Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Matson Navigation Co.

13 Citing cases

  1. CSX Transportation Co. v. Novolog Bucks County

    Civil Action No. 04-4018 (E.D. Pa. May. 24, 2006)   Cited 4 times

    A comprehensive review of the relevant case law demonstrates that liability for demurrage must arise out of a contractual relationship. See S. Pac. Trans. Co. v. Matson Navigation Co., 383 F. Supp. 154, 156 (N.D. Cal. 1974) ("The promise to pay demurrage need not be an express one, but may be implied in order to compensate the carrier for the use of its equipment. But, while the obligation to pay may be implied, the promise nonetheless arises out of the contractual relationship and may only be imputed to parties to the contract.") (internal citations omitted); Middle Atl. Conference, 353 F. Supp. at 1118 (finding that the relevant case law "do[es] not require that there be a specific contract to pay demurrage but it must arise out of contract and in practically every instance the obligation is only enforced upon persons who are parties to the contract of carriage.").

  2. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of Pensacola

    936 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Fla. 1995)   Cited 6 times
    Stating in dicta that "[t]he unilateral action of one party in labeling an intermediary as a consignee does not render the putative consignee liable for demurrage" and indicating that an agreement to be contractually bound is key to demurrage liability

    The Port contends that since it was not a party to any of the contracts for shipment, it is not liable for demurrage as a matter of law. In support of its motion, the City relies upon two district court cases: Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Matson Navigation Co., 383 F. Supp. 154 (N.D.Cal. 1974), and Middle Atlantic Conference v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C.1972) (three judge court). On the other hand, CSX has cited no caselaw in support of its position. I have discovered only two other reported cases dealing with this issue.

  3. Norfolk Southern v. Groves

    586 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2009)   Cited 33 times
    Affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment where named consignee was not a party to bill of lading contract where it did not agree to be named as consignee and was not aware of its designation as such

    In Evans Prods. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, the Seventh Circuit held that "[l]iability for freight charges may be imposed only against a consignor, consignee, or owner of the property, or others by statute, contract, or prevailing custom." 729 F.2d 1107, 1113 (7th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted); see also S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Matson Navigation Co., 383 F.Supp. 154, 156 (N.D.Cal. 1974) ("The obligation to pay demurrage arises either out of contract, statute or prevailing custom"); Middle Atl., 353 F.Supp. at 1118 (liability for demurrage "must be founded either on contract, statute or prevailing custom"). Norfolk has not offered any evidence of prevailing industry custom or applicable statute that would hold non-parties to a shipping contract liable for demurrage. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Savannah is neither consignor nor owner of the freight.

  4. Wis. Cent., Ltd. v. TiEnergy, LLC

    Case No. 15 C 2489 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2017)   Cited 2 times

    South Tec., 337 F.3d at 821 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court turns to other relevant factors to determine whether TiEnergy is a consignee by operation of law, including whether the "consignee has played an active role in the railroad transportation contract or has an interest in or control over the goods," see South Pacific Transp. Co. v. Matson Navigation Co., 383 F. Supp. 154, 157 (N.D. Cal. 1974), or whether the consignee accepted delivery of the goods. See Groves, 586 F.3d at 1278 ("a consignee's liability is quasi-contractual, and arises by operation of law when the consignee accepts delivery of the goods[.]")); see also Universal Am-Can, Ltd. v. Nw. Steel & Wire Co., No. 01 C 50220, 2002 WL 88924, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2002) ("Consignees may be liable for freight charges based on acceptance of delivery even where the initial liability for the charges rests with the consignor.").

  5. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Brampton Enterprises

    CASE NO. CV407-155 (S.D. Ga. Sep. 15, 2008)

    The South Tec opinion is consistent with several other decisions. In Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Matson Navigation Co., 383 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Cal. 1974), the court held that the defendant terminal operator was not liable for demurrage. The defendant was not named as consignee on the bills of lading for most of the shipments, but was named as consignee for some of the shipments. First, the court held that the defendant could not be liable for demurrage where the bills of lading named it as a "care of" party and not as consignee. The court then stated:

  6. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Port Erie Plastics, Inc.

    Civil Action No. 05-139 Erie (W.D. Pa. Sep. 29, 2006)   Cited 1 times
    Following the District Court's decision in this case

    "[L]liability for demurrage must arise out of a contractual relationship." See CSX Transportation Co. v. Novolog Bucks County, 2006 WL 1451280, *7 (E.D. Pa 2006) (quoting S. Pac. Trans. Co. v. Matson Navigation Co., 383 F.Supp. 154, 156 (N.D.Cal. 1974)) ("The promise to pay demurrage need not be an express one, but may be implied in order to compensate the carrier for the use of its equipment. But, while the obligation to pay may be implied, the promise nonetheless arises out of the contractual relationship and may only be imputed to parties to the contract.") (internal citations omitted).

  7. Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Carry Transit, Inc.

    Civil Action No. 3: 04-CV-1095-B (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2005)

    The plaintiffs in Matson and South Tec sought to hold the defendants liable for demurrage charges because they were listed as consignees on some bills of lading, while the majority of bills of lading properly listed the defendants as a "care of" or "stop" party, naming some other party as the consignee. S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Matson Navigation Co., 383 F.Supp. 154, 155 (N.D. Cal. 1974); S. Tec, 337 F.3d at 821. According to Union Pacific, the [ Matson and South Tec] courts held that due to the vast majority of identical shipments identifying the actual consignee, it was apparent to the rail carriers that another party named as consignee on a few of the bills of lading was really an agent for the consignee named on the `vast majority' of the bills of lading.

  8. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of Pensacola

    887 F. Supp. 275 (N.D. Fla. 1995)

    CSX contends that if it cannot collect pursuant to its tariff, "it would be a clear injustice" if it the railroad was not compensated for its damages on some other basis. The parties have cited only two district court cases, and both are over twenty years old. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Matson Navigation Co., 383 F. Supp. 154 (N.D.Cal. 1974); Baker v. Prolerized Chicago Corp., 335 F. Supp. 183 (N.D.Ill. 1971). I have discovered no other reported cases on point.

  9. CSX Transportation Co. v. Novolog Bucks County

    502 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2007)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that primary jurisdiction arguments are waivable

    The "longstanding law" invoked by Novolog for the proposition that a transloader cannot be considered a consignee for demurrage purposes where it has not executed the bill of lading that names it as the consignee is, in fact, limited to three federal district court cases. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Port Erie Plastics, Inc., No. 05-139 Erie, 2006 WL 2847414 (W.D.Pa.Sep.29, 2006) (following the District Court's decision in this case); Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Carry Transit, No. 3:04-CV-1095-B (N.D.Tex. Oct. 27, 2005) (holding that where a transloader did not have any beneficial interest in the freight and did not authorize the shippers to list it as a consignee it could not be held liable for demurrage charges); and Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Matson Navigation Co., 383 F.Supp. 154, 157 (N.D.Cal.1974) (holding that a transloader who is "merely named in the railroad bill of lading" without being actively involved in the transportation contract and without any "culpability for the delay" cannot be liable for demurrage, but noting specifically that the transloader had been named as the "care of party in the vast majority of the bills of lading under examination). We do not find these cases persuasive.

  10. Illinois Central Railroad v. South Tec Development Warehouse, Inc.

    337 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 2003)   Cited 32 times
    Explaining that in the absence of a contract providing otherwise, only a consignee is liable for demurrage

    See id. at 884. In Southern Pac. Trans. Co. v. Matson Navigation Co., 383 F.Supp. 154 (N.D.Cal. 1974), a railroad sought to recover demurrage charges assessed against Matson, which received railroad shipments that were sent onward by sea to their final destinations in Hawaii. On most of the shipments, Matson was not listed as a consignee on the bills of lading.