MANUEL, J. Twelve years ago this court, in the case of Sokol v. PublicUtilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265], struck down on constitutional grounds the then existing rule for discontinuance of telephone service used for illegal purposes and announced the standard which any future rule must meet. "[W]hatever new procedure is hereafter devised," we held, "must at a minimum require that the police obtain prior authorization to secure the termination of service by satisfying an impartial tribunal that they have probable cause to act, in a manner reasonably comparable to a proceeding before a magistrate to obtain a search warrant. In addition, after service is terminated the subscriber must be promptly afforded the opportunity to challenge the allegations of the police and to secure restoration of the service.
( In re Harris (1968) 69 Cal.2d 486, 489-490 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 340, 446 P.2d 148].) (See also Brandenstein v. Hoke (1894) 101 Cal. 131, 133 [35 P. 562] (establishment of reclamation district); Sokol v. Public Utilities Com. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254-256 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265] (curtailment of telephone service); Estate of Buchman (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 546, 559-561 [ 267 P.2d 73] (removal of executor).) Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous court in Mendoza v. Small Claims Court (1958) 49 Cal.2d 668, 672 [ 321 P.2d 9], stated the constitutional principle most succinctly: "When public necessity demands, there may be action followed by a hearing. [Citations.] Otherwise due process requires that no person shallbe deprived of a substantial right without notice and hearing. [Citations.]" (Italics added.)
" P.U.C. Reg. 14:403-5a; see R.S. 48:2-24. It may be noted that in the Paterson Publishing Co. case, supra, 21 N.J. 460, the company gave notice of a future date of proposed discontinuance thereby affording reasonable and timely opportunity to the subscriber to take any legal steps it considered advisable; normally such action would be feasible and would be likely to avoid the suggestion of procedural infirmity or lack of due process. See Kaufman, Ex Parte Deprivation of Telephone Serviceto Alleged Gamblers — Police vs. Constitution, 2 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 9 (1953); cf. Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission, 65 Cal. 2 d 247, 53 Cal.Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265 (1966); 67 Colum. L. Rev. 773 (1967); 55 Calif. L. Rev. 566 (1967); 20 Stan. L. Rev. 136 (1967). See also Taglianetti v. New EnglandTel. Tel. Co., supra, 103 A.2d at 71-72; Pike v.Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 263 Ala. 59, 81 So.2d 254, 266 (1955); 34 Texas L. Rev. 935 (1956); 8 Ala. L. Rev. 344 (1956).
The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account." ( Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 [4 L.Ed.2d 1307, 1321, 80 S.Ct. 1502]; see Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission, 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265].) (10) Those elements of due process deemed essential for the protection of one accused of a crime are not inevitably guaranteed to one duly convicted of a crime.
(7) Appellants' claim of damages presents entirely different issues. The threshold question of jurisdiction involves ambiguous and shifting Public Utilities Commission decisions and revolves in part on the same disputed premise as a tort defense under Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265]. Before analyzing the question of jurisdiction, we may first consider the Sokol decision.
In varying contexts, this court has not hesitated to give full effect to the principles set forth in Greene and applied in Willner. (See, e.g., Shively v. Stewart, supra, 65 Cal.2d 475, 479; Sokol v. Public Utilities Com. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254-256 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265]; Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover (1952) 39 Cal.2d 260, 269-270 [ 246 P.2d 656].) Indeed, we have held that even an organization, such as a labor union, which does not exercise state power cannot arbitrarily impair the right to pursue a lawful trade by expelling a member without a fair hearing ( Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 134, 143-144 [ 231 P.2d 6, 21 A.L.R.2d 1387]) or by arbitrarily excluding from membership a person employed in the craft or industry whose employees are represented by that union ( Directors Guild of America, Inc. v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 42, 50-55 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 710, 409 P.2d 934]).
State agencies have in the past initiated criminal investigations against utility customers that resulted in findings of probable cause which both Pacific Bell and General Telephone then used to justify disconnection under Rule 31 and its predecessor. See, e.g., Goldin v. PUC, 23 Cal.3d 638, 647-48, 153 Cal.Rptr. 802, 592 P.2d 289 (1979); Sokol v. PUC, 65 Cal.2d 247, 249-50, 53 Cal.Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265 (1966). Moreover, the district court properly concluded that Sable I's finding that a case or controversy existed regarding threatened federal prosecutions under 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) established that a case or controversy existed regarding Rule 31.
The court reasoned that it would be unfair to impose civil liability on a person when a California statute made it a misdemeanor to refuse an officer's request to aid in an arrest. A more recent California Supreme Court case, Sokol v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 65 Cal.2d 247, 418 P.2d 265, 53 Cal.Rptr. 673 (1966), held that a public utility was not civilly liable for disconnecting the plaintiff's phone after receiving notification from the local police chief that the phone was being used for illegal purposes. A state Public Utilities Commission regulation required the phone company to disconnect phone service whenever it had reasonable cause to believe that a subscriber was using the phone for an illegal purpose, and further provided that notice from a law enforcement officer of such usage was sufficient to constitute reasonable cause.
Tarantino v. Syputo, No. C 03-03450 MHP, 2006 WL 1530030, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2006) aff'd sub nom. Tarantino v. Syputa, 270 F. App' x 675 (9th Cir. 2008) ("A contrary rule would not only be inequitable but would discourage cooperation with law enforcement agencies. ") (quoting Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission, 65 Cal.2d 247, 257-58 (1966). Weldon's factual assertions also undermine his argument.
The towing company defendants argue that they cannot be liable for conversion because they towed plaintiff's vehicles in response to apparently valid commands by city officials. In support of this argument, the towing company defendants citeSokol v. Public Utilities Commission, 65 Cal. 2d 247 (1966). InSokol, the defendant telephone company disconnected plaintiff's phone service at the request of the California Public Utilities Commission, which believed plaintiff to be using the telephones for illegal gambling activities.