Opinion
NO. 12-11-00193-CV
04-30-2012
BETTY ANN SOLIS, APPELLANT v. WARE MEADOWS APARTMENTS, APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE
COUNTY COURT AT LAW #2
GREGG COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Betty Ann Solis appeals from an order evicting her from an apartment and ordering the payment of back rent. In three issues, she contends that her landlord improperly ended her rent subsidy and improperly failed to renew her lease. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
Betty Solis is the beneficiary of a federal program that pays the majority of her rent for an apartment. She signed a lease with the Ware Meadows Apartments on December 28, 2009. The lease stipulated that she would pay rent monthly in the amount of $147.00, so long as she received the federal rent subsidy, and that she would abide by certain rules. In May 2010, Ware served Solis with a notice of noncompliance with the lease. The notice of noncompliance stated that she had been given notice in June 2007 for "drugs" and in November 2009 for "[f]eeding animals" and for "[i]nterfering with [management]." The notice further stated that Solis was "still throwing food behind the dumpster and over the fence feeding [r]acoons" and that Ware Meadows had reports that she was seen petting a cat that "its [sic] being reported that you are feeding." Ware Meadows subsequently filed suit to evict Solis.
The suit began in the justice court. The record does not disclose the result of that trial, but an appeal was made to the county court at law. Prior to trial in that court, Solis and Ware Meadows entered into a confidential settlement agreement. That agreement, signed by the parties on June 11, 2010, stipulated that Ware Meadows would dismiss the lawsuit in exchange for promises by Solis to stop feeding animals, to stop calling the police to report attempts by Ware Meadows to trap animals, to not make "verbal complaints, criticisms, or protests regarding the management of Ware Meadows," and to keep the agreement confidential. Both parties agreed that Solis's tenancy would end on January 31, 2011.
Subsequent to that agreement, on June 21, 2010, Ware Meadows entered into a new lease agreement with Solis. That lease was a month to month lease with a monthly rent contribution by Solis of $147.00. By its terms, the lease would continue month to month unless Solis lost her rent subsidy or violated one of the specifically enumerated prohibitions contained in "Paragraph 23" of the lease. The lease contained a clause stating that it was the entire agreement between the parties and did not state that it would end in January 2011. In fact, the lease stated that Ware Meadows would recertify Solis's eligibility for assistance "around" October 1 "every year" the lease was in effect.
In January 2011, Ware Meadows delivered to Solis a notice of nonrenewal of the lease. In that notice, Ware Meadows alleged that there had been "substantial violation and repeated violations that disrupt the livability of the property," and that Solis had interfered with management and violated a "court agreement of bad mouthing manager [sic] to others" as well as "working and NOT reporting [her] income." The notice also referenced the agreements signed on June 11, 2010, and June 21, 2010. Thereafter, Solis attempted to tender her original lease payment of $147.00. Ware Meadows refused to accept that payment and brought a forcible detainer suit to evict Solis. In its suit, Ware Meadows alleged that Solis failed to pay the full market rent for the apartment.
The justice court found in Ware Meadows' favor and ordered Solis to leave the apartment. Solis appealed to the County Court at Law No. 2 in Gregg County, Texas. That court held a trial de novo. The trial court found that Solis breached an agreement to move out of the apartment in January 2011 and ordered her to vacate the apartment. Solis filed a motion for new trial. That motion was overruled, and this appeal followed.
THE AGREEMENTS
In her second issue, Solis argues that Ware Meadows was not permitted to terminate her lease except for specifically enumerated reasons, and that Ware Meadows did not follow the proper procedures to do so. Standard of Review
The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession of the premises. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 746; see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.001 (West Supp. 2010). In reviewing a trial court's findings of fact for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the same standards we apply in reviewing the evidence supporting a jury verdict. See Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297, (Tex. 1994). When the appellate record contains a reporter's record, as it does in this case, findings of fact are not conclusive on appeal if a contrary fact is established as a matter of law or if there is no evidence to support the finding. See Material P'ships, Inc. v. Ventura, 102 S.W.3d 252, 257 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
We review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo. See Smith v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 140, 149 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). When performing a de novo review, the reviewing court exercises its own judgment and redetermines each legal issue. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998). We will uphold conclusions of law on appeal if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory the evidence supports. Waggoner v. Morrow, 932 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ). Incorrect conclusions of law do not require reversal if the controlling findings of fact support the judgment under a correct legal theory. Id.
When construing a lease, we seek to give effect to the intent of the parties. Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Tex. 1981). Generally, the written lease will be sufficient to determine the intent of the parties. Id. at 728. Neither party contends that the lease agreement is ambiguous. Therefore, the interpretation of the lease is a question of law. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983). Analysis
There are two conflicting documents signed by the parties in this case. On June 11, 2010, the parties agreed that Solis's tenancy would end in January 2011. On June 21, 2010, the parties signed a month to month lease that did not state when it would end. If this were an ordinary residential lease agreement, no problem would be presented because Ware Meadows could simply end Solis's tenancy, with proper notice, at any time. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.001(a) (West 2007) ("A monthly tenancy or a tenancy from month to month may be terminated by the tenant or the landlord giving notice of termination to the other.").
But this was not an ordinary residential lease agreement. The lease between these parties is a lengthy document designed to comply with standards set by the federal government for housing that is subsidized at taxpayer expense. See generally Nealy v. Southlawn Palms Apts., 196 S.W.3d 386, 389-90 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2006, no pet.). This is a lease agreement that anticipated the Department of Housing and Urban Development would pay most of the rent on Solis's behalf. By making such an agreement, Ware Meadows forfeited a number of privileges it would have had as an ordinary landlord, including the ability not to renew the lease at the end of its term. See 24 C.F.R. 880.607(b)(iv) (Lexis 2012) ("No termination by an owner will be valid to the extent it is based upon a lease or a provisions of State law permitting termination of a tenancy solely because of expiration of an initial or subsequent renewal term.").
Consistent with the fact that Ware Meadows could not terminate the lease simply because it had ended, the lease document states that it "will continue for successive terms of one month each unless automatically terminated as permitted by Paragraph 23." Paragraph 23 lists the reasons that the lease can be terminated. None of the reasons for terminating the lease include that the landlord wishes not to rent to the lessee. Instead, the reasons for termination are various kinds of misconduct or failures to comply with the terms of the lease. Furthermore, the lease states that Ware Meadows will recertify Solis for public assistance "every year around the 1st of October." This is not something that would be necessary if the lease was to end in January.
The trial court found that the parties should be able to reach binding agreements to settle litigation, that the settlement agreement called for the lease to end in January 2011, and that Ware Meadows had a right to possession of the apartment. Solis argues that the June 21, 2010 lease agreement, and not the settlement agreement, should control who has a right to occupy the apartment.
Solis also argues that the settlement agreement, despite its clear language, did not obligate her to leave the premises in January 2011 because it must be construed consistently with state and federal law, which she argues created a perpetual lease. This begs the question of why the parties entered into the settlement agreement, if Ware Meadows gained nothing more than an agreement for Solis to abide by the terms of her lease, but is one we need not address because of our resolution of Solis's other argument.
For the reasons we will explain, we agree with Solis's position. When there are multiple contracts pertaining to the same subject, they must be read together to discern the intent of the parties. City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 137 (Tex. 2011) (citing Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831, 840-41 (Tex. 2000)). In fact, what purports to be multiple agreements can be read together as a single contract. Id.
The problem here is that the two agreements-the June 11 settlement and the June 21 lease-are inconsistent as to when the lease agreement ends. The settlement agreement, executed first, states that the month to month tenancy was to end in January 2011. The lease agreement, executed second, both by its specific terms and by the relevant law that applies to these kinds of public housing leases, ends only if the tenant leaves, if the tenant commits misconduct, or if the tenant loses her rental subsidy. When two documents do not reference one another and differ on an important term, the later agreement controls. See Davis v. Norris, 352 S.W.3d 715, 719 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2011, pet filed.) (citing Midwest Med. Supply Co. v. Wingert, 317 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.)); Courage Co. v. Chemshare Corp., 93 S.W.3d 323, 333 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing Cooper v. Supercinski, 700 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ refd n.r.e)).
Accordingly, the agreement that controls the issue of when Solis's lease should have ended is the June 21, 2010 lease, which envisioned a lease that continued unless Solis failed to comply with its terms. Ware Meadows did not allege in its lawsuit that Solis was in violation of the lease for misconduct. Instead, Ware Meadows alleged only that Solis should be evicted for nonpayment of rent. Under Ware Meadows' interpretation of the relevant law, Solis's assistance terminated when her lease terminated in January 2011 pursuant to the settlement agreement reached on June 11, 2010. We express no opinion on this proposition but, for reasons explained above, the lease did not end in January 2011 because Ware Meadows signed a new lease in June 21, 2010 relieving Solis of the obligation to end the lease in January 2011. Accordingly, and consistent with Ware Meadows' interpretation of the law, the subsidy did not end because the lease did not end.
Additionally, the trial court judge made clear in the hearing on the motion for new trial that he did not find "any testimony" as to the violations to be of "any real consequence" and did not "take into consideration the . . . alleged occurrences . . . as a basis for the detainer proceeding judgment[.]"
Ware Meadows served Solis with notice of nonrenewal of the lease. It alleged in that notice that she had violated Section 23 of the lease. The lease itself identifies it as "Paragraph 23." This section or paragraph lists ten reasons for which the landlord may "terminate [the] agreement." These are different from the reasons for which the rental subsidy may be removed, which are listed in Paragraph 17 of the lease. By the terms of its lease, Ware Meadows "agree[d] to rely only upon those grounds cited in the termination notice" if it sought an eviction in court. Some of the items in the nonrenewal notice were, arguably, violations of Paragraph 23. Although not denominated as such, at least one of the allegations, not reporting her income, was a violation of Paragraph 17. Ware Meadows did not repeat these allegations in its complaint.
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Because Solis had a month to month lease and was entitled to pay the subsidized rent, she did not fail to pay her portion of the rent that was due and owing. Therefore, Ware Meadows wrongfully terminated the lease, and the trial court erred in ordering Solis to vacate the apartment and to pay back rent. Accordingly, we sustain this part of Solis's second issue. We need not consider Solis's additional issues because they present alternate grounds for the same relief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
DISPOSITION
Having held that the trial court erred in ordering Solis's eviction and the payment of back rent, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BRIAN HOYLE
Justice
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.