Previously, the Court dismissed without prejudice various counts of Plaintiffs' complaint. Spiller v. District of Columbia , 302 F.Supp.3d 240 (D.D.C. 2018) (" Spiller I "), and Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, Dkt. 29 (Amd. Compl.).
At the motion to dismiss stage, courts look to whether a plaintiff alleges facts to “give rise to a reasonable inference that [] officials were on constructive notice of dangerous or incompetent behavior by the officers in question prior to” the incident in question. Spiller v. D.C., 302 F.Supp.3d 240, 255 (D.D.C. 2018) (RDM) (emphasis in original). Finally, the plaintiff must show that the employer's failure to train or supervise was the proximate cause of the injury alleged.
On the other hand, in Spiller v. District of Columbia , the court held that the plaintiff's arrest and appearance in court alone were insufficient to satisfy the "modest" showing of restriction of liberty necessary for his constitutional malicious prosecution claim to survive a motion to dismiss. 302 F.Supp.3d 240, 248 (D.D.C. 2018). As the Spiller court noted, "[e]xactly what pretrial restrictions constitute ‘seizures’ " for purposes of a constitutional malicious prosecution claim is unclear.
See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29–31. The court in Spiller v. District of Columbia found that the plaintiff's allegations that he was "deprived of liberty" coupled with the mere fact that he was arrested and had to appear in court, were insufficient to satisfy the "modest" showing of restriction of liberty necessary for his malicious prosecution claim to survive a motion to dismiss. 302 F.Supp.3d 240, 248 (D.D.C. 2018). Here too, Mr. Turpin simply alleges that he was subjected to "unnecessary and illegal detention" as a result of his arrest, but fails to allege any restriction on his liberty comparable to the violations in Pitt or Thorp , or in fact any restriction on his liberty stemming from the prosecution itself.
But they involved entirely different groups of SPOs who have nothing to do with the incident at issue here. See Spiller v. Dist. of Columbia, 302 F.Supp.3d 240, 255 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Plaintiffs have not alleged that these officers were previously involved in similar incidents, or that other aspects of their behavior known to their supervisors would have or should have put their superiors on notice that the officers required additional supervision or training.”);
” Spiller v. District of Columbia, 302 F.Supp.3d 240, 254 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Giles v. Shell Oil Corp., 487 A.2d 610, 613 (D.C. 1985)). I agree with defendants that plaintiffs Complaint fails to do so.
In order to state a claim for negligent supervision or training under D.C. law, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting a plausible inference that the employer "knew or should have known its employee behaved in a dangerous or otherwise incompetent manner, and that the employer, armed with that actual or constructive knowledge, failed to adequately supervise the employee" or train him. District of Columbia v. Tulin, 994 A.2d 788, 794 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Giles v. Shell Oil Corp., 487 A.2d 610, 613 (D.C. 1985)); Blakeney v. O'Donnell, 117 F. Supp. 3d 6, 20-21 (D.D.C. 2015) (subjecting failure to train and failure to supervise claims to similar analysis); Spiller v. District of Columbia, 302 F. Supp. 3d 240, 254-55 (D.D.C. 2018) (same). Here, the complaint alleges that correctional officers at the D.C. jail let inmates out of their cells at improper times and allowed them to enter the incorrect cell blocks; "improperly protected" Plaintiff; and "improperly supervised" other inmates, allowing him to be injured by other inmates on two different occasions.
Instead, the plaintiff's letter need only "recite[] facts from which it could be reasonably anticipated that a claim against the District might arise." Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803,09 (D.C. 1978); see Spiller v. District of Columbia, 302 F. Supp. 3d 240, 253 (D.D.C. 2018) ("What matters is that the notice 'describe[ ] the injuring event with sufficient detail to reveal, in itself, a basis for the District's potential liability.'" (emphasis omitted) (quoting Washington v. District of Columbia, 429 A.2d 1362, 1366 (D.C. 1981))).
In support of dismissal, Defendant cites at least two cases in which district courts in this Circuit have dismissed plaintiffs' negligent training and supervision claims based on insufficient factual allegations. In Spiller v. District of Columbia, 302 F. Supp. 3d 240 (D.D.C. 2018), the court dismissed the plaintiff's negligent training and supervision claim, finding that the plaintiff failed to plead facts which would "give rise to a reasonable inference that District or MPD officials were on constructive notice of dangerous or incompetent behavior by the officers in question." 302 F. Supp. 3d at 255.
a plaintiff must establish “that an employer knew or should have known its employee behaved in a dangerous or otherwise incompetent manner, and that the employer, armed with that actual or constructive knowledge, failed to adequately supervise [or train] the employee.” Spiller v. D.C., 302 F.Supp.3d 240 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Giles v. Shell Oil Corp., 487 A.2d 610, 613 (D.C. 1985)). An employer must have the “actual or constructive knowledge” of “problematic behavior on the part of the [employee] in question before the incident at issue.” Id. at 255 (emphasis added); see also Rawlings v. D.C., 820 F.Supp.2d 92, 114-15 (D.D.C. 2011) (requiring evidence of the employee's negligent “behavior before” an incident giving rise to injury).