Opinion
C. A. 6:21-cv-3663-BHH-JDA
12-01-2021
Hakiim R. Speaks, Plaintiff, v. Joshua P. Campbell, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Hakiim R. Speaks (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendant violated his rights under the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se and in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
When Plaintiff commenced this action, he was a pretrial detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center. [Doc. 1 at 2, 4.] Plaintiff appears to assert that Defendant violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by executing an unlawful search and seizure. [Id. at 4.]
An online search of the Greenville County Detention Center shows that Plaintiff is no longer detained at that facility.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, on September 7, 2021, he was pulled over for a traffic infraction because his license plate light was not working. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff contends he never received a traffic ticket for that offense. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that, upon seeing blue lights, he pulled over, turned on his flashers, and turned off his vehicle. [Id. at 6.] When the officer approached his vehicle, Plaintiff asked him why he had pulled him over. [Id.] The officer stated that Plaintiff's license plate light was burned out. [Id.] Plaintiff gave the officer his license, registration, and proof of insurance. [Id.] The officer returned to his patrol car but then quickly walked back to Plaintiff's car and asked where he was coming from and where he was going. [Id.] Plaintiff replied that he was going home from his sister's house. [Id.] The officer began to visually inspect Plaintiff's car and asked if he had any drug charges. [Id.] The officer then told Plaintiff to exit his vehicle and patted him down. [Id.] The officer walked Plaintiff to his patrol car and asked Plaintiff if he could search his vehicle. [Id. at 7.] Plaintiff declined. [Id.] The officer then called the canine unit. [Id.] Plaintiff contends this went beyond the scope of the traffic infraction. [Id.] Plaintiff contends he did not receive a ticket and feels he was targeted by the officer. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that he was then locked up in the Greenville County Detention Center and his car was towed. [Id. at 5.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges he suffered high blood pressure, he had to start taking medicine, and he was placed on a cardiac diet. [Id. at 8.] For his relief, Plaintiff asks to be released from incarceration. [Id.] Additionally, Plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount of $375,000. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
As noted, Plaintiff contends Defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Specifically, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant unlawfully arrested and detained him. [ Id. at 5-7.] Thus, Plaintiff appears to assert claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and/or malicious prosecution. Despite Plaintiff's contentions, however, this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
As an initial matter, the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff was charged in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions with (1) distribution of methamphetamine at case number 2021A2330208272; (2) manufacturing, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II narcotic at case number 2021A2330208273; and (3) possession of marijuana at case number 2021A2330208274, all arising from the incident that took place on September 7, 2021. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers 2021A2330208272, 2021A2330208273, 2021A2330208274) (last visited Dec. 1, 2021). On November 29, 2021, Plaintiff pled guilty to the charge at case number 2021A2330208272 and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 8 years, with credit for 83 days of time served, with the balance suspended to 30 months of probation. The charges at case numbers 2021A2330208273 and 2021A2330208274 were dismissed as part of Plaintiff's agreement to plead guilty to the other charge.
See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by Heck
The Complaint should be dismissed because it is legally frivolous. A finding of frivolousness can be made where the Complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Thus, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989).
The crux of this action appears to be a challenge to Plaintiff's arrest on September 7, 2021, and his subsequent incarceration in the Greenville County Detention Center on those charges. For his relief, Plaintiff purports to seek money damages for the allegedly unlawful arrest and imprisonment and his release from incarceration. However, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking release from custody, such relief is not available in this civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus).
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking money damages based on his allegedly unlawful arrest, incarceration, and prosecution of his criminal charges, his claim is barred because Plaintiff pled guilty and his conviction and sentence have not been invalidated. In Heck, the Supreme Court pronounced,
. . . in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Heck, 512 U.S. at 481. Further, the Supreme Court stated that,
. . . when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Id. This is known as the “favorable termination” requirement, which Plaintiff has not alleged he has satisfied. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008).
The Heck holding applies to this case. Plaintiff seems to allege that Defendant acted improperly by unlawfully arresting him without probable cause and holding him in the Greenville County Detention Center. However, Plaintiff does not allege that his conviction has been invalidated, for example, by a reversal on direct appeal or a state or federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. A favorable determination on the merits of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim would imply that the charges against him and resulting conviction and sentence are invalid.
Abstention under Younger
Further, even if Plaintiff's claims were not barred by Heck, the Court should abstain from hearing Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that the state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff were improper and violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff asks that the charges against him be dismissed. Granting Plaintiff's requested relief, however, would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin the state court criminal proceedings against him. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, at the time Plaintiff filed this action, he was involved in ongoing state court criminal proceedings, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations related to those criminal actions; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted “that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court criminal proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those state proceedings, to the extent they are ongoing. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, ‘whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'”) (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can adequately litigate his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings, to include any valid appeal and post conviction relief actions. Thus, this Court should abstain from adjudicating Plaintiff's claims.
Failure to State a Claim
Finally, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal because his allegations fail to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff purports to assert a claim for violations of the Fourth Amendment. [Doc. 1 at 4.] As noted, the Court reads Plaintiff's allegations as asserting claims for unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
The Fourth Amendment provides, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Section 1983 actions premised on claims including false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
Plaintiff's purported Fourth Amendment claim is without merit because, under § 1983, a public official cannot be charged with unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, or malicious prosecution when the search and arrest are based on probable cause. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause.”). Moreover, “an indictment, ‘fair upon its face,' returned by a ‘properly constituted grand jury,' conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975)); see also Provet v. S.C., No. 6:07-cv-1094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (explaining § 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded based on the filing of an indictment). As noted, the Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's state criminal proceedings. The State filed grand jury indictments for the charges against Plaintiff in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions at case number 2021A2330208272. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/ Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number 2021A2330208272) (last visited Dec. 1, 2021). Thus, even if Plaintiff's claims were not barred by Heck as a result of his guilty plea, the indictment acts as a bar to Plaintiff's claim for money damages as to the charges that were pending against him and his incarceration in the Greenville County Detention Center at the time he filed this action. Any claims related to those charges and incarceration are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. See Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018) (declining to give plaintiff leave to amend because it would be futile for plaintiff to amend his complaint against the defendants being dismissed), aff'd, 766 Fed.Appx. 1 (4th Cir. 2019).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).