Appellant Linda Solomon began working as a budget analyst at the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("Department") in 1997. Solomon v. Vilsack, 656 F.Supp.2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 2009). Solomon "has a long history of depression" and has also been diagnosed with agoraphobia, "an anxiety disorder characterized by the fear of being around other people."
DeSantis v. Napolitano, 2010 WL 2292592, No. CIV 08-1205 JB/KBM, at *21 (D.N.M. May 26, 2010) (Browning, J.) (finding that, because the Court would not, under rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, admit at trial the letters informing the plaintiff that he was awarded disability retirement, it therefore would not consider them on summary judgment). See Solomon v. Vilsack, 656 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59-60 (D.D.C. 2009) ("The[] requirements for eligibility distinguish FERS disability benefits from most other federal disability benefits programs."). Significantly, other courts have held that a plaintiff's award of FERS benefits based on her inability to work demonstrates that she is not "otherwise qualified" for employment under the Rehabilitation Act. Serino v. Potter, 178 F. App'x 552, 555-56 (7th Cir. 2006); Solomon v. Vilsack, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 59-62; Chinchillo v. Powell, 236 F. Supp. 2d 18, 26-27 (D.D.C. 2003) ("An employee cannot plausibly claim that he is unable to work at all to obtain FERS benefits but able to work with an accommodation in connection with a Rehabilitation Act claim.").
The district court initially granted summary judgment for the Secretary on the ground that Solomon's receipt of disability retirement benefits was predicated on her showing that she could not perform the duties of her position even if reasonably accommodated, and thus it precluded her Rehabilitation Act claims as a matter of law. Solomon v. Vilsack, 656 F.Supp.2d 55, 57 (D.D.C.2009). This court reversed, explaining that, because Solomon's retirement application never stated that she would have been unable to work if she had been afforded the accommodations she sought, a jury could find that Solomon's application was consistent with her claim that “she could have worked in the spring and summer of 2004 with reasonable accommodation.”
Solomon's complaint also made a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.See Compl. ¶¶ 26–27. But the Court previously dismissed this claim, see Solomon v. Vilsack, 656 F.Supp.2d 55, 62–63 (D.D.C.2009), and Solomon did not pursue the claim on appeal, see Solomon v. Vilsack, 628 F.3d 555, 560 (D.C.Cir.2010). On appeal, the D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that Solomon's “receipt of disability benefits bars neither her claim that her employer failed to accommodate her disability nor a related set of claims that her supervisors retaliated against her for exercising her rights under federal antidiscrimination laws.”