Opinion
CASE NO: 00-1366-CIV-GOLD/SIMONTON
March 18, 2004
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before me upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #159, filed October 30, 2003) seeking to dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (DE #148, filed February 5, 2003). Plaintiff's filed their Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #170) on December 22, 2003. Defendants filed their Reply (DE #179) on January 16, 2004. Defendants also filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment (DE #180) on January 20, 2004, and Plaintiff's filed their Response (DE #192) on February 13, 2004. Oral argument regarding Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment took place on February 29, 2004. Upon review of the parties' arguments, the record, and the relevant statutes and case law, and for the reasons stated in this Order, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Cross Motion are DENIED AS MOOT.
I will use the designation "Transcript at" followed by the page number to cite to the transcript of the oral argument.
Jurisdiction
This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and civil rights and elective franchise jurisdiction, § 1343.Factual Background
The Factual Background is derived from Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Statement") (DE #160, filed October 30, 2003), Plaintiffs' Response/Rebuttal to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Response/Rebuttal) (DE#169, filed December 22, 2003), and Ordinance 98-105 (DE #193). Material factual inconsistencies will be noted.
The following is a description of the documents that have been filed in conjunction with the Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants concurrently filed an Appendix in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #161) with their Motion, which included the depositions of Gonzalez-Ararigo, Feliciano, Arango, and Ruban and an affidavit of non-appearance of Elimelech. Plaintiff's filed the affidavits of Owsley, Trojecki as to Lending Company, Trojecki as to Century Cabs, Inc., Elimelech, and Ruban (DE #172, filed December 22, 2003). Plaintiff's filed another affidavit of Owsley on December 31, 2003 (DE #175).
The following facts relate to all four counts of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint. These Counts are as follows: Count I alleges a violation of Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights; Counts II and IV allege equal protection violations; and Count III seeks declaratory relief regarding Plaintiffs' rights under Chapter 31.
On July 7, 1998, the Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners enacted Ordinance 98-105, amending Chapter 31 of the Code of Miami-Dade County, which regulates for-hire motor vehicles and passenger motor carriers (i.e., taxicabs), effective April 5, 1999, (Ordinance 98-105). The Board voted on the Ordinance after two days of public hearings. (Statement ¶ 1). Dozens of individuals, including taxicab drivers and license holders, attended the hearings. ( Id. at ¶ 2). Some attendees spoke in favor of the Ordinance, while other attendees spoke against it. ( Id.).
The challenged amendments created new requirements for the issuance of taxicab licenses/medallions and imposed certain restrictions and limitations on the transfer, assignment, sale, and conveyance of taxicab licenses/medallions. (Ordinance 98-105). Specific amendments include prohibitions against the sale of a taxicab licenses unless the transfer, sale, or conveyance is to a taxicab owner; language limiting taxicab owners to the ownership of one license (or two if certain qualifications are met), and then only if the license owner actually drives the taxicab authorized thereby one out of two shifts per day on average of five days per week; prohibitions against the transfer of more than one taxicab license to an immediate family member, regardless of how many taxicab licenses the owner holds and wishes to transfer or bequeath; and prohibitions against corporate ownership of taxicab licenses. (Ordinance 98-105).
In a memorandum dated July 7, 1998, the County Manager stated that regulations regulating the taxi industry "are established for the health, welfare and safety of the public." (DE #198, July 7, 1998 Memorandum at 9). The Ordinance's "whereas" clauses state various reasons for the law. One such clause reads as follows:
Whereas, this Board finds that in order to improve the quality, efficiency and economy of for-hire service it is necessary that issuance of new taxi for-hire licenses be limited to persons who are registered taxi chauffeurs and that the transfer of all taxi for-hire licenses be limited to such persons who shall actually drive the taxi for-hire vehicle authorized thereby. . . .
(Ordinance 98-105). Another whereas clause cites additional reasons:
Whereas, this Board further finds that such limitation on transfers of for-hire taxi licenses will encourage entrepreneurship and be an incentive for the taxi driver, who frequently constitutes a traveler's first and last impression of Miami-Dade County, to provide courteous, safe, and efficient transportation service. . . .
(Ordinance 98-105). Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts states that Miami-Dade County has an interest in ensuring the safety of the taxicab industry, that experienced drivers are more likely to be safe drivers than inexperienced ones, and that safe drivers, in turn, can increase public safety. (Statement ¶ 5). Plaintiff's object to these statements on the "basis of relevance" and state that "[t]here is no issue in this lawsuit as to whether or not experienced drivers are more likely to be safe drivers than inexperienced drivers." (Response/Rebuttal ¶ 2).
Defendants include in their Statement of Undisputed Material Facts a number of statements regarding the differences between taxicabs and limousines, some of which Plaintiff's dispute. (Statement ¶ 13; Response/Rebuttal ¶ 5). Particularly, Plaintiff's dispute that limousine rides must be prearranged and that there is a different market for taxicab rides and limousines. (Response/Rebuttal ¶ 5). They do not disagree specifically with Defendants' statements that taxicab rides can be hailed from the street; that there are different age restrictions on taxicabs as opposed to limousines; and that taxicabs and limousines have different price schemes. (Statement ¶ 13).
Standard of Review
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes summary judgment when the pleadings and supporting materials show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). The court's focus in reviewing a motion for summary judgment is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). The moving party has the burden to establish the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608 (1970); Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d at 646. Once the moving party has established the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, to which the nonrnoving party bears the burden at trial, it is up to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). Issues of fact are genuine only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence presented could find for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the district court must remember that, "credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Id. 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.
Analysis
Upon review of the record, parties' arguments, and applicable case law, I conclude that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on all four counts of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint. In articulating the reasons for my conclusion, I will first address Count I, which alleges of violation of Plaintiffs' substantive due process. I will then discuss Counts II and IV together, as both allege equal protection violations. Finally, I will examine Count III which seeks declaratory relief as to Plaintiffs' rights under Chapter 31 of the county code.
In addition to articulating specific reasons for summary judgment as to each Count, Defendants raise another ground for summary judgment: standing. Defendants argue that most of the Plaintiff's do not own taxicab licenses (also known as medallions, see Plaintiffs' Response at 1). They do not, however, contest the standing of each Plaintiff. Specifically, they do not contest that Century Cabs, Inc. has standing, presumably because this Plaintiff owns taxicab medallions (DE #172, Exh. 3, Trojecki Affidavit as to Century Cabs, Inc. ¶ 2). Accordingly, I must examine each count to determine whether summary judgment is warranted, regardless of whether the remaining Plaintiff's have standing. My examination leads me to conclude that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on each Count; thus, the issue of whether these remaining Plaintiff's would have had standing to assert each claim is moot. Further, I note that some courts have concluded that a finding of standing as to one plaintiff allows courts to proceed to the merits of a case. See, e.g., lyengar v. Barnhart, 233 F. Supp.2d 5, 11 (D.D.C, 2002) ("It is well-settled that if a single plaintiff has standing to use, the Court may proceed on the merits without passing on the standing of the other individual plaintiff's.")
I. Summary Judgment Is Warranted as to Plaintiffs' Substantive Due Process Claim.
Ordinance 98-105 does not violate Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. In Count I, Plaintiff's allege that Ordinance 98-105 deprives them of their constitutionally-protected property interest in taxicab licenses. (Fourth Amended Complaint ¶ 56). Defendants argue that Plaintiff's suffered no deprivation because no protected property right as to taxicab licenses existed prior to the passage of the Ordinance. (Motion at 6). In any event, Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff's had a protected property interest, the Ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, and thus summary judgment should be granted as to this Count. (Motion at 2). Plaintiff's concede that the rational relation test applies. (Response at 5). They argue, however, that Defendants have "failed to articulate, much less establish, the existence of a rational basis for the challenged amendments." (Response at 6).
When considering a substantive due process claim, a court must consider (1) whether the plaintiff was "deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest;" and (2) assuming a protected property interest exists, whether the deprivation of that interest was the result of "an improper motive and by means that were pretextual, arbitrary, and capricious . . . without any rational basis." See Reserve, Ltd. v. Town of Longboat Key, 17 F.3d 1374, 1379 (11th Cir. 1994). I conclude that although Plaintiff's were deprived of a constitutionally protected interest, the Ordinance passes the rational relation test. Thus, summary judgment as to the substantive due process claim is warranted.
A. Plaintiff's Have Been Deprived of a Constitutionally Protected Interest Created by Virtue of Ordinance 98-105.
Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim alleges that Ordinance 98-105 deprives them of their constitutionally-protected property interest in taxicab licenses in violation of their substantive due process rights. (Fourth Amended Complaint ¶ 56). They allege that they have a protected property interest in the right to use and benefit economically from their property interest and to freely transfer, convey, or sell such property interest. ( Id.). They state that some of them purchased medallions with the intent of passing them on through their family, and they claim that Section 31-82(r)(5)'s restriction on gifting more than one license to a child arbitrarily limits their right to do so. (Opposition at 3). They also argue that the limitations on corporate ownership irrationally deprive them of their substantive due process rights. ( Id. at 4). Specifically, they state that many of them owned their licenses through a corporate entity, and they are now unable to freely gift these licenses to their children through corporations because the Ordinance prohibits it. ( Id. at 4). Thus, Plaintiff's argue that Ordinance 98-105 irrationally deprives them of their property interest in (1) transferring their licenses freely, (2) gifting their licenses to their children in an unlimited manner, and (3) using their corporate ownership to gift their license to their children.
I have stated in previous Orders in this case that there existed no protected property right in taxicab licenses prior to the passage of Ordinance 98-105. (Order on Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint, DE#140, filed December 19, 2002, at 7-9). "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. . . ." ( Id. (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709 (1972))). Accordingly, the prior Order stated that Florida law may be applied to determine whether Plaintiff's maintain a property right in the taxicab licenses. ( Id., citing Cheek v. Gooch, 779 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding no violation of due process where Georgia state law does not grant Plaintiff a property interest in the opportunity to acquire a license)). I also previously concluded that "it is clear that Florida courts have consistently held that an individual does not maintain a property right in a license. Indeed, Defendants correctly note that this Court has previously held that `Florida law clearly and unequivocally holds that no such property right exists.'" (Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, DE #105, filed March 22, 2002 at 8 (citations omitted)). I further concluded that "upon a review of the amendments in Chapter 31 of the Miami-Dade County Code, the County has created a property interest in the medallion system for license owners/holders." ( Id. at 12).
In sum, based on the adoption of Ordinance 98-105, I conclude that there is a protected property interest at stake (whereas none existed prior to the passage of the Ordinance). I also conclude that the first prong of the substantive due process test, that there is a deprivation of the protected interest, has been met. Plaintiff's state that the Ordinance deprived them of their interest in taxi licenses by permitting transfer only to registered taxicab chauffeurs (§ 31-82(r)(3)), by restricting gifts of licenses to family members (§ 31-82(r)(5)), and by prohibiting gifts of licenses through corporations (§ 31-82(r)(5)). Because the Ordinance places these limitations on Plaintiffs' property interest in taxicab licenses, there has been a deprivation. Plaintiff's have not shown, however, that the second prong of the substantive due process test has been met: that the deprivation was without any rational basis. See Part I.B, infra.
B. The Ordinance Passes the Rational Relation Test.
Ordinance 98-105 passes the rational relation test. When a legislative enactment is challenged as a violation of an individual's substantive due process rights, a court must first ask whether a "fundamental liberty interest" is implicated. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721-22, 138 L, Ed.2d 772, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997). If a fundamental right is at stake, the court must apply strict scrutiny to the challenged legislation. Id. If, on the other hand, the interest at stake is not deemed "fundamental," the court must apply the lower rational basis standard of review. Id. As a general rule, ordinary economic or commercial regulations, such as the taxicab licensing scheme at issue here, are subject only to rational basis review. Restrepo v. Miami-Dade County, Civ. No. 00-1132, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6932 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2002), citing Model v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32, 69 L.Ed.2d 40, 101 S.Ct. 2376 (1981); Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 953 (11th Cir. 2001). Indeed, Plaintiff's concede that the rational relation test applies. (Opposition at 5). Thus, I apply rational basis review to the Ordinance.
On rational basis review, legislation "carries with it a presumption of rationality that can only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality." Model, 452 U.S. at 331-32. The Eleventh Circuit has explained, "Almost every statute subject to the very deferential rational basis scrutiny standard is found to be constitutional." Williams, 240 F.3d at 948 (citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has followed this principle even when it found the city's reasons for its regulations uncompelling. See Executive Town Country Servs., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 789 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1986) (concluding that city's reasons for enacting certain regulations passed rational basis muster even though the reasons were "not very compelling."). Thus, to survive rational basis review, the challenged legislation need only be related to a legitimate government purpose. Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387, 1390-1391 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Stated simply, rational basis review "requires only a rational means to serve a legitimate end." City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3255 (1985). Accordingly, I will apply the following two-part test to assess Ordinance 98-105's constitutionality: (1) whether the County had a legitimate governmental interest in enacting the Ordinance, and (2) whether there is any plausible link between these interests and the Ordinance's restrictions and limitations at issue. Based on this test, the Ordinance meets rational basis scrutiny.
1. The County had a legitimate government interest enacting Ordinance 98-105.
The County's interest in the public safety of its highways has long been part of its plenary police power to legislate and is a legitimate interest under rational basis scrutiny. According to Miami-Dade County's Home Rule Amendment and Charter, the Board of County Commissioners has the power to "[l]icense and regulate taxis" (Article 1, § 1.01 A(3)) and "[p]erform any other acts consistent with law which are required by this Charter or which are in the common interest of the people of the county" (Article 1, § 1.01A(23)). There is no question that the County has this plenary power over the roads and taxicabs and that it has the power to advance public health, safety, and welfare. The County Manager states that these were the very reasons it enacted the law. (DE #198, July 7, 1998 Memorandum at 9 (stating that taxi industry regulations "are established for the health, welfare and safety of the public")). The Ordinance's "whereas" clauses state various reasons for the law, including the following:
Whereas, this Board finds that in order to improve the quality, efficiency and economy of for-hire service it is necessary that issuance of new taxi for-hire licenses be limited to persons who are registered taxi chauffeurs and that the transfer of all taxi for-hire licenses be limited to such persons who shall actually drive the taxi for-hire vehicle authorized thereby. . . .
(Ordinance 98-105). Another whereas clause cites additional reasons:
Whereas, this Board further finds that such limitation on transfers of for-hire taxi licenses will encourage entrepreneurship and be an incentive for the taxi driver, who frequently constitutes a traveler's first and last impression of Miami-Dade County, to provide courteous, safe, and efficient transportation service. . . .
(Ordinance 98-105).
Plaintiff's admitted during oral argument that the County had the power to enact the Ordinance and that the goal of promoting public health, safety, and welfare is a legitimate interest. (Transcript at 2-3). Plaintiff's stated that although these are legitimate goals, the Ordinance does not serve as a rational means in achieving these goals. ( Id.).Thus, the relevant question is whether the means Defendants selected, namely, enacting Ordinance 98-105, are rationally related to its goal of promoting the safety, health, and welfare of the public. See infra Part 1.B(2).
2. There is a plausible link between the County's goals and Ordinance 98-105.
As long as the Ordinance conceivably or plausibly relates to the County's goals, it passes the second prong of the rational basis test. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096 (1993) ("[If] there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, [the court's] inquiry is at an end."); Williams, 240 F.3d at 948 ( quoting FCC, 508 U.S. at 314-315). The challenging party has the burden "to negative every conceivable basis which might support it." Id.; Williams, 240 F.3d at 948 ( quoting FCC, 508 U.S. at 314-315). A legislative body is not required to articulate any reason at all for its legislative choices, and it is irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether a conceived reason for the challenged statute actually motivated the legislature. FCC, 508 U.S. at 315. Conceivable reasons can thus be "drawn from a litigant's or judge's mind or from an accurate record of the proceedings." See Cash Inn of Dade, Inc. v. Metro Dade County, 938 F.2d 1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 1991). It is "entirely permissible for the County to advance "rationales which may not have been contemplated at the time of passage." Id. (citation omitted). Legislation will survive rational basis scrutiny unless it is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that the court can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational. Gary v. City of Warner Robins, Georgia, 311 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also Schwan v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387, 1390-1391 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[l]f there is any conceivably valid justification for [a rule], and if there is any plausible link between the purpose of the [rule] and the methods selected to further its purpose, then no violation of substantive due process exists.") (citation omitted); cf. City of Clebume, 473 U.S. 432 at 446, 105 S.Ct. at 3258 ("[The County] may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational."), The rational basis test only requires that "the means adopted and the legislation's purpose must be `at least debatable.'" Gary, 311 F.3d at 1339 (quotation omitted).
FCC involved an equal protection challenge, rather than a substantive due process claim, but this distinction is immaterial. See Wood v. United States (In re Wood), 866 F.2d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The standard for evaluating substantive due process challenges to social and economic legislation is virtually identical to the `rational relationship' test for evaluating equal protection claims . . . any plausible reason supporting Congress' action in enacting the suspect legislation satisfies the `rational basis' test.").
Plaintiff's argue that Defendants have not met these standards. (Opposition at 6). Defendants, however, articulated various plausible reasons for each of the challenged provisions in their Motion for Summary Judgment and during oral argument. I will address each of these challenged provisions in turn: the provisions relating to (1) the restriction on the sale, transfer, or conveyance to active taxicab drivers, (2) the gift transfer exception, and (3) restrictions as to corporate ownership.
(a) The Restriction on Sale, Transfer or Conveyance
Plaintiff's challenge the provisions of the Ordinance limiting the transfer of taxicab licenses to registered taxi drivers who drive cabs a minimum of five days a week. (Opposition at 2). In the course of their arguments against this restriction, they also attack §§ 31-82(r)(4) and (r)(6). I will first address Section 31-82(r)(3), which reads as follows:
for-hire taxicab licenses may only be assigned, sold (conditional or outright) or transferred to a Miami-Dade County registered taxicab chauffeur who: (1) does not hold a Miami-Dade County For-Hire Taxicab License; (2) does not hold any interest in a corporation, partnership or other entity which holds a Miami-Dade For-Hire Taxicab License; and (3) meets the requirements provided in the subsection and Section 31-82. Provided, however, that in no event shall an assignment, sale (conditional or outright) or transfer be approved if a chauffeur has any interest (legal, equitable or beneficial) in any for-hire license. It shall be a condition of any license that the assignee, purchaser or transferee shall actually drive the taxicab authorized thereby one out of tow shifts per day on an average of five days per week and that the transferee shall not enter into any agreement to operate a taxicab under authority of such license with any other person who has an interest or ownership in another for-hire license.
Defendants argue that the Ordinance as a whole, and this section in particular, aims to create a driver-owner system because drivers who own the medallion pursuant to which they drive have a direct financial stake in ensuring "safe vehicles, courteous service, and road awareness." (Motion at 2; Transcript at 4). They state that it is "intuitive" that a person who owns a license is more likely to stay in the industry, just as people are more likely to stay in a home that they own than one that they rent. (Transcript at 9). Further, they argue, the longer a driver remains a taxicab driver, the greater the likelihood of having more experienced drivers, who are likely to be safer drivers. (Transcript at 9). Plaintiff's state that it is "self-evident that taxicab drivers who provide good service, whether or not they own the medallion or lease the medallion . . . receive higher tips" and thus both classes of drivers have the "same incentive to provide good services." (Opposition at 7).
These arguments establish that, at the very least, it is debatable whether a driver-owner system is related to increased safety and better service. It is conceivable that a taxicab driver with a financial stake in the medallion pursuant to which he drives is more likely to stay in the taxicab industry, resulting in experienced taxicab chauffeurs who are more likley to drive safely and provide better service than drivers who simply relies on tips to earn money. Plaintiff's have fallen far short of negating this conceivable basis for the Ordinance. Their reliance on cases such as United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821 (1973) is unhelpful, as in this case the legislation did not meet the first prong of the rational basis test. Id. at 533; 93 S.Ct. at 2826. In Moreno, the challenged legislation was an amendment to the Food Stamp Act which rendered ineligible any household containing an individual unrelated to any other member of the household. 413 U.S. 528, 93 S, Ct. 2821. The legislative history indicated "that the amendment was intended to prevent . . . `hippies' and `hippie communes' from participating in the food stamp program." Id. at 533; 93 S.Ct. at 2826 (citation omitted). The Court concluded that this goal did not meet the legitimate purpose prong of the rational basis test. Id. It stated that "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." Id. Plaintiff's in this case, however, admit that the goals of safety, road awareness, and courteous service are legitimate.
Plaintiffs' remaining arguments, involving Defendants' lack of empirical evidence, also fail to undermine the plausibility of Defendants' actions. Plaintiff's state that Defendants neglected "to provide any evidence that the amendments have resulted in better service by taxicab drivers" and that Defendants did not conduct any studies to determine if there is a correlation between a driver-owner system and better service. (Opposition at 3). Plaintiff's argue that there is evidence that there is no such correlation. (Opposition at 3, 7). They state that the "uncontroverted evidence is that the amendments have resulted in fewer transfers of medallions to qualified taxicab drivers." (Opposition at 2). Plaintiff's, however, "must do more than submit evidence which calls the articulated purposes of the legislation into doubt. They must demonstrate that the [County] could not have reasonably believed that the legislation would attain its aims." Cash-Inn of Dade, 938 F.2d at 1244, citing Clover Leave Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463-464, 101 S.Ct. 715, 723-724 (1981). The County "is not required to support its conclusions with empirical data as long as the assumptions it makes are logical." Cash-Inn of Dade, 938 F.2d at 1242 (citation omitted). A determination of whether a rational basis exists "is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." FCC, 508 U.S. at 315.
Here, the Board of County Commissioners voted on the Ordinance after two days of public hearings. (Statement ¶ 1). Dozens of individuals, including taxicab drivers and license holders, attended the hearings. ( Id. at ¶ 2). Some attendees favored the Ordinance, while other attendees spoke against it. ( Id.). Defendants then "passed an Ordinance that [they] felt was the best way to address the problems confronting the taxicab industry" as a compromise between the competing views that were expressed at the hearing. (Motion at 5). This method is sufficient to survive rational basis scrutiny. Cash-Inn of Dade, 938 F.2d at 1242 (concluding based on testimony presented at hearings before the defendant commission that the relevant ordinance passed rational basis scrutiny, even without supporting empirical data). Thus, Plaintiffs' empirical evidence is an insufficient basis upon which to attack the conceivable basis Defendants have articulated.
In the course of their arguments against the restrictions on transfer, Plaintiff's attack two other provisions, §§ 31-82(r)(4) and r(6), on the basis that they arbitrarily allow exceptions to the driver-owner system the Ordinance aims to promote. Section 31-82(r)(4) allows a driver-owner, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, to purchase a second for-hire taxicab license. Section 31-82(r)(6) allows leasing of a for-hire license to a registered chauffeur if the for-hire license holder complies with the provisions of Chapter 31. Defendants state that "this is a classic example of balancing of interests." (Transcript at 5). Defendants explain that the eventual goal of Ordinance 98-105 is to phase in a driver-owner system, but the Ordinance also tries to "create some kind of entrepreneurial spirit or sense." (Transcript at 6; Ordinance 98-105 ("Whereas, this Board further finds that such limitation on transfers of for-hire taxi licenses will encourage entrepreneurship and be an incentive for the taxi driver, who frequently constitutes a traveler's first and last impression of Miami-Dade County, to provide courteous, safe, and efficient transportation senlice. . . .")). Thus, Sections 31-82(r)(4) and (r)(6) represent a balance between allowing a license-holder some opportunity for growth without undermining the overall goal of eventually having a driver-owner system. (Transcript at 6).
Plaintiff's next argue that Defendants' designated corporate representative was unable to present a rationale for allowing two licenses but not a third. (Opposition at 4-5). They contend that this representative could not provide a rational basis for allowing leases to a driver who does not own a medallion, despite the stated objective of promoting a driver-owner system. The County, however, is allowed to compromise and address a problem incrementally. According to the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, the "legislature must be allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally' even if its approach is significantly over-inclusive or under-inclusive." Williams, 240 F.3d at 948, citing FCC, 508 U.S. 316, 113 S.Ct. at 2102. Incremental steps do not render legislation unconstitutional under rational basis scrutiny. Id. Thus, the County is permitted to make compromises and adopt an approach that will eventually lead to a driver-owner system. Whether the County should have ignored competing interests and adopted a more restrictive approach, which Plaintiff's certainly would have opposed, is not for this Court to decide. It is enough that the Ordinance, while taking into account competing interests, serves as a rational means in furthering a legitimate purpose. (b) Gift Transfer Exception
Plaintiff's challenge the "gift transfer exception" contained in Section 31-82(r)(5). Section 31-82(r)(5) provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, a qualified taxicab for-hire license holder may transfer a for-hire license as a gift (i.e., without consideration) to an immediate family member or other natural person who: (i) does not hold a Miami-Dade County for-hire license; (ii) does not hold any interest in a corporation, partnership or other entity which holds a Miami-Dade County for-hire taxicab license; (iii) is a resident of and domiciled in Miami-Dade County; and (iv) meets the requirements of § 31-82 with the exception of the requirement that the transferee be a Miami-Dade registered chauffeur As used herein, a "qualified taxicab for-hire license holder" shall mean: (i) a natural person who holds a taxicab for-hire license in his or her name; (ii) a natural person who, as of the effective date of this ordinance, owns more than fifty percent of the shares of a corporation which holds a taxicab for-hire license in its name; or (iii) a natural person who, as of the effective date of this ordinance, holds more than a fifty percent interest in a partnership which holds a taxicab for-hire license in its name. A qualified taxicab for-hire license holder who holds more than one taxicab for-hire license may transfer as a gift no more than one for-hire license to each member of his or her immediate family and may only transfer a for-hire license as a gift to another natural person who is not an immediate family member on one occasion during his or her lifetime. As used herein, "immediate family member" shall mean parents, spouse, children, grandchildren or court-appointed legal guardian of an immediate family member.
The gift transfer provision allows a medallion holder to transfer licenses to immediate family members who do not hold licenses. (Transcript at 13). Once again, Defendants stated at oral argument that the rationale for this provision involves a balancing of interests. (Transcript at 11-12). Specifically, the County wanted to promote a driver-owner system, but it also wanted to take into account the concerns of individuals, such as Plaintiff Rafael Arango, who had previously purchased medallions in order to convey them to their children as a sound investment. (Transcript at 11-12). Based on the gift transfer exception, a license holder may not transfer more than one license to each family member. ( Id. at 13). Thus, if an individual has twenty children and twenty licenses, he or she may transfer one (and only one) license to each child. ( Id.) The purpose behind this restriction is as follows: if one person could transfer all her licenses to one child, that child could then transfer the twenty licenses to her children who could continue to transfer the licenses to nondrivers. ( Id.) By allowing only one license per person, however, the Ordinance disperses the licenses. ( Id.). The County argues that these licenses would eventually be transferred to drivers because it is unlikely that people would continue to will one license at a time to children who would be unable to acquire other licenses. ( Id.). Moreover, once an individual has distributed one license per family member, that individual, pursuant to the Ordinance, would have to sell the remaining licenses to drivers, further promoting a driver-owner system. (Id. at 15).
Plaintiff's state that the gift transfer exception is irrational because it does not further the County's goal of promoting a driver-owner system. (Transcript at 15). Once again, Plaintiff's are essentially arguing that the County could have been much more restrictive than it was in furthering its goals. As explained in Part I.B.2(a), supra, the County is permitted to make compromises.
(c) Restrictions as to Corporate Ownership
Finally, Plaintiff's challenge the provisions of Ordinance 98-105 limiting corporate ownership. For example, Section 31-82(r)(3) states as follows:
for-hire taxicab licenses may only be assigned, sold (conditional or outright) or transferred to a Miami-Dade County registered taxicab chauffeur who: (1) does not hold a Miami-Dade County For-Hire Taxicab License; (2) does not hold any interest in a corporation, partnership or other entity which holds a Miami-Dade For-Hire Taxicab License; and (3) meets the requirements provided in the subsection and Section 31-82.
This Section prohibits transfer to a registered taxicab chauffeur who holds shares in a corporation that owns a license. Individuals cannot use the gift-transfer exception to circumvent this prohibition because of Section 31-82(r)(1):
any change in the ownership structure of a corporation or partnership where at least 5% of the shares of said corporation or at least 5% of the partnership interest is assigned, sold or transferred to another shall be deemed a sale for purposes of this section.
Thus, the transfer of five percent or more of a corporation's shares is considered a sale, not a gift. (Transcript at 18). Defendants stated a conceivable basis for this restriction during oral argument. ( Id.). They explain that this provision aims to prevent a situation where licenses are simply being transferred back and forth among the same group of individuals or corporations. ( Id.) They explain that without the restriction, if a corporation held 900 licenses, and three individuals each owned 33.3% of the shares of the corporation, they could transfer their shares, and thus 300 licenses each, to family members who did not drive taxicabs, thereby circumventing the Ordinance's primary goal of promoting a driver-owner system. ( Id.). Thus, the corporate ownership restrictions promote the driver-owner system, which conceivably relate to the goals of safety, health, and welfare, as discussed in Part I.B.2(a), supra. Plaintiff's have not been able to refute this conceivable basis. Accordingly, their substantive due process claim does not survive summary judgment.
II. Summary Judgment Is Warranted as to Counts II and IV Because Ordinance 98-105 Does Not Violate Equal Protection Requirements.
I also grant summary judgment as to Counts II and IV, which allege equal protection violations. Plaintiff's allege that Ordinance 98-105 irrationally treats taxicab license owners differently from owners of limousine and corporate car licenses. (Fourth Amended Complaint ¶¶ 60-61). Defendants argue that taxicab license owners are not similarly situated to the latter two classes of owners. (Motion at 7-9). Specifically, Defendants state that taxicab rides can be hailed from the street, and need not be prearranged; that there are different age restrictions on taxicabs as opposed to limousines; and that limousines have a different price scheme from taxicabs. ( Id) Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 13). Further, Defendants argue as they did under Count I that any distinction the Ordinance makes between taxicab license owners and other vehicle license owners is rational. (Motion at 9). Plaintiff's argue in opposition that taxicabs and limousines are similarly situated and that the Ordinance's distinction between the two classes is irrational (Opposition at 9, citing Santos v. City of Houston, Texas, 852 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994)).
Count IV is also based on equal protection. In this Count, Plaintiff's allege that the Ordinance treats "owners of taxicab licenses less favorably than other similarly situated citizens of the State of Florida by preventing them from owning taxicab licenses." (Fourth Amended Complaint ¶ 74). Defendants argue that the record does not support the assertion that taxicab license holders are similarly situated to Florida citizens who do not own taxicab licenses. (Motion at 12). Plaintiff's do not respond to this point.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1. Accordingly, all persons who are "similarly situated" must be treated alike. City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985) ( citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 72 L.Ed.2d 786, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (1982)). As a general rule, social or economic legislation's classifications of individuals must only be rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. Id. This latitude gives way when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin, because a legitimate purpose seldom exists for such classifications. Id. Accordingly, such laws are subject to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. Additionally, classifications based on gender and illegitimacy receive an intermediate level of scrutiny. Id. Absent one of these suspect classifications, the Supreme Court has stated:
Where individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system . . . to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued. In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational means to serve a legitimate end.Id. at 441-42; see also FCC, 508 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct. at 2101 ("Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.").
Further, the Supreme Court has stated that defining the class of persons subject to a regulatory requirement "inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and the fact [that] the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration." FCC, 508 U.S. at 315-316 (quotation omitted). The Court explained that such line-drawing is unavoidable in most economic or social legislation. Id. The Court explained, "This necessity [of drawing lines] renders the precise coordinates of the resulting legislative judgment virtually unreviewable, since the legislature must be allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally.' Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff's concede that rational basis review applies on this Count. (See Fourth Amended Complaint ¶ 61 ("There is no rational basis for this disparate and discriminatory treatment")). The rational basis analysis under equal protection analysis is the same as it is under substantive due process. See Wood v. United States (In re Wood), 866 F.2d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The standard for evaluating substantive due process challenges to social and economic legislation is virtually identical to the `rational relationship' test for evaluating equal protection claims . . . any plausible reason supporting Congress' action in enacting the suspect legislation satisfies the `rational basis' test.").
The County could have plausibly concluded that there was a rational basis to distinguish between taxis and limousines. In Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 825 F.2d 367 (11th Cir. 1987), the Eleventh Circuit states that there are differences between these industries that warrant different treatment. In that case, the court reversed and remanded a lower court decision finding a statute regulating "off-airport" rental car companies unconstitutional. Id. The court addressed the challenge that the statute violated equal protection by treating these off-airport companies differently from other companies. Id. The court assessed the regulatory structure's different treatment of the following classes: off-airport rental companies, on-airport rental companies, taxicab companies, and limousine services. Id. at 371. The court stated that the distinctions the airport authority had drawn between all these industries "are based on its rational assessment of the relative benefits and the extent of use of each category of vehicles that enter the airport." Id. The court also cited another Eleventh Circuit case which held that the difference in rate structure between limousines and taxicabs passed muster under the rational basis test. Id. at 372, citing Executive Town Country, 789 F.2d 1523.
Based on these principles, I conclude that the Ordinance's distinction between taxicabs and limousines is rational. Defendants have cited the following differences between the taxicab and limousine industries: taxis can be hailed from the street; there are different age restrictions on taxicabs as opposed to limousines; and limousines must charge passengers three and a half times the hourly rate charged by taxicabs. (Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 13; Reply at 6, citing Miami-Dade Code, Chapter 31, Section 31-604(3)). The County could have plausibly concluded that people are more likely to use taxis than limousines because the former are less expensive, and that the frequent use of taxis made it imperative for the County to enact laws aimed at increasing safety and courteousness in the taxi industry. Therefore, Ordinance 98-105's distinction between taxicabs and other industries does not violate equal protection concerns.
Notwithstanding, Plaintiff's argue, based on Santos, that this distinction is irrational. 852 F. Supp. 601. In Santos, the challenged ordinance prohibited jitneys with a seating capacity of less than 15 passengers from operating on the streets of the city. Id. at 603. The court assessed the constitutionality of this ordinance based on the argument that it differentiated between jitneys with less than 15 passengers versus jitneys with more than 15 passengers. Id. at 608. The court began with the premise that under due process and equal protection analyses, a rational relationship between legislation and a legitimate governmental purpose will allow the legislation to survive constitutional scrutiny. Id. The court later, however, misstated this well-established test, stating that the ordinance's 15-passenger limit "has no substantial relationship to traffic safety." Id. (emphasis added). Regardless of whether the court misapplied the test, other factors differentiate that case from the instant action. In Santos, the court noted that the admitted objective of the ordinance was to classify jitneys out of business because most jitneys have less than 15 passengers, Id. Further, city officials had conceded that the ordinance, enacted in 1924, was archaic and no longer relevant. Id. Accordingly, the Santos court stated that even if the ordinance ever had a purpose, its usefulness has passed. Id. at 608-609. In this case, the distinctions between the taxicab industry and other industries, which the Eleventh Circuit has found rational in the past, do not have the purpose of classifying taxicabs out of business, nor is the Ordinance conceded to be archaic. Because Ordinance 98-105 does not violate equal protection, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants as to Counts II and IV.
III. Plaintiff's Are Not Entitled to Declaratory Relief under Count III as a Matter of Law.
Summary judgment is also entered in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiffs' remaining Count for Declaratory Relief. In Count III, Plaintiff's seek declaratory relief on the basis that Defendants' interpretation of Ordinance 98-105 conflicts with the language of the Ordinance regarding the gift transfer exception and corporate ownership of licenses. (Fourth Amended Complaint ¶ 72).
To the extent there is any ambiguity in these provisions, the County argues that it is entitled to deference when interpreting its legislative enactments. Plaintiff's argue that the County is not free to enforce an irrational interpretation of an ordinance and that the principle of deference does not apply when the language of a statute is clear on its face. I conclude, however, that the County is rational in its interpretations of (1) the gift transfer exception and (2) corporate ownership of licenses.
A. The County's Interpretation of the Gift Transfer Exception is Rational.
Once again, Chapter 31, § 31-82(r)(3) of the Miami-Dade County Code provides as follows:
for-hire taxicab licenses may only be assigned, sold (conditional or outright) or transferred to a Miami-Dade County registered taxicab chauffeur who: (1) does not hold a Miami-Dade County For-Hire Taxicab License; (2) does not hold any interest in a corporation, partnership or other entity which holds a Miami-Dade For-Hire Taxicab License; and (3) meets the requirements provided in the subsection and Section 31-82.
Section 31-82(r)(5) of the Code allows a gift exception for immediate family members:
notwithstanding any provision to the contrary . . . a qualified taxicab for-hire license holder may transfer a for-hire license as a gift, i.e., without consideration, to an immediate family member or other natural person [who] does not hold a Miami-Dade County for-hire license [and who] meets the requirements of § 31-82 with the exception of the requirement that the transferee be a Miami-Dade registered chauffeur.
Finally, Section 31-82(r)(1) states the following:
any change in the ownership structure of a corporation or partnership where at least 5% of the shares of said corporation or at least 5% of the partnership interest is assigned, sold or transferred to another shall be deemed a sale for purposes of this section.
Defendants argue that as a result of § 31-82(r)(1), the Code is clear that any transfer of five percent or more of the shares of a corporation is considered a sale, not a gift. Thus, there is no gift exception to the requirement that this transfer be made to a registered taxicab chauffeur. Plaintiff's argue that this interpretation conflicts with the express language of § 31-82(r)(5), which states that the gift exception applies "notwithstanding any provision to the contrary."
As explained in Defendants' Reply, Plaintiff's incorrectly assert that the language in § 31-82(r)(5), which allows gifts of licenses "notwithstanding any provision to the contrary" somehow regulations the transfer of a corporation's shares. Section 31 — 82(r)(5) makes no reference to shares of a corporation. Section 31-82(r)(1), however, does explicitly reference how the Code treats the transfer of shares in a corporation. It provides that if five percent or more of the shares of a partnership or corporation are transferred, even if it would otherwise appear to be a gift, the Code treats such a transfer as a sale. Thus, the Sections do not conflict, and the County's interpretation, based on a plain reading of the Sections, is not irrational.
B. The County's Interpretations regarding Corporate Ownership of Licenses Are Rational.
Plaintiff's argue that they are also entitled to declaratory relief regarding Defendants' interpretation that the Ordinance prohibits corporate ownership of medallions. They argue that this interpretation expressly conflicts with language in the Ordinance which allows and contemplates corporate ownership of medallions. (Opposition at 13, citing § 31-82(c)(1)(b) (providing that if the applicant for the for-hire license is a corporation, the form shall be signed or sworn to by the president or vice president); § 31-82(c) ("Applicant means an individual, partnership or corporation which applies for a for-hire license . . . Applicant shall also mean an individual, partnership, or corporation which makes an application . . . to renew or transfer a for-hire license . . . pursuant to the provisions of this Article." (emphasis added))).
I conclude that these provisions of the Ordinance are consistent with the County's interpretation that corporations may renew their licenses even though they may not receive new licenses. The Ordinance states that its provisions limiting the transfer of for-hire licenses shall become effective 270 days after the date of enactment. The County explains that as a result, taxicab licenses could be sold to corporations for the 270-day period of time after the adoption of the Ordinance. Now that the 270 days have passed, corporations can renew their licenses, but they cannot receive new ones through a transfer. This interpretation is rational and does not conflict with other provisions in the Code referring to corporate ownership. Chapter 31, Section 31-82(h) requires the renewal of for-hire licenses. Plaintiff's cite § 31-82(c)(1)(b), which provides that if the applicant for the for-hire license is a corporation, the form shall be signed or sworn to by the president or vice president. They also cite § 31-81(c), which includes in the definition of applicants "an individual partnership or corporation which makes application, where applicable, to renew or transfer a for-hire license, permit, chauffeur registration, or passenger service, company registration pursuant to the provisions of this Article." (emphasis added). It is not irrational to interpret these Sections to mean that a corporation or partnership may apply for renewal of an existing taxicab license issued to it prior to the expiration of the 270-day period. Thus, Plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief.
Accordingly, because Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all four Counts of the Fourth Amended Complaint, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #159) is GRANTED.
2. All pending motions in this case, including Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #170) and Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #180), are DENIED AS MOOT.
3. This case is CLOSED.
DONE AND ORDERED.