Opinion
C. A. 8:23-cv-02240-DCN-JDA
05-30-2023
Eric Lamont Spann, Plaintiff, v. Warden Jackson, Bryan P. Stirling, Associat Warden Tisdale, Captain Greene, L Largent, Mrs. Pringle, Lt. McCullogh, L Welch, Lt. Robinson, Sergeant McMillan Ofc./Sergeant Sweetenburg, DHO Angela F Brown, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Eric Lamont Spann (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and is currently incarcerated at the Lee Correctional Institution (“Lee”). [Doc. 1 at 2-3.]
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02, D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such complaints for relief and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Upon review, the undersigned finds that certain claims and Defendants are subject to summary dismissal from this action. However, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to survive initial review as to his claim for excessive use of force against Defendant Greene. All other claims and Defendants are subject to dismissal for the reasons below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [ Id. at 5.] According to Plaintiff, Defendant Greene assaulted him on August 8, 2022. [ Id. at 8.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he was sprayed in the face with chemical munition. [Id. at 8, 11.] Plaintiff alleges he received medical treatment to wash his face and his eyes. [ Id. at 11.] However, Plaintiff now has a burning sensation in his eyes and on the skin of his face. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Greene's actions constitute assault and battery and that, as a result, he has suffered emotional distress, mental aguish, and burning on the left side of his face. [ Id.] Plaintiff seeks money damages from Defendants. [ Id. at 11-12.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) if it sought monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under the less stringent standard applicable to pro se pleadings, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). As noted, although the Court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; see also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that, although the court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements to state a claim); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-74 (4th Cir.1989) (dismissing complaint dismissed because it “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”). Thus, although a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed his Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
As noted, certain Defendants and claims are subject to summary dismissal from this action for the reasons below.
Defendants entitled to dismissal
To begin, all Defendants named in this action-except Defendant Greene-are subject to dismissal because they are not proper parties subject to suit under § 1983 or because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that they were personally involved in any purported constitutional violations giving rise to a plausible claim.
Defendants Jackson, Tisdale, and Stirling
First, Defendants Jackson, Tisdale, and Stirling (the “supervisory Defendants”) are subject to summary dismissal. Plaintiff identifies Defendant Jackson as the Warden at Lee [Doc. 1 at 2, 4]; Defendant Tisdale as an Associate Warden at Lee [ id. at 4, 6]; and Defendant Stirling as the Director of SCDC [ id. at 1-2]. Plaintiff appears to name each of these supervisory Defendants based on their supervisory roles at Lee and/or over SCDC. Nevertheless, the supervisory Defendants are subject to summary dismissal.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff makes no allegations in the Complaint about the supervisory Defendants' direct involvement in any alleged unconstitutional conduct. Instead, Plaintiff makes only general, vague allegations about these supervisory Defendants' obligations over Lee and/or SCDC. “However, such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012) (dismissing claims against the Governor of South Carolina and former director of SCDC), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012).
Further, construing Plaintiff's claims against the supervisory Defendants as based on supervisory liability, the undersigned notes that the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). For a supervisory official to be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by his subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) and deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221. Here, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations against the supervisory Defendants to demonstrate that they were aware of, or deliberately indifferent to, any risk of constitutional injury to Plaintiff. As such, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the supervisory Defendants, and they should be dismissed from this action. See Fordv. Stirling, No. 2:17-cv-02390-MGL, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2017).
Defendants Largent, Pringle, McCullogh, Welch, Robinson, McMillan, Sweetenburg, Brown
Plaintiff also names the following eight Defendants in his Complaint: Lt. Largent, Mrs. Pringle, Lt. McCullogh, Lt. Welch, Lt. Robinson, Sergeant McMillan, Ofc./Sergeant Sweetenburg, and DHO Angela R. Brown. [Doc. 1 at 7-8, 12.] However, these eight Defendants, like the supervisory Defendants, are subject to summary dismissal.
Critically, Plaintiff makes no allegations in the Complaint about their direct involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. Instead, he makes only general, vague allegations about their respective obligations arising from having witnessed the alleged incident with Defendant Greene. As noted, however, absent allegations of specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims as to each Defendant, the Complaint is insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against these eight Defendants. Tracey, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2. Likewise, Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants fail under a theory of supervisory liability to the extent he intends to assert such a claim against them. Shaw, 13 F.3d at 798; Ford, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2. Accordingly, these eight Defendants are entitled to dismissal from this action.
In the section evaluating Plaintiff's claims below, the undersigned addresses whether Plaintiff has alleged facts to state a failure-to-protect claim against any Defendant and concludes he has not. As discussed below, to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a failure-to-protect claim against these eight Defendants, he has not alleged facts showing they were aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff or were deliberately indifferent to such a risk.
Claims subject to dismissal
In addition to Defendants noted above being entitled to dismissal from this action, certain claims asserted in the Complaint are also subject to dismissal for the reasons below.
As an initial matter, the undersigned observes that it is difficult to decipher precisely what causes of action Plaintiff is asserting. Plaintiff cites, without explanation, the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments as the basis of his claims. [Doc. 1 at 5.] Liberally construing the Complaint, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff may be asserting the following claims: (1) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of due process; (2) failure to protect in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (3) deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (4) excessive use of force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court will address each claim in turn.
To the extent Plaintiff intended to assert any other claim not addressed herein, the undersigned concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief as to any other cause of action.
Fourteenth Amendment Violation
Plaintiff purports to assert a claim for violations of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. [ Id.]
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, three kinds of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims may be brought: (1) claims for the denial of those specific protections in the Bill of Rights that have been made applicable to the states; (2) claims under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them; and (3) claims for violations of procedural due process, which prohibits the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without fair procedure.” Hewins v. Loftis, No. 6:15-cv-04320-MGL-JDA, 2016 WL 11410920, at *6 (D.S.C. May 19, 2016), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 4035461 (D.S.C. July 28, 2016). “To state a procedural due process violation [under the Fourteenth Amendment], a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law.” Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). Because “the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner,” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995), “to demonstrate a liberty interest meriting procedural due process protection, a prisoner must show (1) denial of an interest that can arise either from the Constitution itself or from state laws or policies, and that (2) this denial imposed on him an atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” Prieto, 780 F.3d at 251 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support any plausible claim arising under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Accordingly, Plaintiff's due process claim is subject to dismissal.
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting a claim against these Defendants for alleged violations of the prison grievance system, such a claim is without merit. “[I]t is well settled that inmates have no federal constitutional right to have any inmate grievance system in operation at the place where they are incarcerated.” Rivera v. Leonard, No. 5:15-cv-01191-DCN, 2016 WL 3364905, at *4 (D.S.C. June 17, 2016), aff'd, 672 Fed.Appx. 262 (4th Cir. 2016). “Because inmate grievance procedures are not constitutionally required in state prison systems, the failure to follow grievance procedures does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Doans v. Rice, 831 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1987) (unpublished table decision).
Failure to Protect
Next, liberally construed, the Complaint may be asserting a claim against certain Defendants for failing to protect Plaintiff from the alleged assault by Defendant Greene. However, to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert such a claim, he has failed to allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” imposes certain basic duties on prison officials. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. These include maintaining humane conditions of confinement, including the provision of adequate medical care and “reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Corrections officers have “a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners,” for “[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id. at 833, 834 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). However, “not every injury suffered by a prisoner at the hands of another translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety.” Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]o state a valid Eighth Amendment claim for an alleged failure to protect, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) serious or significant physical or emotional injury, and (2) that the prison officials had a sufficiently culpable state of mind.'” Bacon v. Rose, No. 7:13-cv-00350, 2014 WL 997252, at *2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 14, 2014) (citations omitted).
Here, the allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to state a failure-to-protect claim under § 1983. Critically, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that any Defendant was aware that Plaintiff was at risk to be harmed and, therefore, he has not demonstrated that any Defendant had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Burress v. Perkins, No. 2:13-cv-01970, 2014 WL 12543919, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 20, 2014) (finding that a plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted where the plaintiff did not allege “facts demonstrating that the defendants were aware that the three assaulting inmates posed a significant threat to the plaintiff or were likely to cause him harm”); see also Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 756-57 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court's dismissal of a failure-to-protect claim where the complaint failed to allege that the correctional officers “had any knowledge of the impending harm”).
Deliberate Indifference
Further, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs, the Complaint fails to provide sufficient facts to state such a claim.
To state a cause of action under § 1983 for an Eighth Amendment deprivation, Plaintiff must allege facts showing Defendants' deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, constituting unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Summary dismissal is appropriate, however, when no viable claim has been stated even though the complaint contains a cogent description of the underlying facts. Id. at 106-08. Deliberate indifference is a very high standard, which requires more than a showing of mere negligence. Id. at 106. Deliberate indifference also requires “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1994). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “the Constitution is designed to deal with deprivations of rights, not errors in judgment, even though such errors may have unfortunate consequences.” Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695-96 (4th Cir. 1999). Further, the medical treatment at issue “must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990).
The instant Complaint does not allege facts demonstrating that any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs. Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that he received medical treatment after chemical munitions were sprayed in his face. [Doc. 1 at 11.] The Complaint fails to demonstrate a “deliberate or callous indifference” on the part of any prison official to Plaintiff's medical needs. Pressley v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1987). Also, “[t]he fact that medical professionals may differ on a recommended course of treatment does not establish deliberate indifference.” Hendrick v. Booth, No. TDC-14-cv-4021, 2015 WL 8055172, at *8 (D. Md. Dec. 3, 2015), aff'd, 654 Fed.Appx. 136 (4th Cir. 2016); see also Chamberlain v. Clarke, No. 7:14-cv-00013, 2014 WL 2154183, at *2 (W.D. Va. May 22, 2014) (“That an inmate simply disagrees with the course of treatment or the treatment is unsuccessful will not raise a deliberate indifference claim.”); Powell v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 1:08-cv-0087, 2009 WL 4666454, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 2, 2009) (“Plaintiff's disagreement or unhappiness with her course of medical treatment is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference because Plaintiff is clearly receiving treatment even if she disagrees with the appropriateness of that treatment.”); Sprinkle v. Barksdale, No. 7:08-cv-00430, 2008 WL 4499887, at *2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 7, 2008) (finding no deliberate indifference where prison doctors were monitoring the plaintiff's level of pain and providing medication to treat that pain). As such, Plaintiff's allegations do not set forth a claim of constitutionally inadequate medical care.
Therefore, any claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs Plaintiff may be asserting against Defendants is subject to summary dismissal. See King v. SCDC, No. 0:11-cv-03097-JMC, 2011 WL 7431227, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 652494 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2012).
Excessive Force
Finally, the undersigned addresses Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Greene for excessive use of force. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Greene assaulted him and sprayed him in the face with chemical munitions, causing him to suffer an injury. [Doc. 1 at 8, 11.] The undersigned concludes that Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Greene as to this claim are sufficient to survive initial review. As such, the undersigned will authorize service of process as to Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Greene for excessive use of force. All other claims and Defendants, however, are subject to summary dismissal.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Consequently, for the reasons stated above, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss from this action, without issuance and service of process, Defendants Warden Jackson, Bryan P. Stirling, Associate Warden Tisdale, Lt. Largent, Mrs. Pringle, Lt. McCullogh, Lt. Welch, Lt. Robinson, Sergeant McMillan, Ofc./Sergeant Sweetenburg, DHO Angela R. Brown, and each of Plaintiff's claims except for his excessive use of force claim against Defendant Greene. Therefore, Defendant Greene is the only remaining Defendant in this action and Plaintiff's claim against him for excessive use of force is the only remaining claim in this action.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint as to the Defendants and claims that are recommended for dismissal by mere amendment and therefore recommends that those Defendants and claims be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because further amendment would be futile. See Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 610-12, 614-15 (4th Cir. 2020).
The undersigned will issue an order authorizing service of process of the Complaint on Defendant Greene contemporaneously with this Report.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.