Opinion
HHDCV185049821S
06-03-2019
Sheri SPEER v. Donna SKAATS et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Budzik, J.
Defendants Donna Skaats, Patrick Boatman, and Seaport Capital Partners, LLC, move for summary judgment on plaintiff Sheri Speer’s three-count complaint alleging tortuous inference with business expectancies (count one), abuse of process (count two), and fraud (count three). Ms. Speer proceeds pro se. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety.
FACTS
The December 4, 2017 complaint alleges the following material facts. From 2008 through 2010, the defendants made a series of fourteen mortgage loans to Ms. Speer for the purchase of certain residential and commercial real estate. Some of the real estate purchased by Ms. Speer was in rentable condition, but other properties needed repairs to make them suitable for tenants. Ms. Speer alleges that funds from the loans were not forthcoming such that she could make necessary repairs, gain renters, and generate sufficient revenue to service the loans. Ms. Speer fell behind on the loan payments. Ms. Speer alleges that the defendants knew she would not be able to service the loans and that they schemed against her to take possession of the mortgaged properties through foreclosure. These essential allegations are the underlying basis for Ms. Speer’s fraud claim.
Ms. Speer further alleges that once she fell behind on the loan payments, the defendants conspired with Ms. Speer’s other creditors to place her in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. See In re Speer, United States Bankruptcy Court, Docket No. 14-21007 (ASD) (D. Conn.). Ms. Speer alleges that the defendants, together with other creditors, instituted the bankruptcy proceeding in bad faith in an attempt to cover up the original fraudulent acts associated with the fourteen mortgages and to gain possession of the mortgaged properties at a discounted price through the bankruptcy process. These essential facts underlie Ms. Speer’s abuse of process claim.
Finally, Ms. Speer alleges that, during the bankruptcy proceeding, the defendants contacted certain tenants at the mortgaged properties and improperly instructed those tenants not to pay some $18,000 in rents due Ms. Speer. Ms. Speer alleges these acts, together with the original allegedly improper involuntary bankruptcy petition, constitute tortious interference with her business expectancies.
LEGAL STANDARD
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bozelko v. Papastavros, 323 Conn. 275, 282, 147 A.3d 1023 (2016). "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact ... A material fact ... [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 821, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015). "The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534-35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). "Because res judicata or collateral estoppel, if raised, may be dispositive of a claim, summary judgment [is] the appropriate method for resolving a claim of res judicata." Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712, 627 A.2d 374 (1993).
ANALYSIS
a. Count One: Tortious Interference with Business Expectancies
The defendants seek summary judgment on Ms. Speer’s tortious interference claim on the basis of collateral estoppel because the propriety of the involuntary bankruptcy petition was fully litigated as part of the bankruptcy proceeding. The defendants also assert that Ms. Speer fails to present any evidence disputing the defendants’ proffered evidence that they never improperly contacted her tenants. The court agrees with the defendants.
On August 5 and 27, 2014, Judge Albert Dabrowski of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut held an evidentiary hearing on Ms. Speer’s involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. See In re Speer, 522 B.R. 1, 4 (D.Conn. 2014). Ms. Speer participated in the hearing pro se, introduced evidence, and examined witnesses. Id. One of the issues specifically considered by Judge Dabrowski was whether "the Involuntary Petition should be denied or dismissed on the grounds that it was filed in bad faith." Id., 10. After considering Ms. Speer’s various arguments, Judge Dabrowski rejected her claim of bad faith. Id. at 10-12. Indeed, Judge Dabrowski specifically ruled that "there is no evidence that the purpose of the filing was for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose." Id., 11. Judge Ann Nevins of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut reviewed Judge Dabrowski’s decision on a motion for reconsideration filed by Ms. Speer. See In Re Speer, United States Bankruptcy Court, Docket No. 14-21007 (AMN) (D.Conn. March 31, 2017) (Defs.’ Ex. C). After reviewing the evidence considered by Judge Dabrowski regarding Ms. Speer’s bad faith claim, Judge Nevins agreed with Judge Dabrowski’s original ruling. Id.
"[C]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action ... For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated ... The doctrine of collateral estoppel is based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate ... Collateral estoppel is grounded in the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest ... In order for collateral estoppel to bar the relitigation of an issue in a later proceeding, the issue concerning which relitigation is sought to be estopped must be identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding. To establish whether collateral estoppel applies, the court must determine what facts were necessarily determined in the first trial, and must then assess whether the [party] is attempting to relitigate those facts in the second proceeding." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Marques v. Allstate Ins. Co., 140 Conn.App. 335, 339-40, 58 A.3d 393 (2013). Here, it is plain that Ms. Speer has already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of whether her involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed in bad faith. The issue was explicitly considered by two bankruptcy judges after a hearing on the merits in which Ms. Speer fully participated. Ms. Speer cannot now seek a different result from this court simply because she dislikes the results she received in bankruptcy court.
Regarding the defendants alleged contacts with Ms. Speer’s tenants, the defendants present evidence establishing the following facts. In March of 2017, Judge Nevins entered an order of sanctions requiring Ms. Speer to pay certain moneys. See Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Ann. M. Nevins, In Re Speer, United States Bankruptcy Court, Docket No. 14-21007 (AHN) (D.Conn. December 19, 2017) (Defs.’ Ex. J). A writ of execution was issued from the bankruptcy court to collect money due under the sanctions order. Id., 14. At the December 19, 2017 hearing before Judge Nevins dealing with, inter alia, Ms. Speer’s noncompliance with the sanctions order, Marshall Margaret LaBranche testified that she served the writ of execution on three of Ms. Speer’s tenants. Id. 117-18. Marshall LaBranche testified that she collected money from one of the tenants pursuant to the writ of execution. Id. at 119-20. At the December 19 hearing, the three tenants testified. See Supp. Aff. of Patrick W. Boatman, at ¶¶8-15 (Defs.’ Ex 3). None of the tenants testified that any of the defendants in this case advised them regarding how not to pay rent to Ms. Speer. Id.; see also In Re Speer, supra, United States Bankruptcy Court, Docket No. 14-21007 (AHN). Ms. Speer participated in the December 19 hearing pro se and examined each witness. Additionally, as part of this litigation, Ms. Speer served several requests for admission on Ms. Skaats. Ms. Speer asked Ms. Skaats to admit that she advised some of the tenants not to pay rent to Ms. Speer. In sworn responses, Ms. Skaats denied that she instructed Ms. Speer’s tenants to pay rent other than in compliance the bankruptcy court’s writ of execution. See Responses to First Requests for Admissions Directed to Defendant Donna Skatts (Defs.’ Ex. N).
Ms. Speer presents no evidence whatsoever to rebut the evidence submitted by defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment.
The court pauses to address Ms. Speer’s repeated requests for discovery to aid her in opposing the motion for summary judgment. On October 24, 2018, the court issued an order (#117.86), exercising its discretion to continue the motion for summary judgment to allow Ms. Speer to conduct discovery on that portion of her complaint alleging the defendants improperly instructed Ms. Speer’s tenants not to pay rent. The court set an explicit 60-day deadline for the completion of that discovery. On December 11, 2018, the court reiterated that the 60-day deadline remained in effect. (#164.86). Despite the court’s clear orders, Ms. Speer, nevertheless, waited until approximately 9:00 p.m. on December 24, 2018 to contact defense counsel to inquire about beginning the discovery process. Ms. Speer claimed that her motion for reconsideration of the court’s October 24, 2018 order somehow automatically tolled its effect. Litigants may not unilaterally subvert the operation of clear court orders by simply filing pleadings, absent some clear court rule or controlling authority. Here, no such rule or authority exists. Ms. Speer failed by her own actions to take advantage of the opportunity for discovery provided by the court.
Therefore, based on the undisputed material facts as set forth above, the court grants the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to count one of the complaint. Ms. Speer is collaterally estopped from relitigating the propriety of her bankruptcy proceeding because that issue was actually and expressly litigated as part of that proceeding. Additionally, Ms. Speer fails to present any evidence whatsoever to rebut the clear evidence presented by the defendants that they did not interfere with Ms. Speer’s business expectancy by improperly instructing tenants not to pay rent.
b. Count Two: Abuse of Process
Ms. Speer’s abuse of process claim is based on the defendants’ allegedly bad faith filing of the involuntary bankruptcy petition. As set forth above, that claim has already been fully and fairly litigated as part of Ms. Speer’s bankruptcy proceeding. Therefore, Ms. Speer is collaterally estopped from litigating those issues again. The court grants summary judgment on count two of the complaint.
c. Count Three: Fraud
Finally, defendant Seaport Capital Partners, LLC moves for summary judgment on Ms. Speer’s fraud claim on the basis of res judicata. The court agrees with Seaport Capital Partners, LLC and, therefore, grants summary judgment on count three.
When Ms. Speer was a debtor in possession in her bankruptcy proceeding, she filed an adversary complaint. See Defs.’ Ex. D. That adversary complaint made essentially the same allegations of fraud and withholding of funds as made in the third count of the complaint in this matter. See Defs.’ Ex. D, ¶¶19-16; 31-40. Thomas C. Bosarino was subsequently appointed Chapter 7 Trustee for Ms. Speer. As trustee for Ms. Speer’s bankruptcy estate, Mr. Bosarino compromised the claims asserted in Ms. Speer’s adversary proceeding in return for $20,000 and certain other relief. See Defs.’ Ex. E. In return, Mr. Bosarino agreed to a dismissal with prejudice of the adversary proceeding filed by Ms. Speer. Defs.’ Ex. E, ¶30(d). On November 10, 2015, Judge Nevins entered an order approving the Trustee’s Motion to Compromise. See Defs.’ Ex F.
"The doctrine of res judicata holds that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated as to the parties ... in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction ... If the same cause of action is again sued on, the judgment is a bar with respect to any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made ... To determine whether two claims are the same for purposes of res judicata, we compare the pleadings and judgment in the first action with the complaint in the subsequent action." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jewish Home for the Elderly of Fairfield County, Inc. v. Cantore, 96 Conn.App. 326, 332, 901 A.2d 49 (2006).
"The judicial [doctrine] of res judicata ... [is] based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate ... [W]here a party has fully and fairly litigated his claims, he may be barred from future actions on matters not raised in the prior proceeding." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jewish Home for the Elderly of Fairfield County, Inc. v. Cantore, supra, 96 Conn.App. 332. The doctrine supports the policy in Connecticut that "[s]tability in judgments grants to parties and others the certainty in the management of their affairs which results when a controversy is finally laid to rest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 59, 808 A.2d 1107 (2002).
"We have adopted a transactional test as a guide to determining whether an action involves the same claim as an earlier action so as to trigger operation of the doctrine of res judicata. [T]he claim [that is] extinguished [by the judgment in the first action] includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. What factual grouping constitutes a transaction, and what groupings constitute a series, are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivatoin, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expections or business understanding or usage." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadle Co. v. Gabel, Conn.App. 279, 296, 794 A.2d 1029 (2002).
Here, again, it is plain that Ms. Speer is suing on the same transactions and series of transactions upon which she sought to assert claims of fraud and conspiracy in her bankruptcy proceeding. Ms. Speer may not seek to relitigate these claims now in superior court. Moreover, because the claims asserted in count three are the same claims as those asserted in the adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy trustee has already fully released Seaport Capital Partners, LLC from any liability for those claims. See Defs.’ Ex. G.
For all the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety.