Opinion
22AP-379
06-01-2023
Hayam Soliman, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wael Nawar, Defendant-Appellant.
On brief: Wael Nawar, pro se. Argued: Wael Nawar.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations C.P.C. No. 21DR-0668
On brief: Wael Nawar, pro se.
Appellee elected not to file a brief in this case.
DECISION
MENTEL, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Wael Nawar, appeals from a June 14, 2022 decision and judgment entry denying his motion to set aside the magistrate's order and Aly Nawar's, appellant's father, motion to add a new party. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} The procedural history of this case is extensive, and in large part, unrelated to the matters confined to this appeal. Briefly, plaintiff-appellee, Hayam Soliman, filed a complaint for divorce and a motion for temporary orders on March 3, 2021. Appellant filed an answer and counterclaim for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities on August 27, 2021. On February 18, 2022, a magistrate issued an order, pursuant to Civ.R. 75, which provided temporary orders on several outstanding matters in the case such as: residential custody of the child, parental time, child support, and medical insurance. On February 28, 2022, appellant filed objections to the temporary order, which the court interpreted as a motion to modify temporary orders. After conducting a hearing, the magistrate denied the motion on April 8, 2022. On April 15, 2022, appellant filed a motion, styled as an objection, which the trial court interpreted as a motion to set aside the magistrate's order. The motion requested changes to the temporary order as to the location of the supervised parental time and the effective date of the temporary domestic order from March 3, 2021 to February 18, 2022. On April 5, 2022, Aly Nawar filed a motion to be added as a new party in the case seeking to establish virtual visitation with his granddaughter. On June 13, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the above motions. On June 14, 2022, the trial court denied appellant's April 15, 2022 motion and Aly Nawar's motion to be added as a new party.
{¶ 3} On June 30, 2022, appellant filed a timely appeal from the trial court's June 14, 2022 decision and judgment entry.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶ 4} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:
[1.] The court erred and abused its power and acted by racist and un-fairly way with out impartially.
[2.] The Judge refused to receive any new evidence from the appellant at the court hearing day without any reasons.
[3.] The court order was not working for the best interest for the child where the Magistrate order that the child visitation must be supervised.
[4.] The Magistrate and the Judge did not taking serious action to help the appellant from practicing his parenting time when the appellee prevent him many times without any actions from the court.
[5.] There were also a discrimination at the treatment between the appellant and the appellee.
[6.] The court did not respect any foreigner court order issue before this court looked on this case.
[7.] The judge did not follow the Ohio Civ. R. 4.2. (Sic passim.)
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Appellant's Assignments of Error
{¶ 5} As an initial matter, we must determine if the trial court's June 14, 2022 judgment is a final, appealable order.
{¶ 6} As set forth in Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2), a reviewing court is conferred jurisdiction to consider final, appealable orders from trial courts of their districts. A final order is that which" 'dispose[s] of the whole case or some separate and distinct branch thereof.'" McCracken v. Lee, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-236, 2020-Ohio-3125, ¶ 10, quoting Lantsberry v. Tilley Lamp Co., 27 Ohio St.2d 303, 306 (1971). When a judgment is not a final, appealable order, a reviewing court does not have jurisdiction to review the matter and it must be dismissed. In re Special Grand Jury Investigation, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-446, 2018-Ohio-760, ¶ 6, citing State v. Boschulte, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1053, 2003-Ohio-1276, ¶ 4.
{¶ 7} An order of the trial court is considered a final, appealable order if it meets the requirements of R.C. 2505.02 and, if applicable, Civ.R. 54(B). Tonti Homes Corp. Siculan, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-162, 2022-Ohio-3067, ¶ 7, citing Oakley v. Ohio State Univ. Wexner Med. Ctr., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-843, 2019-Ohio-3557, ¶ 10. The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth a two-step process for resolving whether an order is both final and appealable. Olive Branch Holdings v. Smith Tec. Dev., LLC, 181 Ohio App.3d 479, 2009-Ohio-1105, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), citing Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17 (1989). First, a reviewing court must determine if the order falls under one of the categories provided in R.C. 2505.02(B). Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-164, 2011-Ohio-2942, ¶ 18. If the order falls under one of the categories outlined in R.C. 2502.02(B), the court must then determine if Civ.R. 54(B) language that "there is no just reason for delay" was included in the order. Internatl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 8 v. Vaughn Indus., L.L.C., 116 Ohio St.3d 335, 2007-Ohio-6439, ¶ 7, citing State ex rel. Scruggs v. Sadler, 97 Ohio St.3d 78, 2002-Ohio-5315, ¶ 5-7. If the Civ.R. 54(B) language is absent, the reviewing court may not review an order that disposes of fewer than all claims. Id. We note, however, that "the mere incantation of the required language does not turn an otherwise non-final order into a final appealable order." Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 96 (1989).
{¶ 8} Generally, temporary spousal and child support orders are not considered final, appealable orders. Meisner v. Walker, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-671, 2016-Ohio-215, ¶ 8; Hibbs v. Hibbs, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-93, 2008-Ohio-5621, ¶ 6; Kelm v. Kelm, 93 Ohio App.3d 686, 689 (10th Dist.1994) ("Because a temporary support order is provisional in nature, subject to modification at any time, it does not determine the ultimate rights of the parties involved.") In this case, the trial court did not resolve all the claims asserted in the action as the order was limited to denying appellant's motion to set aside the magistrate's ruling concerning aspects of the temporary order and denial of non-party Aly Nawar's motion to be added as a new party. Here, the matters addressed in the trial court's entry are temporary and can be modified by the trial court at any time. Moreover, the trial court's decision and entry does not contain Civ.R. 54(B) language. "Without an express determination that there is no just cause for delay, any order, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims does not terminate the action." VanDyke v. Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1114, 2007-Ohio-2088, ¶ 8. As the Civ.R. 54(B) language is absent from the order at issue, the entry is subject to modification and is not a final, appealable order. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction over assignments of error that concern the trial court's denial of appellant's April 15, 2022 motion.
{¶ 9} While it is unclear in appellant's brief whether he is also asserting an assignment of error regarding the denial of his father's motion to be added as a new party, the motion was briefly discussed during oral arguments. Out of an abundance of caution, we will also address whether appellant has standing to appeal the denial of his father's motion to be added as a new party. Standing is defined as "[a] party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right." Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶ 27, citing Black's Law Dictionary 1442 (8th Ed.2004)." 'An appellant cannot raise issues on another's behalf, especially when that [other] party could have appealed the issues appellant posits.'" In re D.B., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-267, 2019-Ohio-4439, ¶ 16, quoting In re D.T., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-853, 2008-Ohio-2287, ¶ 8. This court has consistently found that a parent lacks standing to appeal a trial court's denial of a grandparent's motion to intervene. See D.B. at ¶ 14 (concluding the father did not have standing to appeal the trial court's denial of the paternal grandfather's motion to intervene); see also In re M.D., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-786, 2019-Ohio-3674, ¶ 57 (finding the mother lacked standing to appeal the trial court's denial of her sister's motion to intervene in a permanent custody matter); D.T. at ¶ 8 (concluding the mother lacked standing to appeal the denial of cousin's motion to intervene in custody matter). Here, appellant brought an appeal on behalf of his father's motion to be added as a new party. Because a party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of this court, we lack jurisdiction to consider any of appellant's assignments of error concerning the denial of Aly Newar's motion to be added as a new party. D.B. at ¶ 14, citing In re S.G.D.F., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-57, 2016-Ohio-7134, ¶ 11, citing Ohio Contract Carriers Assn. v. Public Util. Comm. of Ohio, 140 Ohio St. 160, 161 (1942).
{¶ 10} We note that it is clear from the record that appellant cares deeply for his child. However, we are limited in our jurisdiction to matters that comply with the requirements of a final, appealable order.
In appellant's seventh assignment of error, he argues that the complaint in this case was not served consistent with Ohio Civ.R. 4.2. While appellant's June 14, 2022 decision and judgment entry does not constitute a final, appealable order, we note that this court addressed an identical argument by appellant in a prior decision. See Soliman v. Nawar, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-633, 2023-Ohio-1762, ¶ 13-15 ("Nawar I"). We agree with our analysis in Nawar I and incorporate it by reference in the instant case.
{¶ 11} Accordingly, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 12} Based on the foregoing, we find the order from which appellant seeks to appeal is not a final, appealable order. Therefore, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Appeal dismissed.
BEATTY BLUNT, P.J. and LUPER SCHUSTER, J, concur.