging that defendants EQR-Briarwood and Equity Residential Properties Management Corp. had wrongfully terminated her occupancy of the premises leased by Mobile Medical from defendants and were liable under a variety of contract and tort causes of action, including negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of the implied covenant of quiet use and enjoyment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful eviction, breach of contract, trespass, invasion of privacy—intentional, invasion of privacy—negligence, illegal entry in violation of section 1954, lock out in violation of section 789.3, and negligence. She sought compensatory and punitive damages.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted and judgment in their favor was entered on February 22, 2007. On appeal, this court reversed the judgment on the ground that triable questions of material fact precluded summary adjudication. (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1057 (Spinks I).)
On May 27, 2010, Spinks requested dismissal with prejudice of the contract causes of action, including breach of the implied covenant of quiet use and enjoyment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract. Subsequently, on September 27, 2010, Spinks requested dismissal with prejudice of the causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy—intentional, invasion of privacy—negligence, illegal entry in violation of section 1954, and negligence.
The matter then proceeded to a jury trial on the remaining causes of action for wrongful eviction, trespass, and lock out in violation of section 789.3. After the close of evidence, Spinks dismissed her claim for punitive damages. Spinks also moved to amend the complaint to allege that defendants had aided and abetted Mobile Medical's torts and for a directed verdict on the cause of action for lock out in violation of section 789.3. Defendants moved for nonsuit. The trial court denied all three motions.
The jurors rendered their special verdicts on October 4, 2010. The special verdict for wrongful eviction asked the jurors to answer the following question: "Was Plaintiff Lori Spinks a party in possession of the premises at the time of the lock change?" The jurors answered, "No."
The special verdict for trespass asked three questions. First, the special verdict asked, "Did the Defendants Equity Residential and Briarwood Apartments intentionally enter or cause another person to enter an apartment occupied by Plaintiff Lori Spinks?" The jurors answered, "Yes." Second, the special verdict asked, "Did Plaintiff consent to the conduct of the Defendants in entering or causing another person to enter an apartment occupied by Plaintiff?" The jurors answered, "No." Third, the special verdict asked, "Did Plaintiff abandon the apartment by the time of the alleged wrongful conduct?" The jurors answered, "Yes."
The special verdict for lock out in violation of section 789.3 also asked three questions that the jurors answered: "Did the Defendants Equity Residential and Briarwood Apartments act with the intent to terminate Plaintiff Lori Spinks' occupancy of the apartment used as her residence by willfully causing, directly or indirectly: (1) the interruption or termination of any utility service furnished the occupant including electricity; (2) the removal of the occupant's furnishings from the premises; [and] (3) the occupant from gaining reasonable access to the property by changing the locks." The jurors answered, "No," to each question.
The judgment on jury verdict was entered on November 8, 2010. The judgment ordered that Spinks take nothing from defendants and that defendants were entitled to recover the amount allowed under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032 et seq. The first amended judgment on jury verdict entered on April 25, 2011, provides that Spinks take nothing from defendants and that defendants recover costs and attorney fees in the amount of $15,419. Thereafter, Spinks filed a timely notice of appeal from the amended judgment.
IV. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Spinks contends (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support the finding that she abandoned the apartment; (2) the evidence showed that defendants' conduct was a substantial factor in causing Spinks to leave the apartment; (3) the jury finding on trespass is not supported by substantial evidence; (4) the jury instructions and special verdict regarding wrongful eviction misstated the law; (5) the evidence was not sufficient to support the finding that defendants did not violate section 789.3; and (6) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the employment agreement and the deposition testimony of Richard Brown, Mobile Medical's representative.
We will begin our evaluation of the issues raised on appeal by addressing Spinks' contention that the evidence was not sufficient to support the finding that she abandoned the apartment by the time of defendants' alleged wrongful conduct, since we find that issue to be crucial to the resolution of Spinks' other contentions on appeal.
A. Abandonment
1. Applicable Law
As Spinks concedes, a plaintiff's abandonment of the premises is a defense to all of the causes of action tried in this matter: wrongful eviction (Psihozios v. Humberg (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 215, 220-222 (Psihozios)), trespass (Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane (1911) 161 Cal. 689, 694 (Lightner Mining)), and lock out in violation of section 789.3 (Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 406 (Hale)).
The California Supreme Court has ruled that abandonment "is not proven by showing an intention to abandon. To constitute an abandonment there must be a concurrence of the act of leaving the premises vacant, so that they may be appropriated by the next comer, and the intention of not returning." (Judson v. Malloy (1870) 40 Cal. 299, 309-310 (Judson); see also Lindblom v. Round Valley Water Co. (1918) 178 Cal. 450, 455; Kassan v. Stout (1973) 9 Cal.3d 39, 43.) Thus, as stated in Avalon Pacific-Santa Ana, L.P. v. HD Supply Repair & Remodel, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1198, abandonment occurs when the lessee intends to permanently relinquish all rights in the leased premises.
Additionally, as this court stated in Spinks I: "[R]elinquishment is ordinarily a question of fact. 'While abandonment is a matter of intent which may be proved by the acts and conduct of the party who is alleged to have abandoned the property in controversy, a finding of abandonment must be based upon evidence from which an inference of abandonment can reasonably be drawn.' [Citations.]" (Spinks I, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048; see also Pickens v. Johnson (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 778, 788.)
2. Standard of Review
Since the issue of whether the plaintiff abandoned leased premises presents a question of fact, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (Martin v. Cassidy (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 106, 110-111.) " 'Where findings of fact are challenged on a civil appeal, we are bound by the "elementary, but often overlooked principle of law, that . . . the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted," to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor in accordance with the standard of review so long adhered to by this court.' [Citation.]" (Bickel v. City of Piedmont (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1040, 1053 (Bickel).) Further, "[w]e are not at liberty to reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.]" (Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners Assn. v. Griffin (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 619, 634 (Tesoro).)
3. The Parties' Contentions
Spinks argues that she did not voluntarily abandon her right to occupy apartment 502 because the evidence shows that she was forced to leave after her employer told her that her furniture would be removed and the utilities turned off, and defendants' property manager informed her that the locks would be changed. Spinks also points to the evidence showing that she wanted to stay in the apartment and refused offers of assistance to move elsewhere. According to Spinks, her conduct in leaving the apartment therefore did not constitute "clear and unmistakable affirmative acts of repudiation of her right to occupy the premises."
Defendants contend that there is substantial evidence that Spinks abandoned apartment 502 due to actions taken by Mobile Medical; specifically, Mobile Mobile's instructions to the furniture company to remove the rental furniture on February 22, 2005, and instructions to PG&E to turn off the utilities on February 21, 2005. Defendants emphasize Spinks' testimony that her reason for not staying in the apartment was the furniture company's removal of the rental furniture on February 22, 2005. Additionally, defendants point to the photographs taken by Spinks' mother on February 22, 2005, showing that prior to the lock change at about 4:30 p.m., all of the furniture had been removed and Spinks' personal belongings had been packed and were outside the apartment. Other acts showing Spinks' intent to abandon the apartment before the lock change, defendants argue, include her acts of making a reservation at the Tropicana Lodge during the morning of February 22, 2005, and having her church friends remove her belongings.
4. Analysis
Our analysis begins with the jury's findings with respect to abandonment, as reflected in the special verdicts.
The special verdict for trespass asked, "Did the Defendants Equity Residential and Briarwood Apartments intentionally enter or cause another person to enter an apartment occupied by Plaintiff Lori Spinks?" The jurors answered, "Yes." Second, the special verdict asked, "Did Plaintiff consent to the conduct of the Defendants in entering or causing another person to enter an apartment occupied by Plaintiff?" The jurors answered, "No." Third, the special verdict asked, "Did Plaintiff abandon the apartment by the time of the [defendants'] alleged wrongful conduct?" The jurors answered, "Yes."
The special verdict for wrongful eviction asked the jurors to answer the following question: "Was Plaintiff Lori Spinks a party in possession of the premises at the time of the lock change?" The jurors answered, "No." The special verdict for lock out in violation of section 789.3 asked in part: "Did the Defendants Equity Residential and Briarwood Apartments act with the intent to terminate Plaintiff Lori Spinks' occupancy of the apartment used as her residence by willfully causing, directly or indirectly: [¶] . . . [¶] the occupant from gaining reasonable access to the property by changing the locks." The jurors answered, "No."
The special verdicts rendered by the jurors show that defendants' alleged wrongful conduct, as presented at trial, was entering or causing another person to enter the apartment occupied by Spinks without her consent for the purpose of changing the apartment's locks. The jurors were specifically asked to find whether Spinks had abandoned the apartment "by the time of the [defendant's] alleged wrongful conduct." They found that she had done so. In other words, the jurors found that Spinks had abandoned apartment 502, and was no longer occupying or possessing the apartment, before defendants' alleged wrongful conduct in entering her apartment to change the locks occurred. For several reasons, we determine that substantial evidence supports the jury's findings.
First, the evidence showed that the only person that defendants caused to enter Spinks' apartment without her consent was the maintenance man who changed the locks at about 4:30 p.m. on February 22, 2005. Although the furniture movers entered Spinks' apartment on February 22, 2005, the evidence showed that defendants were not involved in that entry because the furniture movers acted on Mobile Medical's instruction and were let into the apartment by Spinks' mother. It is undisputed that defendants had no part in shutting off the apartment's utilities, since that was done on Mobile Medical's instructions to PG&E.
Second, the evidence demonstrated that Spinks vacated apartment 502 before the 4:30 p.m. lock change on February 22, 2005, since she had removed her personal belongings from the apartment by that time.
Third, it may be reasonably inferred from the evidence of Spinks' acts and conduct that she intended to abandon the apartment at the time she vacated it. (Judson, supra, 40 Cal. at pp. 309-310; Spinks I, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048.) The evidence showed that on February 21, 2005, Spinks received Mobile Medical's February 17, 2005 letter informing her that as of February 22, 2005, the utilities would be turned off and the furniture removed. Also on February 21, 2005, Spinks spoke with Tauala, the apartment manager, and learned that Mobile Medical had instructed Tauala to change the locks on the apartment on February 22, 2005. When Spinks spoke to Tauala the next day, during the morning of February 22, 2005, Spinks told Tauala that she had already made a hotel reservation to stay at the Tropicana Lodge. Spinks had also asked her church friends to help her pack her belongings and had removed them from the apartment before the lock change occurred at around 4:30 p.m.
We recognize that Spinks argues that she did not abandon the apartment because she was forced to move against her will. We also recognize that it has been held that where an employee's right to possession of the employer's premises terminated upon the termination of employment, the employer may not forcibly drive the employee off the premises without being "guilty of a forcible entry." (San Francisco etc. Soc. v. Leonard (1911) 17 Cal.App. 254, 262.)
Under the substantial evidence standard, however, we have viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to defendants as the prevailing party, "giving [defendants] the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in [their] favor . . . . [Citation.]" (Bickel, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) Applying this standard, we determine that even assuming that Spinks' decision to relinquish the apartment was forced because her apartment had become uninhabitable, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's findings that Spinks had abandoned the apartment, and was no longer occupying or possessing it, before defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct in entering the apartment to change the locks occurred.
B. Substantial Factor
Spinks next argues that the evidence does not support defendants' argument at the time of trial that it was Mobile Medical's acts, not the acts of defendants, that caused her to leave the apartment. According to Spinks, there is substantial evidence showing that defendants' acts with respect to the lock change were a substantial factor in causing her abandonment. Defendants disagree, arguing to the contrary that there is substantial evidence to show that Spinks abandoned the apartment due to the actions of Mobile Medical.
We observe that Spinks has not identified any express or implied fact finding by the jury regarding the issue of whether the acts of defendants were a substantial factor in causing her to leave the apartment. Moreover, the special verdicts do not include any question on the issue. In the absence of any factual findings by the jury, we decline to address the issue of whether the evidence showed that the acts of defendants were a substantial factor in causing Spinks to abandon the apartment. "Our role is limited to determining whether the evidence before the trier of fact supports its findings. [Citation.]" (Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 767.)
C. Trespass
Regarding her cause of action for trespass, Spinks reiterates her argument that the jury's finding that she had abandoned the apartment by the time of defendants' alleged wrongful conduct is not supported by substantial evidence. Since the jury found in her favor on the other elements of the tort of trespass, Spinks contends that the judgment must be reversed.
Defendants maintain that they could not have trespassed against Spinks because she had already abandoned the unit by the time of the lock change. We agree.
The California Supreme Court long ago instructed that "[i]t is a well-settled proposition that the proper party plaintiff in an action for trespass to real property is the person in actual possession." (Lightner Mining, supra, 161 Cal. at p. 694.) Thus, as this court has stated: " ' "A trespass is an invasion of the interest in the exclusive possession of land, as by entry upon it . . . ." ' " (Capogeannis v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 668, 674 (Capogeannis).) "California has adhered firmly to the view that '[t]he cause of action for trespass is designed to protect possessory—not necessarily ownership—interests in land from unlawful interference. [Citations.]' " (Ibid.; see also Spinks I, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1042-1043.)
Accordingly, a valid claim of trespass depends upon the plaintiff having possession of the real property at issue at the time of the alleged trespass. (See Lightner Mining, supra, 161 Cal. at p. 694; Capogeannis, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 674.) It follows that where the plaintiff has abandoned leased premises, the plaintiff no longer has actual possession and cannot claim that entry upon the premises constitutes a trespass. Thus, as the parties agree, abandonment of the premises is a defense to a cause of action for trespass. (See Lightner Mining, supra, 161 Cal. at p. 694.)
Here, as we have discussed, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's findings that Spinks had abandoned the apartment—since she was no longer occupying or possessing it—before defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct in entering the apartment to change the locks occurred. We therefore find no merit in Spinks' contention that with respect to the cause of action for trespass, the judgment must be reversed because the evidence is not sufficient to support the jury's finding on abandonment.
D. Instructional Error and Special Verdict Error
Spinks contends that the trial court misstated the law regarding the cause of action for wrongful eviction in the court's instructions to the jury and in the special verdict form. Specifically, Spinks asserts that (1) the special verdict form improperly required the jury to determine whether Spinks was a "party in possession" at the time of the apartment locks were changed; and (2) the jury was improperly instructed that a "party in possession" is an occupant in "rightful possession." Spinks maintains that the cause of action for wrongful eviction requires only that the plaintiff be in "actual possession, peacefully obtained."
The special verdict for wrongful eviction asked the jurors to answer the following question: "Was Plaintiff Lori Spinks a party in possession of the premises at the time of the lock change?" The jurors answered, "No."
The jury instructions for wrongful eviction included the following instructions:
"Plaintiff Lori Spinks has made a claim for wrongful eviction. In order to prove wrongful eviction, Plaintiff must prove: [¶] 1. That Lori Spinks was a party in possession of the premises at the time of the lock change; [¶] 2. That Defendants' agents or employees prevented her use of the property as a residence."
" 'Party in possession' means any person who hires real property and includes a boarder or lodger."
"A person who is a licensee does not have a possessory interest in property. Rather, the person merely has the right to use the property for a specified purpose. If Plaintiff is a licensee, she is not a party in possession. [¶] Plaintiff is not a licensee if she has proven the following: [¶] 1. She had exclusive possession of the premises under the lease between Mobile Medical Staffing LLC and defendants; [¶] 2. She paid for the use of the premises in the form of her labor."
Spinks further maintains that the instructional error was prejudicial because the jurors were misled into believing that in order to find that she was a "party in possession," they had to find that she had exclusive possession of the premises and paid rent. Had the jury been correctly instructed, Spinks argues, a different result would have been obtained.
Defendants point out that Spinks failed to object either to the jury instructions or the special verdict form during the proceedings below, and in fact agreed to them during discussions with the trial court and defense counsel. Defendants therefore contend that Spinks has waived her objections. Alternatively, defendants argue that even assuming the jury instructions and special verdict form were erroneous with respect to the definition of "party in possession," there was no prejudice, since abandonment of the premises is a defense to the cause of action for wrongful eviction and therefore Spinks cannot demonstrate that she would have received a more favorable result absent the erroneous definition.
Spinks does not dispute that she failed to object at the time of trial to the jury instructions and special verdict form that she now argues misstate the law. Before considering the substance of Spinks' argument, we will consider whether she has forfeited her claims of instructional error and special verdict error.
"The forfeiture rule generally applies in all civil and criminal proceedings. [Citations.] . . . ' " ' "The purpose of the general doctrine of waiver [or forfeiture] is to encourage a defendant to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or avoided and a fair trial had . . . ." ' [Citation.]" ' " (Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 264.)
With respect to the special verdict form, the general rule is that where a party did not object to the special verdict form at trial, the objection is forfeited on appeal. (Lynch v. Birdwell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 839, 851; Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 277; Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 131.) Since Spinks did not object to the special verdict form, she has forfeited her claim of special verdict error.
Failure to object to a civil jury instruction, on the other hand, does not result in forfeiture where, as here, a party contends on appeal that a jury instruction misstates the law. (Bowman v. Wyatt (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 286, 298; Carrau v. Martin Lumber & Cedar Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 281, 296.) However, instructional error does not constitute reversible error absent prejudice. (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 682.)
"A judgment may not be reversed on appeal, even for error involving 'misdirection of the jury,' unless 'after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,' it appears the error caused a 'miscarriage of justice.' (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) When the error is one of state law only, it generally does not warrant reversal unless there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached. [Citation.] [¶] Thus, when the jury receives an improper instruction in a civil case, prejudice will generally be found only ' "[w]here it seems probable that the jury's verdict may have been based on the erroneous instruction." ' " (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 574.)
Even assuming, as Spinks argues, that the jury instructions and the special verdict form for wrongful eviction failed to correctly instruct the jury to determine, with regard to the cause of action for wrongful eviction, whether Spinks had "actual possession, peacefully obtained" of the apartment, we find no prejudice. Abandonment of the premises is, as Spinks has conceded, a defense to a claim of wrongful eviction. (Psihozios, supra, 80 Cal.App.2d at pp. 220-222.) We have previously determined that substantial evidence supports the jury's key finding that Spinks had abandoned the apartment—and therefore no longer had any kind of possession—before defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct in changing the locks. We therefore also determine that the jury's verdict on the cause of action for wrongful eviction could not have been based upon an erroneous instruction regarding the nature of her possession of the apartment.
For these reasons, we find no merit in Spinks' contentions of instructional error and special verdict error.
Section 789.3, subdivision (b)(1) provides in pertinent part, "[A] landlord shall not, with intent to terminate the occupancy under any lease or other tenancy or estate at will, however created, of property used by a tenant as his or her residence, willfully: [¶] Prevent the tenant from gaining reasonable access to the property by changing the locks . . . ." Thus, "[s]ection 789.3 forbids landlords of residential dwellings from engaging in specified conduct, including changing the locks with intent to oust the resident." (Spinks, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018, fn. 1.) " 'The manifest purpose of section 789.3 is to discourage landlords from using self-help.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1051.)
The special verdict for violation of section 789.3 asked three questions: "Did the Defendants Equity Residential and Briarwood Apartments act with the intent to terminate Plaintiff Lori Spinks' occupancy of the apartment used as her residence by willfully causing, directly or indirectly: (1) the interruption or termination of any utility service furnished the occupant including electricity; (2) the removal of the occupant's furnishings from the premises; [and] (3) the occupant from gaining reasonable access to the property by changing the locks." The jurors answered, "No," to each question.
Spinks argues that the jury's finding that defendants did not violate section 789.3 is not supported by substantial evidence, since "[t]he evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates Tauala's knowledge that Mobile [Medical] was seeking to remove [Spinks'] furniture and that Mobile [Medical] requested that the locks be changed. There can be no doubt that she understood that termination of [Spinks'] occupancy was the goal."
Defendants argue that the evidence showed that they did not terminate Spinks' occupancy by performing the lock change because Spinks had already abandoned the apartment; therefore, defendants could not have prevented her from gaining reasonable access.
We reiterate that our standard of review precludes us from reweighing the evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses. (Tesoro, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 634.) Our review is limited to determining whether the jury's findings are supported by substantial evidence. (Bickel, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) Here, there is substantial evidence that defendants did not directly or indirectly cause the utilities to Spinks' apartment to be turned off, or the furniture to be removed, since the evidence showed that Mobile Medical was solely responsible for those acts.
Moreover, since we have determined that substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Spinks had abandoned the apartment before defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct in changing the locks, we consequently also find that substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that the defendants did not prevent Spinks "from gaining reasonable access to the property by changing the locks." As we have noted, Spinks concedes that abandonment is a defense to a claim that a landlord violated section 789.3. (Hale, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 406.)
For these reasons, we find no merit in Spinks' contention that the jury's findings with regard to the cause of action for violation of section 789.3 are not supported by substantial evidence.
F. Evidentiary Error
Finally, Spinks argues that the trial court erred in denying her motions in limine to exclude her employment agreement with Mobile Medical and the deposition testimony of Richard Brown. According to Spinks, admission of this evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial.
Defendants assert that the trial court correctly ruled that Spinks had "opened the door regarding the employment agreement" during her direct examination, noting that Spinks' trial counsel questioned her about her understanding of the employment agreement. Defendants also note that Attachment A to the employment agreement included the housing agreement, which provided the jury with relevant information concerning Spinks' housing situation. Further, defendants point to this court's prior decision in Spinks I, which states that the employment agreement "explains both the basis on which [Spinks] went into possession and her rights and obligations vis-a-vis Mobile [Medical], the promisee under the lease. . . . [T]he employment agreement in this case is relevant to an understanding of the parties' relationships, and it may be considered for that purpose." (Spinks I, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1026.)
Additionally, defendants argue that Brown's testimony was relevant to their defense, because Brown authenticated Mobile Medical's letters to Spinks; confirmed that Mobile Medical was responsible for shutting off the electricity, removing the rental furniture, and requesting the lock change; provided background information about the company's custom and practice of providing housing for traveling nurses; and established that defendants could not be liable for punitive damages because they were merely complying with Mobile Medical's request for a lock change and did not act out of ill will.
We determine that Spinks has not met her burden to show that the trial court's evidentiary rulings constitute reversible error. " '[A]n appellate court reviews any ruling by a trial court as to the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.' [Citation.]" (Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1059, 1078.) This court has explained that "[d]iscretion is abused only when in its exercise, the trial court 'exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.' [Citation.] There must be a showing of a clear case of abuse and miscarriage of justice in order to warrant a reversal. [Citation]. A trial court will abuse its discretion by action that is arbitrary or ' "that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law." ' [Citations.] In appeals challenging discretionary trial court rulings, it is the appellant's burden to establish an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]" (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 281 (italics added) (Shaw).)
Spinks has not, and cannot, dispute that the employment agreement and the deposition testimony of Richard Brown, Mobile Medical's representative, were relevant to show the parties' relationships and how she came to occupy the apartment leased by Mobile Medical. Moreover, Spinks merely states that "[i]n all likelihood, the employment contract and Brown's testimony confused and prejudiced the jury." This conclusory assertion, without more, is not sufficient to meet Spinks' burden on appeal to show that the trial court's evidentiary rulings constituted "a clear case of abuse and miscarriage of justice." (Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.)
V. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondents.
_________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR: _________________
MIHARA, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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