Opinion
A167149
01-30-2024
In re A.P. et al., persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. M.S., Defendant and Appellant. SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. Nos. J45481, J45482.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
M.S. (mother) appeals the juvenile court's termination of jurisdiction over her two minor children - A.P. and K.P. (collectively, children) - arguing there was insufficient evidence that continued supervision was unnecessary. She also contends the court abused its discretion by granting Alfredo P. (father) sole legal custody of the children. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A.P. and K.P. are respectively six and four years old. Mother and father have a history of domestic violence and substance use; they separated before K.P. turned one year old. The children thereafter resided with mother, but there was no formal custody arrangement.
In February 2022, the Solano County Health and Social Services Department (Department) filed a petition on behalf of the children. (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 300; undesignated statutory references are to this code.) The Department alleged it received an emergency referral that mother physically abused A.P. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) He had a bruised eye and face, swelling, and purple discoloring inside his lip. During a forensic interview, he stated mother punched him, and she" 'beat'" him and his sister" 'a lot.'" Although mother reported A.P.'s injuries were the result of him falling out of a bunk bed - an excuse she had used for other injuries - she later admitted to hitting him in the mouth, causing his lip to hit a tooth and bruise. Because A.P. had been abused or neglected, the Department also alleged there was a substantial risk K.P. would be abused or neglected. (§ 300, subd. (j).) Indeed, at the time of the referral, she had a cracked, but healing finger. Although the Department urged father to take emergency custody of the children, he failed to do so, thus placing them in substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.
The Department also expressed concern about mother's unmet mental health needs, which impaired her ability to provide regular care for the children. For example, mother previously failed to obtain medical attention after breaking K.P.'s thumb. Indeed, she had a history of grabbing, breaking, and dislocating the children's fingers and failing to obtain medical attention for them. Mother also had unaddressed trauma from prior sexual abuse by a family member. And she had delusions, such as believing her roommates were trying to traffic her and had drugged her.
The juvenile court sustained the allegations, detained the children, placed them in foster care, and ordered supervised visitation for the parents. The Department's 2022 jurisdictional report chronicled father's criminal history, including lewd acts with a child requiring him to register as a sex offender. The Department noted mother had a history of reporting physical and sexual abuse of her children by family members or unknown perpetrators. Indeed, throughout the case, mother insisted the foster parents were sexually abusing the children and sexually trafficking them to male friends - similar to allegations she made against father, former roommates, and other random people. She denied any mental health diagnoses.
An addendum report drafted a few months later, however, indicated father's parenting skills and ability to engage with the children improved since his initial supervised visits. His visits were going well, the children were excited to see him, and all three played appropriately. He provided healthy snacks and properly redirected the children when they had disagreements over sharing toys. He obtained a driver's license and started working for a food delivery service. He completed two parenting classes, was working to enroll in a third program, and complied with drug testing. In addition, the Department reported father took accountability for his initial failure to protect the children. It opined he would benefit from family maintenance services while residing in his mother's home for additional support and supervision. By contrast, mother often alleged the children were being abused by their foster parents. During one supervised visit, she repeatedly asked K.P. whether they were" 'sticking things up her butt.'" A subsequent physical exam at a hospital revealed the children were healthy with no signs of trauma.
At a jurisdictional hearing in June 2022, the juvenile court adjudged the children dependents. In addition to ordering mother to undergo a psychological evaluation, the court suspended all visits after finding them detrimental to the children. The court prohibited mother from contacting paternal grandmother, father, and the children at the residence. It removed the children from mother and placed them with father. The court further granted mother reunification services and father family maintenance services.
At the six-month review hearing, the Department recommended terminating mother's reunification services. (§ 364.) According to the Department, mother denied abusing the children and instead accused others of causing the children harm, demonstrating a lack of insight. And although mother was diagnosed with a delusional disorder after her psychological evaluation, she denied having any mental health issues. She acknowledged she needed therapy to address her past trauma and expressed willingness to participate in services to obtain custody of the children, but nonetheless alleged the psychological evaluation simply incriminated her. Due to her lack of insight, the Department reported mother's prognosis for reunifying with the children was poor. The Department also recommended terminating the dependency proceedings and placing the children in father's sole custody because they were doing well in his care and there were no immediate safety concerns.
The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over the children and granted father sole legal and physical custody. (§ 364.) It terminated reunification services for mother after finding she made minimal progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement with father. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) It granted mother supervised visitation via video conference on Saturdays, but authorized father to expand supervised visitation to include in-person visits.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's order terminating jurisdiction over the children. After indulging "all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court," we conclude substantial evidence supports its findings. (In re M.V. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1506-1507; Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 300 [reviewing termination of dependency jurisdiction for abuse of discretion].)
"Once a child has been declared a dependent, the juvenile court must review the status of the child every six months." (In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1154.) Family maintenance services must be provided for a child who remains at home. (Bridget A. v. Superior Court, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 303.) At the six-month family maintenance hearing, the court determines whether the dependency should be terminated or whether continued supervision is necessary, not whether reunification is warranted. (Aurora P., at p. 1155.) In making that determination, the court considers the totality of the evidence, including reports by social workers who must recommend whether continued supervision is necessary. (Ibid.)
The child's placement determines the applicable standards at a sixmonth review hearing. (In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 98.) Section 364 governs when a dependent child is in the offending parent's care because they were removed and returned home. (In re Shannon M. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 282, 290; Bridget A. v. Superior Court, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 313-315.) "[T]here is a statutory presumption in favor of terminating jurisdiction and returning the children to the parents' care without court supervision." (Shannon M., at p. 290.) Under that section, the default finding is terminating supervision where the social services agency makes that recommendation. (In re Aurora P., supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163.) In those circumstances, either parent, guardian, or the child must object and establish by a preponderance of evidence conditions justifying retaining jurisdiction exist or are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn. (Ibid.; § 364, subd. (c).)
From the record, it appears the juvenile court applied section 364 when determining jurisdiction. Neither party below objected to that standard. But since the children were removed from mother's custody and placed with father, it is unclear whether the court should have applied section 361.2. That section applies when a child has been removed and placed with a noncustodial parent - in those circumstances the court must determine whether supervision is still necessary. (§§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3), 366.21, subd. (e)(6); In re Shannon M., supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 291, fn. 6.) The standards governing six-month review hearings under section 366.21 are similar to those applicable to section 364 six-month review hearings. (In re Maya L., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 99; § 364, subd. (c).) Both require determining whether continued supervision is necessary. (Maya L., at p. 99.) But section 361.2 - unlike section 364 - does not require the court to examine whether conditions originally supporting jurisdiction still exist. (Maya L., at p. 99.) Under either standard, terminating jurisdiction was appropriate.
Here, the Department recommended terminating juvenile court supervision. (In re Aurora P., supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1155.) The juvenile court's finding that the children no longer needed court supervision is amply supported by the record. The Department noted father worked diligently to provide the children with a stable and structured environment. (Ibid.) The children were well cared for, with father and paternal grandmother providing them with all their emotional, physical, and medical needs. The children were in good health, up to date with routine medical care and immunizations. Through his parenting classes, father learned about different developmental stages and the children's ability to express their wishes and feelings. The children reported feeling safe with father and wanted to remain in his care. (Compare with In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1134 [substantial evidence of continued need for supervision existed when social services agency recommended continued monitoring of child in father's home, mother was the only parental figure child knew, and child was more bonded to mother].) Their feelings of security resulted in them being more adventurous and inquisitive, meeting their development milestones, and interacting with their peers. Father maintained excellent communication with the children's school, where they arrived on time and well groomed.
Mother's argument that father is unable to protect the children because he failed to obtain emergency custody of them upon the initial January 2022 emergency referral is meritless. That issue no longer exists. (In re A.J. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 525, 535 [terminating jurisdiction appropriate when there are no existing protective issues].) Critically, the Department's sixmonth status review report noted father demonstrated his ability to keep the children safe from danger. In June 2022, father sought and was granted a no-contact order to protect the children and himself from mother while they were staying with paternal grandmother. And when the juvenile court altered visitation to allow contact between the children and mother, father allowed contact in a responsible and consistent manner. Indeed, she does not present any evidence disputing the children are safe in father's care.
Father's initial refusal to provide the children with mental health services and his classification as a sex offender do not warrant retaining jurisdiction over the children, contrary to mother's assertions. First, we acknowledge a therapist recommended the children obtain ongoing counseling - therapy started while they were in foster care - and father initially declined mental health services for the children when they were placed in his custody. But the Department social worker testified regarding father's receptiveness to continuing counseling after understanding the trauma the children experienced as the result of mother's abuse. To that end, just before the status review hearing, a therapist started the assessment process. Second, father cleared his criminal record before the status review hearing and was no longer required to register as a sex offender. It was reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude neither issue required continued supervision over the children, and mother fails to identify anything in the record demonstrating otherwise.
Mother's willingness to participate in intensive mental health services and medication does not justify continuing jurisdiction, contrary to her assertions. While that may impact her efforts to reunify with the children, it has no bearing on the relevant issue here - whether continued juvenile court supervision of their placement with father is necessary. (In re Armando L. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 606, 615 ["the juvenile court is not concerned with reunification, but in determining whether the dependency should be terminated or supervision is necessary" at § 364 hearings].) The totality of the evidence here demonstrated there is no need for the children's continued involvement in the dependency system.
Mother next contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in awarding father sole legal custody of the children because she was employed, could provide insurance and other benefits for the children, and could ensure they received necessary mental health services. We disagree.
When terminating jurisdiction over children, juvenile courts have broad discretion to issue custody and visitation orders. (§ 362.4; In re Anna T. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 870, 871.) Those "exit orders" may only be modified upon a court finding there is a significant change of circumstances since the order was first issued and that a modification is in the best interests of the child. (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513 &fn. 4.) Custody determinations under section 362.4 are guided by the totality of the circumstances and the child's best interests. (In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112.) "The issue of the parents' ability to protect and care for the child is the central issue." (In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 712.) Because the juvenile court" 'has been intimately involved in the protection of the child, [it] is best situated to make custody determinations based on the best interests of the child without any preferences or presumptions.'" (J.M., at p. 112.) We review exit orders for an abuse of discretion, reversing only if the order was arbitrary and capricious. (Id. at p. 113.)
We discern no abuse of discretion in the custody order here. Father had demonstrated he could keep the children safe in a stable environment. Nothing indicated additional insurance or her supervision was required to provide for the children's medical or mental health needs, as mother suggests. The Department consistently reported father provides for the children's emotional, physical, and medical needs. In contrast, the juvenile court noted the children came under the juvenile court's jurisdiction, in part, due to mother's untreated mental health and the children sustaining serious injuries from her physical abuse. The Department continued to have concerns regarding her lack of insight into the physical abuse she inflicted upon both children. Indeed, she denied abusing them and instead accused others of causing harm to them. She believed others, such as father, coached the children to make abuse allegations against her. According to the psychological examiner, denying the abuse increased the risk she would not fully participate in services needed to adequately and safely care for the children.
While mother started participating in mental health services, she had not addressed her mental health issues in a meaningful way. She met the diagnostic criteria for delusional disorder, which the psychological examiner noted impacted her belief in the children's safety around others. But mother continued to deny having any mental health issues. Indeed, during supervised visitation, she repeatedly asked the children whether people were abusing or harming them. As a result, the juvenile court suspended all visitation after finding it detrimental to the children. Although mother highlights her willingness to participate in intensive mental health services and take medication, she testified that willingness only extended to however long it was necessary to get her children back. Given her failure to address the serious issue of her mental health needs and physical abuse of the children, the juvenile court's order granting father sole legal custody was not arbitrary, capricious, or absurd. (In re J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 112-113.)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating jurisdiction and the custody order are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: TUCHER, P. J., FUJISAKI, J