Opinion
2018-UP-037
01-23-2018
South Carolina Department of Social Services, Respondent, v. Angela Van Popering and Justin McGee, Defendants, Of whom Angela Van Popering is the Appellant. In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen. Appellate Case No. 2017-001361
Kimberly Yancey Brooks, of Kimberly Y. Brooks, Attorney at Law, of Greenville, for Appellant. Rebecca Rush Wray, of Greenville, for Respondent. Don J. Stevenson, for the Guardian ad Litem.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Submitted December 21, 2017
Appeal From Greenville County Kelly Pope-Black, Family Court Judge
Kimberly Yancey Brooks, of Kimberly Y. Brooks, Attorney at Law, of Greenville, for Appellant.
Rebecca Rush Wray, of Greenville, for Respondent.
Don J. Stevenson, for the Guardian ad Litem.
PER CURIAM.
Angela Van Popering (Mother) appeals the family court's order removing her child (Child). On appeal, Mother argues the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). We affirm.
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 63-15-300 to -394 (2010).
In appeals from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011).
"Subject matter jurisdiction is 'the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.'" Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314 S.C. 235, 237-38, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994) (quoting Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 472 A.2d 21, 22 (Conn. 1984)). A court without subject matter jurisdiction does not have "authority to act regardless of the geographical location or consent of the litigants." Id. at 238, 442 S.E.2d at 600. "The [Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)] and the UCCJEA govern subject matter jurisdiction in interstate child custody disputes." Anthony H. v. Matthew G., 397 S.C. 447, 451, 725 S.E.2d 132, 134 (Ct. App. 2012). "The UCCJEA's primary purpose is to provide uniformity of the law with respect to child custody decrees between courts in different states." Id.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (2006).
Initially, we find the family court erred in premising its jurisdiction on its finding that neither Michigan nor any other state was Child's home state. In making that finding, the family court appeared to rely on section 63-15-330(A) of the South Carolina Code (2010), which sets forth when South Carolina has jurisdiction to issue an initial child custody decree. The family court erred in focusing on whether Mother intended to return to Michigan because that analysis is not pertinent under the UCCJEA. Rather, the plain language of the UCCJEA provides a state has jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination if it "was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding" and "a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in" that state. See § 63-15-330(A)(1) (providing this state has jurisdiction to issue an initial custody determination if it "was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this [s]tate, but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this [s]tate"); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-302(7) (2010) ("'Home state' means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding."). The evidence showed Child lived in Michigan until approximately November 2016, when she travelled with Mother to visit family and friends. Thus, Michigan was Child's home state within six months before the commencement of this action on January 13, 2017. Because evidence showed Michigan was Child's home state within six months before this action commenced and Child's father continued to live in Michigan, we find Michigan had jurisdiction to issue an initial child custody decree under section 63-15-330(A)(1). Thus, the family court erred in premising its jurisdiction on section 63-15-330. See § 63-15-330(A), (2), (3), (4) (providing South Carolina can exercise jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination when South Carolina is not the child's home state if "a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under (1), " the home state court has declined to exercise jurisdiction, all courts having jurisdiction have declined to exercise jurisdiction, or "no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in item (1), (2), or (3)").
However, the family court had temporary emergency jurisdiction under section 63-15-336 of the South Carolina Code (2010). See § 63-15-336(A) ("A court of this [s]tate has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this [s]tate and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse."). At the hearing, Mother agreed to a finding of excessive corporal punishment and physical neglect, and she agreed returning Child to her home would place Child at an unreasonable risk of harm. Based on those findings, we find Child was "subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse" and it was necessary for the family court to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction under section 63-15-336. We further find the removal order will become a final order under the UCCJEA if no action is initiated in Michigan and South Carolina becomes Child's home state. See 63-15-336(B) ("If a child custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under [s]ections 63-15-330 through 63-15-334, a child custody determination made under this section becomes a final determination, if it so provides and this [s]tate becomes the home state of the child.").
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and HILL, JJ., concur.