Once the lodestar is determined, the Court must determine whether it is appropriate to adjust the lodestar. Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2017). A downward adjustment may be appropriate where a plaintiff achieves "only partial or limited success[.]"

In an extensive report and recommendation adopted by the district court and affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, Judge Cole concluded that Longo's reasonable hourly rate was $300, not $395. Judge Cole combed through the hours to which the City objected, docket entry by docket entry; deducted 864 hours as unreasonable; and reduced the lodestar figure by 50% to account for the limited success Longo achieved in Sommerfield I. Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 2012 WL 5354987, at *9-14 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 139502, at 1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2013), aff'd, 863 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2017). In reaching his decision, Judge Cole stressed, inter alia, the modest recovery achieved ($30,000) compared to the fees counsel sought (about $1.5 million).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, "[t]he district court first calculates the lodestar, which is the hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate—and nothing else." Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "Once the lodestar is calculated, it may be appropriate to adjust it further."

See, e.g. , Smith v. Rosebud Farm, Inc. , No. 11-cv-9147, 2018 WL 4030591, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2018) ("Even a cursory review of the docket reveals that [Mr. Longo's] submissions regularly cited incorrect and/or irrelevant authorities and often were of questionable necessity or utility."); Sommerfield v. City of Chicago , 2012 WL 5354987, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2012), report and recommendation adopted , 2013 WL 139502 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2013), aff'd , 863 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2017) ("[Mr. Longo's] willful misconduct time and time again results in needless and unreasonable expenditures of time for which he invariably seeks compensation through inflated fee awards and that courts have repeatedly condemned his behavior in published opinions that could not be more critical of a lawyer.").

See, e.g., Smith v. Rosebud Farm, Inc., No. 11-cv-9147, 2018 WL 4030591, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2018) ("Even a cursory review of the docket reveals that [Mr. Longo's] submissions regularly cited incorrect and/or irrelevant authorities and often were of questionable necessity or utility."); Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 2012 WL 5354987, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 139502 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2013), aff'd, 863 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2017) ("[Mr. Longo's] willful misconduct time and time again results in needless and unreasonable expenditures of time for which he invariably seeks compensation through inflated fee awards and that courts have repeatedly condemned his behavior in published opinions that could not be more critical of a lawyer.").

“The award's size is a function of three numbers: the hours worked, the hourly rate, and any overall adjustments up or down.” Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2017).

Once the lodestar is determined, the Court must decide whether it is appropriate to adjust the lodestar. Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2017). A downward adjustment may be appropriate where a plaintiff achieves "only partial or limited success."

While a plaintiff who achieves excellent results should receive the entire lodestar, that sum may be excessive for one who has achieved only partial or limited success." Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Defendants do not dispute the rate charged, the number of hours expended, or the staffing choices made by Class Counsel, and the Court has no reason to doubt the accuracy of Class Counsel's submissions.

, 863 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2017)).

Although failure to select a box indicating discrimination under a certain category can bear on the analysis of a discrimination claim related to that category, a plaintiff suing under Title VII can still successfully “pursue a claim not explicitly included in an EEOC complaint ... if her allegations fall within the scope of the earlier charges contained in the EEOC complaint.” Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). See also Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1030 (7th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).