These acts of generosity should not be discouraged by creating a law which would require anyone who begins such a relationship to continue financial support until the child is eighteen years old."); Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa.Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879, 883 (1977) ("when a stepparent is ‘in loco parentis’ with his stepchildren, courts must jealously guard his rights to visitation"); and Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa.Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155, 157 (1965) ("The putative father may, in many instances, instill in the child a sense of stability. He may develop qualities in the child which the mother is uninterested, unwilling or incapable of developing.

Commonwealth ex rel. Morgan v. Smith, 429 Pa. 561, 565, 241 A.2d 531, 533 (1968). In Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879 (1977), we said: Pennsylvania courts recognize that a person may "put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship without going through the formality of a legal adoption. . . ."

Pennsylvania courts have traditionally applied custody principles to matters involving visitation rights. See, Morrisv. Morris, 271 Pa. Super. 19, 412 A.2d 139 (1979); Commonwealthex rel. Stayko v. Stayko, 267 Pa. Super. 24, 405 A.2d 1284 (1979); Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879 (1977); Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965). In a visitation proceeding, as in one for custody, the singular concern is the interest and welfare of the children involved.

A parent is rarely denied the opportunity to visit with his or her child even if he or she delays in asserting that right. See Commonwealth ex rel. Peterson v. Hayes, 252 Pa. Super. 487, 488-489, 381 A.2d 1311, 1312 (1977) (plurality opinion); Spellsv. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 174, 378 A.2d 879, 883 (1977); Fernald v. Fernald, 224 Pa. Super. 93, 94, 302 A.2d 470, 471 (1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Lotz v. Lotz, 188 Pa. Super. 241, 244, 146 A.2d 362, 363 (1958). "Thus, it is clear that visitation rights of a parent not in custody must be carefully guarded.

Surely we would not accord the aforementioned parties custody rights equal to those of a natural parent simply by virtue of their in loco parentis standing. Similarly, here, it would be unreasonable to treat appellee as a natural parent based solely on the fact that he stands in loco parentis to M. Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879 (1977), cited by appellee in support of his contention, is inapposite because that case dealt with visitation rights rather than custody. In Spells we held that the lower court erred in perfunctorily denying a stepparent visitation without a full hearing.

Pennsylvania was apparently the first jurisdiction to examine the matter. In Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879 (1977), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that an ex-stepfather could not be denied the right to visit his former stepchildren just because he lacked any blood relationship to them. In so holding, the court stated at 378 A.2d 881:

In discharging this responsibility, recent decisions from other jurisdictions, for the most part concerning visitation rights of stepparents, are instructive (see, e.g., Gribble v Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 [Utah]; Spells v Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879). For example in Spells ( 250 Pa Super, at 172-173, 378 A.2d, at 881-882), the court fashioned a test for "parental status" or "in loco parentis" requiring that the petitioner demonstrate actual assumption of the parental role and discharge of parental responsibilities.

The rights and obligations arising out of that relationship are exactly the same as between parent and child. Gradwell, 416 Pa.Super. at 125-27, 610 A.2d at 1003 (citing Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879 (1977)). The phrase " in loco parentis" refers to a person who puts himself in the situation of assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship without going through the formality of a legal adoption.

It is true that a stepfather who lives with his wife and her natural children may assume the relationship of in locoparentis. Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879 (1977). Such status "embodies two ideas: first, the assumption of parental status, and second, the discharge of parental duties" and the "[e]xistence of such a relationship is largely dependent upon the intention of the person assuming the parental status."

§ 40-4-9(A)(3). See Normand By and Through Normand v. Ray, 109 N.M. 403, 785 P.2d 743 (1990); see also Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879 (1977). In Spells, the court observed: