Opinion
Case No. 2:99CV0099C
August 16, 2000
ORDER
This § 1983 action arose after Defendants City of Moab and Karla Hancock (collectively, "Defendants") terminated Plaintiff Marget Snyder from her position as the treasurer of the City of Moab. In her amended complaint, Snyder alleges violations of her First Amendment rights and her due process rights. The action is before the court on (1) Defendants' motion for summary judgment (on the entire amended complaint) and (2) Snyder's two motions for partial summary judgment.
Background
The City Treasurer of Moab is appointed by the City Mayor. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-916(1). Snyder was appointed City Treasurer in February 1990, and continuously held that position until January 13, 1998. On January 6, 1998, Defendant Hancock was sworn in as mayor of the City of Moab, after defeating former Mayor Thomas Stocks in the November 1997 election. On January 6, 1998, Hancock wrote Snyder a letter informing her that she would be discharged from her position. According to the letter, Snyder was terminated for the following reason:
I'm sure you and I are in agreement that your commitment was definitely not to me in the recent election. Because of this, I feel that it would be in my best interest — and the City's — to make another appointment to the Treasurer position.
(Letter, dated Jan. 6, 1998, from Hancock to Snyder, attached as Ex. A to Defs.' Memo. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J.) (underlying in original.)
Snyder brings two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, Snyder contends that Defendants violated her rights under the First Amendment (and Fourteenth) because her discharge was based on her lack of support for Hancock in the mayoral election. Second, Snyder alleges that she had a property interest in continued employment with the City of Moab and that Defendants violated her due process rights by failing to provide her with a pretermination hearing.
Pending Motion
There are three pending dispositive motions.
(1) Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the entire amended complaint. First, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment cause of action because (a) Snyder would have been terminated for reasons independent of her political loyalties; (b) political loyalty is an appropriate requirement for a city treasurer; and (c) Hancock is immune from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Second, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the due process cause of action because (a) Snyder had no constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment with the City of Moab and (b) Hancock is immune from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
(2) Snyder's (cross-motion) motion for partial summary judgment on the First Amendment cause of action. Snyder seeks partial summary judgment on the grounds that political loyalty is an inappropriate requirement for the City Treasurer.
(3) Snyder's motion for partial summary judgment on the due process cause of action. Snyder argues that the City of Moab's Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual ("Personnel Manual") created a protected property interest in her continued employment as a city employee. Snyder contends that since she had a property interest, she was entitled to a constitutionally-sufficient pretermination hearing.
Although divided into two motions for partial summary judgment, the combined effect is a motion for summary judgment on her entire amended complaint.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, the court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1552 (10th Cir. 1997).Once the moving party has carried its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); see also Gonzales v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1417, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Discussion
A. First Amendment Cause of Action
1. Constitutional Violation
As a general matter, "The First Amendment protects public employees from discrimination based upon their political beliefs, affiliation, or non-affiliation unless their work requires political allegiance." Mason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1451 (10th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 68-69 (1990)). A claim alleging violation of the First Amendment is "distinct from the due process claims and must be considered regardless of whether the plaintiffs had a legitimate expectation of continued employment." Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435, 1440 (10th Cir. 1988).
In order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment against a political discrimination claim, a plaintiff must establish a genuine dispute of fact that (1) political affiliation and/or beliefs were "substantial" or "motivating" factors behind the dismissal; and (2) the employment position did not require political allegiance. See Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1999).
Under the first prong, Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because Snyder would have been (or was) terminated for other (non-political alliance) reasons. In support, Defendants point to Hancock's deposition in which she stated her decision for terminating Snyder was made, in part, because Snyder did not get along with other city employees and because Hancock believed Snyder had not honestly reported her work times. (See Hancock Depo. at 75:8-9, 97:2-5.) In the termination letter, however, Hancock stated that the reason for termination was Snyder's lack of commitment to Hancock in the November election. How Hancock's letter should be interpreted and whether Snyder's political allegiance was a substantial or motivating factor behind the decision to dismiss is clearly a disputed issue of material fact. Since determination of this issue rests with the trier of fact, the Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that Snyder was, or would have been, terminated for non-political reasons.
If the fact-finder determines that political affiliation was a motivating factor behind Snyder's dismissal, the next issue is whether the position of City Treasurer for the City of Moab is a position that requires political allegiance. Following the Supreme Court's reasoning in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), the Tenth Circuit stated that "the ultimate constitutional question is whether 'party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.'" Dickeson, 844 F.2d at 1441. The Defendants have the burden of proving that party affiliation is appropriate. See id.
In considering this issue, the Tenth Circuit directs that "any analysis must necessarily begin with the inherent powers of the office at issue. However, titles alone do not provide the answer." Id. at 1442. Whether a particular position requires political allegiance or not is a question best answered "by analyzing the nature of the employee's duties and responsibilities." Id. The Defendant bears the burden of proof on whether political association is an appropriate requirement, and in close cases, "doubt should be resolved in favor of the public employee subject to the dismissal." Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1253; see also Dickeson, 844 F.2d at 1441.
The Tenth Circuit has "implicitly held that [the appropriateness of a political allegiance requirement for any particular position] is a question of fact." Barker v. City of Del City, 215 F.3d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1253). Accordingly, the court may grant one of the parties' motions for summary judgment on this issue only if there is no dispute as to the nature of Snyder's duties and the undisputed facts demonstrate that that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.
The treasurer of the City of Moab is the custodian of all of the City's monies. (See Snyder Depo. at 18:16-20.) As outlined in the job description, the City Treasurer performs the following functions:
1. Deposits funds daily into qualifying bank; invests available funds with qualified depositories; reconciles bank and state pool investment account.
2. Balances all monies received on a daily basis; prepares daily Treasurer's report, including a daily cash summary; posts all revenue receipts to General Ledger.
3. Verifies availability of funds for all checks prepared by the City Recorder; signs all warrants for payment; supervises and participates in the acceptance of payments for all licenses, customer deposits, changes of accounts, taxes, fines, etc; bills and collects all special taxes and assessments; administers liens.
4. Supervises and trains employees; assigns and evaluates work performed by employees in the Treasurer's Department.
5. Prepares the annual Treasurer's office budget; monitors budgetary expenditures; orders necessary supplies and equipment for the Treasurer's Department.
6. Interacts with the public and addresses complaints and problems.
(Job Description, attached as Ex. D to Defs.' Memo. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J.)
There are a number of reasons to conclude that a requirement of political loyalty is appropriate for this position. First, the City treasurer was responsible for preparing a budget, an important and sensitive task. See Bicanic v. McDermott, 867 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 1989) (appropriate for Administrator of Parks and Recreation who prepared budgets, negotiated and signed contracts, and "generally [ran] the show at a substantial component of the government"). Second, the City Treasurer's duties included some contact with the public. See Green v. Henley, 727 F. Supp. 582 (D. Kan. 1989) (appropriate for administrator of transportation division of Kansas Corporation Commission who analyzed current transportation regulations, testified before the Kansas Legislature, spoke to the media, and developed transportation policy). Third, the fact that the position is appointed by the mayor favors a finding that political loyalty is appropriate.
On the other hand, there are strong reasons to find that political loyalty is not appropriate for this position. First, Hancock (the mayor herself) testified that political loyalty to the mayor may not be an appropriate requirement for the position:
Q: So would there be anything about the city treasurer's duties that would require political loyalty in your view?
A: No.
Q: So I'll give you a hypothetical. If a city treasurer were to support one candidate for mayor, and another candidate for mayor was actually elected, is there anything about the city treasurer's duties that would make the political support of the city treasurer for the unelected candidate important?
A: Not that I can think of. I don't think there's any relationship at all.
Q: You always thought that way?
A: Yes.
(Hancock Depo. 117:5-9, 122:23-123:22.) While Hancock's opinion is not controlling on the court, it does favor a conclusion that the a political loyalty requirement is not appropriate. In addition, Snyder stated that she performed mostly clerical work on a daily basis:
A: On a daily basis I made the deposits and invested their money and, you know, receipted money in, worked on the general ledger of that department, and made sure that my department was in balance.
Q: Did you have any responsibilities over payroll?
A: No, all I did was sign the checks.
Q: All right. Any other responsibilities that you had as the city treasurer?
A: I was responsible also for the business licensing. That's it.
(Snyder Depo. 18:22-19:6.)
In the end, while the parties do not necessarily dispute what Snyder's responsibilities and duties were, there is simply not enough evidence to adequately answer this question as a matter of law. It is unclear, for example, how much independence Snyder actually had when performing her various tasks as City Treasurer; the record does not demonstrate either the type and frequency of contact with the public; it is unclear how much of her job was clerical and how much involved interpretation and implementation of City policy. Defendants have, therefore, not met their burden of showing that political loyalty is an appropriate requirement. At the same time, however, the court cannot say as a matter of law that political loyalty is not an appropriate criteria for this job. Hence, both Defendants' and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on this issue must be denied.
Since neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the question of whether Snyder's First Amendment rights were violated must be answered by the trier of fact. See Barker, 215 F.3d at 1138. This includes two separate determinations: (1) whether political affiliation and/or beliefs were "substantial" or "motivating" factors behind Snyder's dismissal and (2) whether political allegiance was an appropriate criteria for effective performance of the position of City Treasurer of the City of Moab.
2. Qualified Immunity
Assuming Snyder's First Amendment rights have been violated, Defendants next argue that qualified immunity precludes liability for Hancock. Under the qualified immunity doctrine, "government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability from civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982). "For a right to be clearly established, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1258. The plaintiff has the burden of convincing the court that the law was clearly established. See Green, 727 F. Supp. at 585 (aff'd 924 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1991)). Existence of qualified immunity is a question of law. See Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2000). With regard to this type of case, federal courts have stated that:
The defense of qualified immunity would only protect Hancock, not the City of Moab. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 134 F.3d 1025, 1275 (10th Cir. 1998).
Rather than ask generally whether it was clearly established that the first amendment is implicated in this sort of case, the district courts should have considered whether it was clearly established that employees in the particular positions at issue, in light of the responsibilities inherent in those positions, were protected from patronage dismissal.
Green, 727 F. Supp. at 586 (emphasis added).
As discussed above, the record does not adequately reflect what responsibilities and duties are inherent in the position of City Treasurer of the City of Moab. It is, therefore, not possible to determine whether the law was clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity. Therefore, the court reserves judgment on whether Hancock is protected by qualified immunity pending further development of the record.
B. Due Process Cause of Action
1. Constitutional Violation
"In order to invoke the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause, a plaintiff must show 'the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.'" Dickeson, 844 F.2d at 1437 (internal citations omitted). "A protected property interest in continued employment exists only if the employee has a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' to continued employment." Id. (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). If a plaintiff can prove that she has a property interest in continued employment, a state cannot deprive him of that interest without due process. See id. at 1438.
Whether an employee has a property interest in her employment is determined in accordance with state law. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); Dickeson, 844 F.2d at 1438 n. 5. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that an employment manual can create for cause employment:
This [employment at will] presumption can be overcome by an affirmative showing by the plaintiff that the parties expressly or impliedly intended a specified term or agreed to terminate the relationship for cause alone. Such evidence may be found in employment manuals . . . which demonstrate the intent to terminate only for cause or to continue employment for a specified period.
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989).
Snyder contends that as a full-time employee of the City of Moab, her employment was governed by the City's Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual. According to Snyder, the personnel manual gave her a property interest in continued employment with the City of Moab (though not necessarily a property interest in her position as City Treasurer of the City of Moab).
In support of her argument, Snyder points to three sections of the Manual. Article 7.24(A) states that "Classified employees are not subject to separation or suspension except for cause or reasons of curtailment of work or lack of funds." There is no doubt that this gives "classified employees" a protected property interest in continued employment. See West v. Grand County, 967 F.2d 362, 366 (10th Cir. 1992) (county personnel manual with same language conferred "a property interest in continued employment that could not be curtailed without constitutional protections").
Articles 11.7 and 11.8 define "classified employees." According to those sections, a "classified employee" is one whose work:
consists of the regular full time employees of the City, except the Mayor/Administrator, City Attorney, elected officials, contractors, members of policy, advisory, review and appeal boards, or similar bodies who do not perform administrative duties as individuals and includes any other position designated by the Mayor/Administrator as an appointment to the classified service.
Id.
In Hutchison v. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772, 773-74 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court reasoned that, unless modified by a statute of otherwise, the power of appointment to an office carries with it the power to suspend or dismiss. See id. ("When an individual is appointed by an official, 'the office is held during the pleasure of the authority making the appointment, and . . . no notice or charges or hearings are required for the suspension or removal by the authority appointing the officer.'"); see also Ward v. Richfield City, 776 P.2d 93, 96 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (same); Accord Dickeson, 844 F.2d at 1439 (citing the same rule in Wyoming). Accordingly, Snyder did not have a property interest in continued employment under Utah state law. Accord Dickeson, 844 F.2d at 1439. Furthermore, since Utah statutes grant the power of appointment and removal to the mayor, these powers cannot not be limited by a personnel manual. See id. Hence, no property interest was created by the personnel manual.
Snyder attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing that she had a property interest in continued employment with the City of Moab itself, not necessarily continued employment in her position as City Treasurer. The court disagrees. As discussed above, the mayor had the absolute and exclusive right to appoint and remove the City Treasurer and no one could interfere with these powers. See id. Granting appointed officials for cause employment status (even elsewhere as a city employee) infringes on the mayor's right to appoint and remove. Since the mayor's power to appoint and remove is absolute, the personnel manual cannot give appointed officials a protected property interest in continued employment.
A city mayor may, for example, hesitate to appoint (or remove) if she knows that the appointed (or terminated) individual will remain on the city payroll after leaving an appointed position.
Because Snyder had no property interest in continued employment with the City of Moab, there could be no due process violation. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Conclusion
In summary, the court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment in part and DENIES in part and the court DENIES Plaintiff's two motions for partial summary judgment. Specifically, the court order that: (1) Plaintiff's and Defendants' motions for summary judgment on the First Amendment Cause of Action on the ground that there was no constitutionally violation are DENIED since there are material issues of fact remaining to be resolved; (2) Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment Cause of Action on the ground that Hancock is entitled to qualified immunity is HELD IN ABEYANCE until the record is more fully developed; (3) Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the Due Process Cause of Action is GRANTED; and (4) Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the Due Process Cause of Action is DENIED.
Specifically, a trial of fact must decide whether political affiliation and/or beliefs were "substantial" or "motivating" factors behind Snyder's dismissal and whether political allegiance was an appropriate criteria for effective performance of the position of City Treasurer of the City of Moab.
SO ORDERED.