South Dakota v. Bourland

94 Citing cases

  1. Kerr-McGee Corporation v. Farley

    115 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1997)   Cited 89 times
    Holding that Strate, which interprets Montana, "is not a tribal exhaustion case"

    Kerr-McGee cites to other cases in which tribes are presumed to lack jurisdiction over nonmembers even without specific congressional language stripping tribal authority. In South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), the Court held that a tribe lacked regulatory authority to license nonmember hunters and fishermen for activity on reservation lands that the federal government was extensively regulating for public purposes. Four years earlier, in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), the Court found that the tribe lacked authority to zone activities of nonmembers on open fee lands within the reservation.

  2. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs

    239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2017)   Cited 13 times
    Denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction only for failure to show likelihood of success on the merits

    The Court cannot agree. As the pipeline runs through the land under the lake, rather than the lake's waters, the Court first discusses ownership of the land and then turns to the Tribe's interest in the water.In 1944, Congress passed the Flood Control Act, which "authorized the establishment of a comprehensive flood control plan along the Missouri River." South Dakota v. Bourland , 508 U.S. 679, 683, 113 S.Ct. 2309, 124 L.Ed.2d 606 (1993). "

  3. Wilson v. Marchington

    934 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Mont. 1995)   Cited 1 times

    In this court's opinion, plaintiff's presumption regarding the Blackfeet Tribal Court's unqualified "territorial jurisdiction" is an overly broad interpretation of tribal sovereignty. Moreover, plaintiff's argument ignores the Supreme Court's decisions in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), and South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 113 S.Ct. 2309, 124 L.Ed.2d 606 (1993). II.

  4. Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. State

    104 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 1997)   Cited 89 times
    Setting forth plaintiff's burden on summary judgment

    The Tribe also sought declaratory relief that the State is barred from exercising any regulatory authority over hunting or fishing within the Reservation. Since this litigation began in 1980, the Supreme Court has handed down several important decisions relating to Indian sovereignty and tribal regulatory authority on different land classifications within Reservation boundaries. Accordingly, the district court determined that this action is substantially controlled by South Dakota v. Bourland ("Bourland III"), 508 U.S. 679 (1993), rev'g, 949 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1991), Brendale v. Confederated Tribes Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (plurality), and Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Following this line of authority, the district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment.

  5. Strate v. A-1 Contractors

    520 U.S. 438 (1997)   Cited 373 times
    Holding that Indian tribes generally lack jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against nonmembers arising from traffic accidents that occur on state or federal highways running through an Indian reservation

    (c) It is unavailing to argue, as petitioners do, that Montana does not govern this case because the land underlying the accident scene is held in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and their members. Petitioners are correct that Montana and the cases following its instruction — Brendale v. ConfederatedTribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, and South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 — all involved alienated, non-Indian-owned reservation land. However, the right-of-way North Dakota acquired for its highway renders the 6.59-mile stretch here at issue equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to such alienated, non-Indian land.

  6. Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area v. Larance

    642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011)   Cited 58 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding tribe had authority under first exception to regulate nonmembers' activities on reservation based on long-term business lease with tribe for use of prime tribal riverfront property; fact that business venture itself constituted a significant economic interest for the tribe supported jurisdiction under second exception as well

    (internal citation omitted)). From a tribe's inherent sovereign powers flow lesser powers, including the power to regulate non-Indians on tribal land. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689, 113 S.Ct. 2309, 124 L.Ed.2d 606 (1993) (recognizing that a tribe's power to exclude includes the incidental power to regulate). We also adhere to the Supreme Court's instruction that a tribe's adjudicative authority may not exceed its regulatory authority.

  7. Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.

    791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015)   Cited 4 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting that courts "frequently invoke" Coeur d'Alene in the labor and employment context

    The Supreme Court demands a clear statement of intent for the abrogation of Indian treaty rights. Id. at 739–40, 106 S.Ct. 2216 ; see also South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687, 113 S.Ct. 2309, 124 L.Ed.2d 606 (1993) (“Congress has the power to abrogate Indians' treaty rights ... though we usually insist that Congress clearly express its intent to do so.” (internal citations omitted)).

  8. Atkinson Trading Company v. Shirley

    210 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000)   Cited 8 times

    Id. at 953-54. Our review of Buster is significant because that case, with its explicit approval by the Supreme Court, clearly rebuts Appellant's primary argument that Montana, Brendale, South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), Strate, and Merrion should be read to establish one rule for assertions of tribal jurisdiction on fee land ( Montana, et al.) and another rule for tribal land ( Merrion). The Supreme Court's use of Buster demonstrates that there is nothing inappropriate in reading those cases in harmony rather than cacophony.

  9. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers

    537 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D.D.C. 2008)   Cited 6 times

    After passing the FCA, "[s]even subsequent Acts of Congress authorized limited takings of Indian lands for hydroelectric and flood control dams on the Missouri River in both North and South Dakota." South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 683 (1993). Plaintiff alleges that to complete these various flood control programs, the Corps "acquired land [within the Great Sioux Reservation] by condemnation or by mense conveyance" to which the Oglala Sioux Tribe was not a party, including approximately 105 shoreline recreational areas in South Dakota. 2d Am. Compl. at ¶ 37-38.

  10. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.

    554 U.S. 316 (2008)   Cited 210 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that courts "bear an independent obligation to assure [them]selves that jurisdiction is proper before proceeding to the merits"

    Moreover, when the tribe or its members convey fee land to third parties, the tribe “loses any former right of absolute and exclusive use and occupation of the conveyed lands.” South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689, 113 S.Ct. 2309, 124 L.Ed.2d 606. Thus, “the tribe has no authority itself ... to regulate the use of fee land.”