Opinion
C/A 1:24-31-JDA-SVH
03-01-2024
Rhonda Spa, Plaintiff, v. Aiken/Barnwell Counties Community Action Agency, Inc., Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge
In this employment discrimination case, Rhonda Spa (“Plaintiff”) alleges religious discrimination and retaliation leading to her wrongful termination, which occurred after she refused the COVID-19 vaccine. Her former employer, Aiken/Barnwell Counties Community Action Agency, Inc. (“Defendant”) seeks dismissal of her claims.
Plaintiff asserts three claims against Defendant for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., arguing that Defendant (1) failed to accommodate her religious beliefs, (2) treated her differently than others, and (3) retaliated against her. This matter comes before the court on Defendant's motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 5]. The motion having been fully briefed [ECF Nos. 9, 11], it is ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), this case has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion to dismiss.
I. Relevant Factual Background
Plaintiff alleges she began working for Defendant in 2004 and was most recently employed as the Fiscal Manager. [ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 11]. Plaintiff alleges she had no disciplinary actions on her employment record and met Defendant's legitimate performance expectations. Id. ¶ 12.
Plaintiff states she worked in-person in a private office where she was able to socially distance without issue for two years from March 2020 to March 2022. Id. ¶ 13. According to Plaintiff, Defendant did not implement a COVID-19 vaccination protocol prior to 2022. Id. ¶ 14.
On or about September 16, 2021, in advance of a potential 2022 vaccine protocol release, Defendant requested that staff submit their official proof of COVID-19 vaccination record or provide a sufficient reason for why they could not be vaccinated for COVID-19. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff states that on or around September 29, 2021, she informed George Anderson, Executive Director, that she had not received the COVID vaccine. Id. ¶ 16.
On or about January 4, 2022, Defendant sent a memorandum to the staff indicating that it enacted a COVID-19 vaccine mandate, effective immediately. Id. ¶ 17. The memorandum informed staff that a form requesting medical or religious accommodation needed to be submitted by January 7, 2022, at 2 p.m. Id. ¶ 18.
Plaintiff alleges that on January 7, 2022, she submitted a religious accommodation form and attached a one-page religious accommodation request. Id. ¶ 19. Defendant has submitted Plaintiff's form and request, which states as follows:
Requested Accommodations ....: Vaccination Exemption
Lenth of time the accommodation is needed: until my departure from this earth or termination of employment whichever comes first
Describe the religious belief or practice that necessitates this request for accommodation: see Page 3 attached
Describe any alternative accommodations that might address your needs: Evidence shows that the Covid vaccines do not prevent the spread of the Covid-19 so requiring me to test weekly would certainly constitute discrimination unless all employees be treated equally. I am more than willing to test and quarantine at home should I have symptoms.[ECF No. 5-3 at 2].
Although courts generally do not consider matters outside the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss, Am. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004), a court may consider documents outside the pleadings without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment if those documents are “integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint” and their authenticity is unchallenged. Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 490 (4th Cir. 2015). Here, Plaintiff argues without explanation that her religious accommodation request form is not integral to the complaint. [See ECF No. 9 at 4]. However, “[a] document is integral to a complaint if the claims turn on or are otherwise based on statements contained in the document,” Defs. of Wildlife v. Boyles, 608 F.Supp.3d 336, 344 (D.S.C. 2022), as is the case here regarding Plaintiff's religious accommodation form and attachment. Other documents submitted by the parties are not dispositive to the resolution of the instant motion. Therefore, the court need not determine whether these documents are integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint.
In conjunction with the above, Plaintiff submitted the following:
The nature of my objection to the Covid-19 vaccination requirement is based on my sincere religious belief. I am a born again Christian who believes in the validity of scripture. I seek God's will for my life through prayer, reading the bible and relying on the power of the Holy Spirit to help me do God's will. As a believer in Jesus, the Holy Spirit lives in me.
1 Corinthians 6:19(NIV)
Do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have received from God? You are not your own; you were bought at a price. Therefore honor God with your body.
Psalms 139:13-14(NIV)
For you created my inmost being; you knit me together in my mother's womb. I praise you because I am fearfully and wonderfully made; your works are wonderful, I know that full well.
2 Corinthians 7:l(NIV)
Let us purify ourselves from everything that contaminates body and spirit, perfecting holiness out of reverence for God.
I firmly believe that the Covid-19 vaccine ingredients contain contaminants that are harmful to my body, and that in addition to the known health risks, there are many unknown risk due to the lack of standard testing and long-term study of these substances. Vaccines have been endowed in our lives. The Covid-19 vaccines are the first of their kind, unique in that they do not contain the typical viral ingredients, but rather they have
components and designs such as synthetic mRNA and lipid nanoparticles that have never been used before in this way in humans. Both the mRNA vaccines and the adenoviral vaccine use genetic sequences that serve to teach the body how to manufacture a spike protein that is anomalous to my own genetic structure. Very little scientifically is known about these substances in humans and the long-term effects on the body. The Covid-19 Vaccines are substantially different from prior vaccines in ways that I personally find morally objectionable to my firmly held religious beliefs. In taking this vaccine, I would effectively be taking part in a medical experiment. Not only do I consider this unsafe, but most importantly to me, it would be dishonoring and disobeying to God and the principles laid out in his word were I to allow myself to be injected with one of these Covid-19 vaccines. I have a responsibility to take care of the body God gave me, which “is the temple of the Holy Spirit. Especially when there is other know substances and holistic methods to nurture and boost our God-given immunity. There is an important difference between intentionally injecting my body with a drug that can harm me-whether it is cocaine, meth, heroin or the Covid-19 vaccine-versus unintentionally coming into bodily contact with a harmful virus or substance in this world outside of my complete control. I am fully accountable to God for those things over which I have complete control-like what drugs are intentionally injected into my body. I hereby assert my right to a religious exemption from vaccination. I am humbled and honored to continue my employment with ABCCAA and look forward to this request being granted.Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that on January 31, 2022, Defendant summarily denied all religious accommodation requests. [ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 22]. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant did not engage in the interactive process, and its denials were not based on an undue hardship. Id. ¶ 23.
Plaintiff was notified on February 23, 2022, that her religious accommodation request was denied and that she would be informed of the administrative procedure to address continued employment. Id. ¶ 24. On March 4, 2022, Defendant distributed a memorandum detailing the agencywide mandatory vaccine policy that would go into effect on March 18, 2022. Id. ¶ 25.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant notified her that the vaccine was a “condition of employment” and that staff who were not vaccinated for COVID and provided proof of vaccination to Human Resources by 5 p.m. on Friday, March 18, 2022, would be terminated. Id. ¶ 26. On March 18, 2022, Defendant terminated Plaintiff and told her it was because she had “resigned” by not receiving the COVID vaccine. Id. ¶ 27.
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is “not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint.” Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244. Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support the legal conclusion.” Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001).
B. Analysis
Title VII prohibits employers from taking any personnel actions affecting employees “based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “Courts have recognized that employees may utilize two theories in asserting religious discrimination claims,” “failure to accommodate” and “disparate treatment” theories. Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff asserts both theories, as well as a claim for retaliation.
1. Title VII Failure to Accommodate Claim
Title VII “requires employers to accommodate the religious practice of their employees unless doing so would impose an ‘undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.'” Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 453-54 (2023) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). Where an employee alleges that their employer failed to provide a religious accommodation, courts analyze the case through a “burden shifting scheme akin to the one articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2008).
Thus, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by pleading, and ultimately proving that “(1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; [and] (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.” Id. (quoting Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1019). “If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that it could not [reasonably] accommodate the plaintiff's religious needs without undue hardship.” Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1019; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
Determining whether a plaintiff has a “bona fide religious belief” is a two-pronged inquiry: a court must determine whether the employee's belief is “religious” in nature, as opposed to social, political, or economic views or personal preferences, and whether that belief is “sincerely held.” United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, Va., 708 F.3d 560, 570-71 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.Ct. 2361 (2018). “[I]n determining whether an employee's beliefs are religious in nature, courts have analyzed whether the beliefs in question (1) ‘address fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters,' (2) are ‘comprehensive in nature,' and (3) ‘are accompanied by certain formal and external signs.'” Ellison v. Inova Health Care Servs., C/A No. 1:23-00132-MSN-LRV, 2023 WL 6038016, at *4 & n.6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 14, 2023) (quoting Africa v. Com. of Pa., 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981) and noting that the Fourth Circuit has cited the Africa standard with approval).
Both Plaintiff and Defendant rely on the Africa standard in briefing [see ECF No. 5-1 at 7, ECF No. 9 at 8], as does much of the case law cited herein.
Defendant argues-and Plaintiff does not dispute-that the asserted religious basis for Plaintiff's religious exemption to taking the COVID-19 vaccines falls within the category of cases asserting “body-as-a-temple” claims. [ECF No. 5-1 at 7-8, ECF No. 9 at 9-10]. Review of this case law, all addressing the sufficiency of a complaint, is instructive and supports the conclusion that whether the COVID-19 vaccine is harmful or ineffective is not a belief, religious or otherwise, but rather a concern of scientific fact.
In this circuit, the Eastern District of Virginia has recently addressed a similar circumstance involving multiple plaintiffs, explaining as to one of the plaintiffs as follows:
In Ellison's request for exception, he claims that, as a Christian, he has a right to refuse the vaccine. Specifically, he claims that the Bible requires Christians to treat their bodies as “temple[s] of the Holy Spirit,” meaning that he is “compel[led]” to care for his
mind and body. Dkt. No. 40-3 at 3.7 And because, in his view, taking the COVID-19 vaccine would “introduce to [his] body a medication that could induce harm,” he claims that complying with the hospital's policy would be “antithetical to [his] desire to honor God.” Id. Notably, Ellison supports his claim through references to his “personal analyses” of CDC and FDA databases that he believes prove that “there is a 28 times more likely chance of adverse reactions from the COVID-19 vaccines in the last 15 months, than from any of the other 50+ vaccinations.” Id. Ellison also provided “supplemental information” four months after submitting his initial request to be exempted from the new policy. Dkt. No. 40-4 at 2.8 In his renewed request Ellison first re-asserted the argument about his body being a temple and the need to keep it “protected and undefiled.” Id. at 3. He also stated (for the first time) that he prayed about the vaccine and that “the answer that [God] revealed was that [he] must protect [his] temple from the vaccine and refuse it.” Id.
Based on Ellison's own stated reason, the Court finds that, though couched in religious terms, Ellison refused the vaccines based on concerns of vaccine safety. District courts have routinely rejected similar claims. See, e.g., Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., Nos. 22-cv-342, 22-cv-392, 2023 WL 2455681, at *2-7 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 10, 2023) (finding that exemption requests “predicated fundamentally on [ ] concerns with the safety of the vaccine and [plaintiffs'] right to bodily integrity”-even if based on the “belief that [plaintiff's] body is a temple” and “ratified by prayer”-are fundamentally “medical judgments . . ., not matters of religious belief”).Ellison, 2023 WL 6038016, at *5 (dismissing the “body-as-a-temple” claims of several plaintiffs); see also Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Med. Ctr., C/A No. 3:22-01306-JR, 2023 WL 7221458, at *6 (D. Or. Sept. 13, 2023) (“the Court readily accepts that plaintiff ‘has a bona fide religious belief that that her body is a temple of the Holy Spirit'-however, plaintiff's specific determination of what is harmful (i.e., ethylene oxide) was not, in this case, premised on the Bible or any other religious tenet or teaching, but rather on her research-based scientific/medical judgments”), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 3:22-01306-JR, 2023 WL 7220734 (D. Or. Nov. 2, 2023); Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., C/A No. 23-11171-JCB, 2023 WL 7116739, at *4 (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 2023) (finding that the plaintiff's belief that “what God has created is perfect” and that it would “go against God by defiling [her] perfectly created body that He created in His image by receiving the vaccine” was “not a bona fide religious belief” entitled to Title VII protection); Guthrie-Wilson v. Cook County, C/A No. 1:23-362, 2023 WL 8372043, at *2 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 4, 2023) (“although plaintiff purports to ground her refusal to receive the Covid-19 vaccine in her faith as a Seventh Day Adventist, she identifies no specific religious tenet that conflicts with Covid-19 vaccination, citing only the broad principle that she must ‘practice a healthy lifestyle and abstain from anything that could bring her harm.'”); Finkbeiner v. Geisinger Clinic, 623 F.Supp.3d 458, 466 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (rejecting religious-discrimination claims concerning COVID-19 requirements because holding otherwise would “count everything [the plaintiff] believes about healthy living as religious practice”); Ulrich v. Lancaster Gen. Health, C/A No. 22-4945, 2023 WL 2939585, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2023) (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2023) (“Ulrich's attempt to avoid testing which she argues ‘could bring potential harm, introduce harmful substances, cause adverse health effects or endanger [her] wellbeing,' and her argument that COVID testing would cause her ‘anxiety,' clearly state medical concerns which she attempts to ‘cloak with religious significance,' as in Africa.”).
Plaintiff argues otherwise, citing to a set of cases drawing the following distinction that Plaintiff argues is applicable here:
[A] religious belief that the body is a temple of God is not in itself inconsistent with receiving a vaccine. Many people hold that belief without also believing that receiving a vaccine defiles the body. The important question isn't whether an employee has a religious belief not to mistreat her body; the question is whether the employee's belief that the vaccine qualifies as mistreatment is itself based in religion. If Petermann believed that the vaccine defiled her body because it was unhealthy or unsafe, that would be a medical objection, not a religious objection. See id. But if her objection to the vaccine was rooted in a belief “that she must remain as God made her,” that would be sufficient to show a religious conflict at the pleading stage.Petermann v. Aspirus, Inc., C/A No. 22-332-JDP, 2023 WL 2662899, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 2023) (citation omitted); see also Passarella, 2023 WL 2455681, at *7 (dismissing claims from plaintiffs who indicated there was “no religious belief that would prevent [them] from taking the vaccine if [they] believed it was safe” but allowing the claims of one plaintiff to proceed where her offered reasons for opposition to taking the vaccine was as follows: “I oppose all vaccines. My children are not vaccinated. My husband has never been vaccinated. My son is not circumcised. We are the way God made us. It is my right [as] an American and a Christian to remain that way.”); see also Leeck v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, C/A No. 5:22-4634, 2023 WL 4147223, at *9 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 2023) (denying employer's motion to dismiss because Plaintiff objected to all vaccines and injections on religious grounds).
The distinction drawn by Plaintiff is inapplicable here where her proffered and primary reasons for refusing the COVID-19 vaccine are based on “[e]vidence [that] shows that the Covid vaccines do not prevent the spread of the Covid-19,” as well as her assertions that she “firmly believe[s] that the Covid-19 vaccine ingredients contain contaminants that are harmful to my body” and that the vaccine is dangerous in that is it new, formulated differently from previous vaccines, and insufficiently or ineffectively tested. [ECF No. 5-3 at 3-4, see also id. (Plaintiff equating the COVID-19 vaccine to cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin)].
The court rejects Plaintiff's argument, as articulated by the court in Leeck, that where both medical and religious reasons are offered, “the presence of reasons that do not satisfy the first criterion need not negate the presence of reasons that do satisfy the criterion,” 2023 WL 4147223, at *7, particularly here where, as articulated by the court in Passarella, Plaintiff has indicated no religious belief that would prevent her from taking the COVID-19 vaccine if she believed it was safe. 2023 WL 2455681, at *7.
As explained by the Third Circuit:
We note that we are not the only court to come to the conclusion that certain anti-vaccination beliefs are not religious. This is not to say that anti-vaccination beliefs cannot be part of a broader religious faith; in some circumstances, they can, and in those
circumstances, they are protected. However, Fallon has not presented such circumstances here.Fallon v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr of Se. Pennsylvania, 877 F.3d 487, 492-93 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Jackson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., C/A No. 5:23-5102, 2023 WL 9097854, at *6 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 27, 2023) (“Because the Court finds that her beliefs against vaccination are rooted in political, sociological, philosophical, and/or medical-rather than religious-beliefs, Ms. Jackson's claims under Title VII and ACRA are dismissed.”).
Plaintiff additionally cites to Camp v. L.A. Arena Co., LLC, C/A No. EDCV 22-2220-JGB-KKX, 2023 WL 4680797, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2023), where the court denied motion to dismiss, allowing plaintiff's Title VII failure to accommodate claim to proceed where plaintiff's alleged reason for refusing the COVID-19 vaccine is as follows:
I am commanded by my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ not to do anything that would desecrate or destroy my body. And taking an experimental vaccine that has been proven to be ineffective at stopping Covid-19; but instead has been proven to cause enlarged hearts, heart attacks, as well as a litany of other adverse side effects falls under the purview of knowingly desecrating and destroying my body.See also Langer v. Hartland Bd. of Educ., C/A No. 3:22-01459 (JAM), 2023 WL 6140792, at *6-7 (D. Conn. Sept. 20, 2023) (“These allegations and just their sheer prolixity suggest that Langer's real reason for objecting to both the vaccine and related testing requirement was because she does not believe the vaccine works. And an objection to the science that supports (or does not support) the COVID-19 vaccine is not an objection based on religion. Nevertheless, the true reason for Langer's objection to the testing requirement is an issue I should not resolve at the pleadings stage of this litigation.”). Camp and Langer appear inconsistent with the weight of authority and reasoning provided in the case law above.
Plaintiff argues that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) “chose to define religion broadly to ‘ensure that the Commission will not have to determine what is or is not a religion.'” [ECF No. 9 at 6 (citing EEOC Compl. Man. § 2-II.A.1.c.)]. However, the EEOC has also provided the following guidance that is instructive here:
Title VII does not protect social, political, or economic views or personal preferences. Thus, objections to a COVID-19 vaccination requirement that are purely based on social, political, or economic views or personal preferences, or any other nonreligious concerns (including about the possible effects of the vaccine), do not qualify as religious beliefs . . . under Title VII.EEOC Guidance, What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws, https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws (last visited February 28, 2024).
A court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. Phillips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's Title VII failure to accommodate claim.
2. Title VII Disparate Treatment Claim
The complaint asserts that Plaintiff was terminated “because of her religious beliefs and requests for accommodations based on her religion” and that she was “treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who did not hold the same religious beliefs.” [ECF 1-1 ¶¶ 32-33].
To state a plausible disparate treatment religious discrimination claim, an employee must plead and ultimately show that the employer “treated her differently than other employees because of her religious beliefs.” Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1017 (emphasis in original); see also Abeles v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 676 Fed.Appx. 170, 174 (4th Cir. 2017) (listing elements of a Title VII prima facie case for a claim of disparate treatment based on religion as follows: “a plaintiff must show ‘(1) membership in a protected class, (2) satisfactory job performance, (3) adverse employment action, and (4) different treatment'-which here means more severe discipline-'than similarly situated employees outside the protected class.'”) (citing Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010); Cook v. CSX Transp. Co., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993)).
Plaintiff has alleged she was treated the same as all other similarly-situated employees in that all employees were mandated to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. The complaint contains no allegation that any other employee received an accommodation-religious or otherwise-that allowed them to continue employment with Defendant without offering proof that they had received COVID-19 vaccine.
Notwithstanding, Plaintiff argues “Defendant's denial of all requests for religious accommodations and termination of all employees who requested religious accommodations without engaging in the interactive process give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination sufficient to meet the fourth prong of a prima facie case for Title VII discrimination.” [ECF No. 9 at 14]. However, Plaintiff cites only one distinguishable out-of-circuit case in support. See Camp, 2023 WL 4680797, at *6 (finding the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged disparate treatment including allegations that the defendants “approved only six of the forty-five requests for religious exemptions it received.”).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged her “employer treated the employee more harshly than other employees of a different religion, or no religion, who had engaged in similar conduct.” Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1017. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII disparate treatment claim.
3. Title VII Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff claims that Defendant “retaliated against [her] because of her requests for religious accommodations by terminating [her].” [ECF 1-1 ¶ 53]. However, Plaintiff was not terminated because she requested an accommodation but rather because she no longer met the “condition of employment” that she receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Id. ¶¶ 26-27.
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation in contravention of Title VII, a plaintiff must prove ‘(1) that she engaged in a protected activity,' as well as ‘(2) that her employer took an adverse employment action against her,' and ‘(3) that there was a causal link between the two events.'” Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405-06 (4th Cir. 2005)). “The text, structure, and history of Title VII demonstrate that a plaintiff making a retaliation claim . . . must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Univ. of Texas S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).
The parties disagree whether Plaintiff's request for a religious accommodation is a protected activity under Title VII. The court need not resolve this issue because Plaintiff has failed to plead that her request was the but-for cause of her termination where she, instead, pleads and argues in briefing that “she was terminated for failing to comply with the condition of employment [receiving the vaccine] in conflict with her religion.” [See ECF No. 9 at 5, see also ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 26-27].
The court rejects Plaintiff's argument that Defendant's but-for reason for her termination was her request for an accommodation, made months prior to her last day of employment, and that her failure to take the vaccine played no part in Defendant's decision. In evaluating Defendant's motion, this court “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments” E. Shore Markets, Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 5].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).