Opinion
1928.
October 21, 2003.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Walter Tolub, J.), entered April 15, 2002, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Norman I. Klein, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Cynthia B. Lovinger, for defendant-respondent.
Before: Andrias, J.P., Ellerin, Friedman, Gonzalez, JJ.
In determining the applicable statutory period, the reality and essence of a cause of action, rather than what its proponent has named it, governs (see Bunker v. Maccaro, 80 A.D.2d 817, 818, citing Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., 276 N.Y. 259, 264). Although plaintiffs pleaded causes of action nominally for restitution and unjust enrichment, those causes are based on the same allegations as their causes for legal malpractice. Accordingly, plaintiffs' causes are governed by the three-year limitations period for legal malpractice (CPLR 214) and, as such, are time-barred.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.