Opinion
[No. 200, October Term, 1949.]
Decided July 19, 1950. Motion for rehearing filed August 11, 1950. Rehearing denied October 5, 1950.
Equity — Jurisdiction — Title to Land or Interests Therein — Though Cases Ordinarily Triable at Law, Factors Present May Justify Equitable Jurisdiction — Easements — Right of Way — Title by Prescription — Equitable Jurisdiction of This Suit to Establish and Enforce, Sustained — Evidence — Presumption of Adverse Character of User, Raised by Proof of Open and Continuous Duration, without Land-Owner's Objection, for 20 Years — Evidence of Land-Owner's Erection of Unlocked Gates on Route, for His Convenience and Not to Bar the Way, Insufficient to Defeat Claim to Prescriptive Easement of Passage — Exclusive Character of User — Evidence to Negate — Proof of Occasional Use by Property-Owner's Customers, Does Not Constitute — Evidence Herein Established Plaintiff's Open, Exclusive and Continuous Use of Road Over Defendant's Property for More than 20 Years — Resultant Presumption of Adverse Character of User Unrebutted.
The rule requiring resort to an action at law in matters involving title to land or interests therein is not inflexible, and factors such as the possibility of irreparable damages, lack of reasonable doubt as to the title, and need of mandatory injunction to afford complete relief, may justify sustaining of jurisdiction in equity. p. 34
In this suit to enjoin defendant's interference with plaintiffs' use of a certain roadway over its land and to compel removal of obstructions and restoration of a bridge, in which plaintiffs' claimed title by prescription to the right of way was denied, held, equity had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. p. 34
Proof of open and continuous use of a roadway over the land of another without objection by owner for twenty years imposes upon the owner the burden of showing that the user was not adverse, but by license or permission inconsistent with a claim of right. p. 35
The mere erection by land-owner of unlocked gates across a roadway on his land for the greater convenience of his operations and not as a barrier to passage, will not defeat a claim to a prescriptive easement of passage, though, if the right to maintain unlocked gates is exercised for the statutory period, it may limit the extent of the adverse user. pp. 35-36
In suit by owners of adjoining farms against race track to enjoin interference with plaintiffs' alleged right of way by prescription across defendant's land, proof that defendant's patrons had used the road from time to time during race meetings (25 days per year), did not militate against plaintiffs' claim of adverse and exclusive use. p. 36
In suit by owners of adjoining farms against race-track to enjoin interference with plaintiffs' claimed right of way by prescription across defendant's land, where it appeared that plaintiffs' predecessors in title commenced in 1908 to ford a river into defendant's land and to cross it to nearby town, that alternative route was about three times as long, that plaintiffs maintained the road, in 1919 constructed a bridge across the river, and used the road and bridge uninterruptedly and without seeking or obtaining defendant's permission, until May 13, 1949, when defendant blocked the road with barricades, that only a few of plaintiffs were ever employed at defendant's track, that, though defendant kept sliding gates on the roadway, they were never closed except during race meetings (25 days per year), when a watchman was stationed at them to regulate the traffic of defendant's patrons, as many as 100 autos of whom used the road each day during the racing season, that even during the meetings plaintiffs were permitted to pass through the gates without question, and that a sign "Road closed — Bridge out of repair" was erected by defendant only to avoid possible liability to persons injured on the bridge, held: (1) equity had jurisdiction, though title to an interest in land was involved; (2) there was abundant proof of plaintiffs' open and continuous user of the way for the period of 20 years; (3) defendant had not rebutted the resultant presumption that the user was adverse and not permissive; whence (4) the trial court properly decreed for plaintiffs. pp. 33-36
M.C.P., Jr.
Decided July 19, 1950.
Motion for rehearing filed August 11, 1950.
Rehearing denied October 5, 1950.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Prince George's County (MARBURY, J.).
Suit by Paul H. Meyer, Otto J. Meyer, Schubert R. Meyer, Frederick J. Meyer, Garter G. Dick, Goley J. Dick, Fritz Sanders, and J. Thomas Simpson against the Southern Maryland Agricultural Association, for an injunction against defendant's interference with plaintiffs' use of a certain roadway over defendant's premises, in which plaintiffs alleged they had obtained a right of way by prescription, and to compel removal of obstructions and restoration of a bridge. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
The cause was argued before MARBURY, C.J., DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, and HENDERSON, JJ.
Hyman Ginsberg, with whom were Ginsberg Ginsberg, John W. Farrell and John S. Conroy on the brief, for the appellant.
M. Hampton Magruder and Ralph W. Powers for the appellees.
This appeal is from a decree of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, in equity, enjoining interference with the use of a certain roadway over the land of the appellant, and requiring the appellant to remove obstructions and restore a bridge. The questions presented are whether the appellees acquired an easement by prescription or dedication, and whether there was jurisdiction in equity to decide the disputed question of title.
We find no merit in the contention as to jurisdiction. The authorities were discussed in the recent case of Potomac Edison Co. v. Routzahn, 192 Md. 449, 456-8, 65 A.2d 580, 583, where it was said that the rule requiring resort to an action at law is not inflexible, and that factors such as the possibility of irreparable damage, the lack of reasonable doubt as to the title, and the need for mandatory injunction to afford complete relief, may be taken into account. Cf. Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 24 A.2d 795.
In the instant case there was abundant proof of continuous user for the statutory period. In 1908 Jacob Meyer, the father of four of the appellees, and some of his neighbors began fording the Patuxent River, by team and on horseback, and crossing the land now owned by the appellant to a county road known as the Bowie Road, and thence to the town of Bowie, where they transacted business, purchased supplies and attended church. In 1919 several of the appellees constructed a bridge over the river and continued to use the road, which had a gravel surface and was generally kept in repair by the appellees, although some surfacing was done by the appellant. In 1926 the appellant erected a new grandstand, which involved a relocation of a portion of the road, but the appellees continued to use it without interruption until May 13, 1949, when barricades were erected. No permission was ever sought from or given by the appellant.
While the appellees could reach Bowie by another road, this alternate route was about three times as long. It was shown that while some of the appellees had, at one time or another, been employed at the track, others had never been so employed.
The chief contention of the appellant is that the adverse character of the user was not established, and that it was in fact permissive, because of the maintenance by the appellant of one or more sliding gates which it maintained on the roadway. But the evidence shows that these gates were never locked and were kept open altogether except during the race meetings held during a period of about twenty-five days a year. Even during race meetings the appellees' use was not forbidden, but the closing of the gates and the posting of a watchman was designed to control the flow of traffic coming to the races. At one time the appellant erected a sign "Road closed — Bridge out of repair," but the chancellor found that this was designed to avoid possible liability to persons injured on the bridge. During the racing season the road was used by as many as one hundred cars a day. The bridge was never impassable, and there was testimony that even during the racing season the appellees were allowed to pass through the gates without question. We think the appellant has not met the burden of showing that the use of the way was by license or permission inconsistent with a claim of right. Wilson v. Waters, 192 Md. 221, 227, 64 A.2d 135, 137; Cox v. Forrest, 60 Md. 74, 80. In Baker v. Frick, 45 Md. 337, 340, 24 Am. Rep. 506, it was said that "the grant of a right of way * * * does not imply that the grantor may not erect gates at the points where the way enters and terminates." Easter v. Overlea Land Co., 129 Md. 627, 99 A. 893, is distinguishable upon its facts, for there the gates were kept locked, and there was definite evidence of permission. For cases holding that the mere erection of gates, for the greater convenience of the owner's operations and not as a barrier to passage, will not defeat a claim to a prescriptive easement of passage, see Davis v. Wilkinson, 140 Va. 672, 125 S.E. 700; Carpenter v. Stapleton, 169 Va. 22, 192, S.E. 792; Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C. 289, 29 S.E.2d 906; Hodgkins v. Branchini, 323 Mass. 169, 80 N.E.2d 464; note 73 A.L.R. 778, 788, and Tiffany, Real Property, 3d Ed., Sec. 812. Indeed, if the right to maintain unlocked gates has been exercised for the statutory period, it has been held that this does not negative, but merely limits the extent of, the adverse user.
The mere fact that patrons of the race track have used the road from time to time does not militate against the appellees' claim of adverse and exclusive user. Wilson v. Waters, supra. See also note to this case in 10 Md. L.R. 272. In view of our conclusion on the point of prescriptive right, it is unnecessary to consider whether the evidence would support the chancellor's finding that there was a dedication within the rule laid down in Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 24 A.2d 795.
Decree affirmed, with costs.