That means that here, where the controversy involves step two considerations and, potentially, the reliability of the ALJ's RFC findings, Plaintiff has the burden of proving not only the existence of underappreciated, vocationally severe impairments, but also that any alleged error at step two undermines the reliability of the ALJ's RFC finding and, by extension, the ALJ's ultimate “not disabled” finding at step four or step five. Socobasin v. Astrue, 882 F.Supp.2d 137, 142 (D. Me. 2012). The ALJ found that although Plaintiff had reported “suspected small fiber neuropathy . . . no specific etiology had been identified.”
20 C.F.R, § 404.1509; Mulero v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 108 F. App'x 642, 644 (1st Cir. 2004) (to be severe, impairment must satisfy durational requirement). If error occurred at step 2, remand is only appropriate when the claimant can demonstrate that an omitted impairment imposes a restriction beyond the physical and mental limitations recognized in the Commissioner's RFC finding, and that the additional restriction is material to the ALJ's "not disabled" finding at step 4 or step 5. Socobasin v. Astrue, 882 F. Supp. 2d 137, 142 (D. Me. 2012) (citing Bolduc v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-220-B-W, 2010 WL 276280, at *4 n. 3 (D. Me. Jan. 19, 2010) ("[A]n error at Step 2 is uniformly considered harmless, and thus not to require remand, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate how the error would necessarily change the outcome of the plaintiff's claim.")). 1. Left Knee Impairment
Parsons v. Astrue, No. 1:08-cv-218-JAW, 2009 WL 166552, at *2 n.2, aff'd, 2009 WL 361193. If error occurred at step 2, remand is only appropriate when the claimant can demonstrate that an omitted impairment imposes a restriction beyond the physical and mental limitations recognized in the Commissioner's RFC finding, and that the additional restriction is material to the ALJ's "not disabled" finding at step 4 or step 5. Socobasin v. Astrue, 882 F. Supp. 2d 137, 142 (D. Me. 2012) (citing Bolduc v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-220-B-W, 2010 WL 276280, at *4 n. 3 (D. Me. Jan. 19, 2010) ("[A]n error at Step 2 is uniformly considered harmless, and thus not to require remand, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate how the error would necessarily change the outcome of the plaintiff's claim.")). The ALJ found that Plaintiff has a severe combination of mental impairments of affective disorder, anxiety disorder and personality disorder.
Parsons v. Astrue, No. 1:08-cv-218-JAW, 2009 WL 166552, at *2 n.2, aff'd, 2009 WL 361193. If error occurred at step 2, remand is only appropriate when the claimant can demonstrate that an omitted impairment imposes a restriction beyond the physical and mental limitations recognized in the Commissioner's RFC finding, and that the additional restriction is material to the ALJ's "not disabled" finding at step 4 or step 5. Socobasin v. Astrue, 882 F. Supp. 2d 137, 142 (D. Me. 2012) (citing Bolduc v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-220-B-W, 2010 WL 276280, at *4 n. 3 (D. Me. Jan. 19, 2010) ("[A]n error at Step 2 is uniformly considered harmless, and thus not to require remand, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate how the error would necessarily change the outcome of the plaintiff's claim.")). A. Fibromyalgia
In addition to the United States Magistrate Judge's thorough explanation of why remand is not appropriate in this case despite the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) error in finding that the plaintiff had no medically determinable back impairment, I add the following. Contrary to the plaintiff's position at oral argument, Socobasin v. Astrue, 882 F.Supp.2d 137 (D. Me. 2012), is not directly analogous to this case. In Socobasin, the magistrate judge determined that the ALJ's error in determining the plaintiff's impairment was non-severe was not harmless because "the record would have been devoid of any expert opinion regarding functional limitations imposed by the plaintiff's [ ] impairment."
The Commissioner cites case law holding that an ALJ is not required to consider “sparse” evidence pertaining to non-severe impairments. See Lopez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-cv-1059 (MDM) (D.P.R. July 18, 2023); Rosado-Mejias v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 201438 (BJM), 2022 WL 909385, at *10 (D.P.R. Mar. 29, 2022) and Socobasin v. Astrue, 882 F.Supp.2d 137, 142 (D. Me. 2012).
The error at Step 2, therefore, is not harmless. Socobasin v. Astrue, 882 F.Supp.2d 137, 142 (D. Me. 2012) (citing Bolduc v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-220-B-W, 2010 WL 276280, at *4 n. 3 (D. Me. Jan. 19, 2010) (“[A]n error at Step 2 is uniformly considered harmless, and thus not to require remand, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate how the error would necessarily change the outcome of the plaintiff's claim.”)). In sum, as to the third period identified by the ALJ, the ALJ's Step 2 finding, and his RFC finding are not supported by substantial evidence on the record.
If error occurred at step 2, remand is only appropriate when the claimant can demonstrate that an omitted impairment imposes a restriction beyond the physical and mental limitations recognized in the Commissioner's RFC finding, and that the additional restriction is material to the ALJ's “not disabled” finding at step 4 or step 5. Socobasin v. Astrue, 882 F.Supp.2d 137, 142 (D. Me. 2012) (citing Bolduc v. Astrue, No. 1:09-cv-00220-JAW, 2010 WL 276280, at *4 n. 3 (D. Me. Jan. 19, 2010) (“[A]n error at Step 2 is uniformly considered harmless, and thus not to require remand, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate how the error would necessarily change the outcome of the plaintiff's claim.”))
The ALJ's RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence on the record and thus Plaintiff has failed to establish that additional restrictions are necessary. See Socobasin v. Astrue, 882 F.Supp.2d 137, 142 (D. Me. 2012) (citing Bolduc v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-220-B-W, 2010 WL 276280, at *4 n. 3 (D. Me. Jan. 19, 2010) (“[A]n error at Step 2 is uniformly considered harmless, and thus not to require remand, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate how the error would necessarily change the outcome of the plaintiff's claim.”)); see also McDonald v. Soc. Sec. Admin. Comm'r, No. 1:09-cv-473-JAW, 2010 2680338, at *5 (D. Me. June 30, 2010). B. Vocational Evidence
Plaintiff, 5 moreover, has not identified any additional restrictions that her borderline intellectual functioning would impose beyond the restrictions included in the ALJ's RFC determination. Remand, therefore, is not warranted. Socobasin v. Astrue, 882 F.Supp.2d 137, 142 (D. Me. 2012) (citing Bolduc v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-220-B-W, 2010 WL 276280, at *4 n. 3 (D. Me. Jan. 19, 2010) (“[A]n error at Step 2 is uniformly considered harmless, and thus not to require remand, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate how the error would necessarily change the outcome of the plaintiff's claim.”)). The vocational expert testified that “an IQ is just a screenshot” and “there are more components to learning ability than just an IQ score, ” noting that she had placed persons with IQs below 77 in occupations similar to the representative jobs of marker, packager and grader/sorter.