Opinion
No. 26179
June 28, 2004
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Pemiscot County, Honorable Fred W. Copeland, Circuit Judge.
Thomas W. Rynard, Blitz, Bardgett Deutsch, L.C., Jefferson City, Missouri, and Stephen P. Sokoloff, Sokoloff Spielman, Kennett, Missouri, for Appellant.
Thomas L. Caradonna and Douglas M. Nieder, Lewis, Rice Fingersh, L.C., St. Louis, Missouri, for Respondents.
Donna Snider, Assessor for Pemiscot County, ("Assessor") appeals from a decision of the Missouri State Tax Commission ("Commission") setting aside Assessor's assessed valuation for specified real and personal property and setting new values for such property owned by Casino Aztar/Aztar Missouri Gaming Corp. ("Aztar"). Three of the four points raised on appeal, Points I, II, and IV, respectively, address the real property assessment, and Assessor argues that the Commission erred in setting aside the real property assessment because: 1) the value set by the Commission does not represent the true value in money in that the Commission valued the property at a use other than its highest and best use; 2) Aztar failed to overcome the presumption of the validity of Assessor's assessment and the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial and competent evidence; and, 3) the Commission's valuation approach violated the Missouri Constitution by treating casino properties differently from other commercial properties. The remaining point, Point III, states that the Commission erred in setting aside the personal property assessment because Aztar failed to overcome the presumption of the validity of Assessor's assessment, and the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Assessor initially filed her appeal with the Missouri Supreme Court, which transferred the matter to this Court.
Assessor contends that, based primarily on Points I and IV, this appeal is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Missouri Supreme Court. Article V, Section 3 of the Missouri Constitution grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Missouri Supreme Court for all cases involving construction of revenue laws of the state. Twelve Oaks Motor Inn, Inc. v. Strahan , 96 S.W.3d 106, 108 (Mo.App. 2003).
The Missouri Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction when the case involves: 1) the construction; 2) of the revenue laws; 3) of this state. Id. All three elements must be met to invoke the Missouri Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction. Maryville Prop., L.P. v. Nelson , 83 S.W.3d 608, 610 (Mo.App. 2002).
Here, the third element has not been met, because to be a revenue law "of this state" the law must be "adopted by the general assembly to impose, amend or abolish a tax or fee on all similarly-situated persons, properties, entities or activities in this state, the proceeds of which are deposited in the state treasury." Two Pershing Square, L.P. v. Boley , 981 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Mo.App. 1998) (internal citation omitted). Since this appeal involves property taxes on both real and personal property that, under § 137.115, RSMo 2000, are imposed by and paid to the county treasury, the case does not involve the construction of a revenue law of the state of Missouri. See id. Thus, this Court has jurisdiction.
Facts
For tax year 1999, Assessor valued Aztar's real property at $11,970,280, with a corresponding assessed value as commercial property of $3,830,490. It is important to note that, with regard to the real property, Assessor's records split the parcel into two separate tracts, due to computer program restrictions. All parties agree that it is one parcel of land; therefore, we will address it in that manner, realizing, as the Commission did, that any final valuation would essentially be halved and allocated between the two parcels for Assessor's records.
The real property consists of 37.5 acres of land located in Caruthersville, Missouri, of which 19.3 acres are unprotected flood ground, leaving 18.2 acres of usable ground. The area is zoned as commercial/residential, specifically within the light industrial district. The property was designed and constructed to serve as the facilities for the land-based operations of Aztar's licensed gaming business. The improvements to the property include a pavilion, which contains a restaurant, bar, common areas, restrooms, executive offices, and employee areas; gazebos; parking lot; and expo center.
Aztar's total personal property valuation for tax year 1999 was $17,210,160, with an assessed value of $5,736,720. The caveat concerning the personal property is that Aztar did not challenge the valuation of all its personal property. Aztar only disputed the assessment of its casino vessel, the City of Caruthersville, and a wharf barge, the Scott. The remaining personal property consisted of items such as gaming equipment, slot machines, furniture, fixtures, and computer equipment.
The parties agreed that the market value for the two challenged items, as determined by Assessor, was $13,715,109; thus, the Commission's decision would include the undisputed amount of $3,495,051, plus the amount determined as the appropriate market value for the vessel and barge. The resulting assessed value would, therefore, be the value for all of Aztar's personal property, not just the vessel and barge.
Aztar filed complaints with the Board of Equalization requesting that the Board review the real property and personal property assessments. The Board found Assessor's assessments appropriate for both the real property and the personal property.
Aztar appealed to the Commission. Following a hearing on the matter, the Commission issued decisions setting aside Assessor's assessments for Aztar's real and personal property. For the real property, the Commission found the true value in money of the property for tax years 1999 and 2000 was $5,113,280, with an assessed value of $1,636,250. As for the personal property, the Commission found the true value in money for the personal property was $4,237,791, with an assessed value of $1,411,200. Since the value of the undisputed personal property was $3,495,051, the Commission determined that the true value in money of the vessel and the barge was $742,740.
Pursuant to statute, real property assessments are for two years, with assessments made on January 1 of the odd-numbered year and applied to both the odd-numbered year and the subsequent even-numbered year. § 137.115.1, RSMo 2000. Under that same statute, personal property is assessed annually. § 137.115.1, RSMo 2000. Thus, in the case at bar, assessments for Aztar's real and personal property were made on January 1, 1999, and applied to tax years 1999 and 2000 for the real property and tax year 1999 for the personal property.
Assessor sought judicial review of the Commission's decisions in the Circuit Court of Pemiscot County. The parties stipulated that the cause be submitted to the trial court upon the record of the Commission and briefs filed with the court. The trial court affirmed the decisions of the Commission via a docket entry. This appeal, brought by Assessor, followed.
Standard of Review
In reviewing the judgment, we examine the decision of the Commission, rather than the decision of the trial court. Daly v. P.D. George Co. , 77 S.W.3d 645, 648 (Mo.App 2002). Our review is limited to a determination of whether the decision is supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the record as a whole, or whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unlawful, or in excess of the Commission's jurisdiction. Id.
We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, and if the evidence would support either of two opposed findings, we are bound by the administrative determination. Id. The Commission is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence. Nance v. State Tax Comm'n of Missouri , 18 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Mo.App. 2000). The proper methods of evaluation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S./Marriott Hotels, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n of Missouri , 852 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo.App. 1993). Only if the Commission's decision involves a question of law may we review independently. Aspenhof Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n of Missouri , 789 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Mo.App. 1990).
The tax assessor's valuation of property is presumed correct. Nance , 18 S.W.3d at 615. That presumption may be rebutted, however, if the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence that his proposed opinion on market value is indicative of the market value of the property on the date of assessment. Daly , 77 S.W.3d at 651. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might find adequate to support a conclusion. Id. Persuasive evidence is evidence that is of sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. Id.
Discussion of Assessor's Points
Point I — Valuation of real property at other than highest and best use; thus, not representative of true value in money
In her first point, Assessor contends that the Commission erred in setting aside the assessment for Aztar's real property and setting a new value because the new value does not represent the true value in money of the property, because the Commission valued the property at a use other than its highest and best use.
Under § 137.115, RSMo 2000, real property must be assessed according to the property's true value in money. § 137.115.1, RSMo 2000. According to the Missouri Supreme Court, "[t]rue value in money is the price which the property would bring from a willing buyer when offered for sale by a willing seller." Missouri Baptist Children's Home v. State Tax Comm'n , 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo.banc 1993). The definition has been further refined to indicate that a willing seller is one who is not obligated to sell and a willing buyer is one who is not obligated to buy. Daly , 77 S.W.3d at 649. The true value in money of the property is the fair market value of the property on the valuation date, which here was January 1, 1999. Missouri Baptist Children's Home , 867 S.W.2d at 512. Determining true value in money is a question of fact for the Commission. Aspenhof Corp. , 789 S.W.2d at 869.
True value in money is defined in terms of the property's value in exchange, rather than the property's value in use. Daly , 77 S.W.3d at 649. A property's true value in money is a function of the property's highest and best use, which has been defined as "the use of the property that will produce the greatest return in the reasonably near future." Aspenhof Corp. , 789 S.W.2d at 869. Highest and best use has also been defined as "the use which will most likely produce the highest market value, greatest financial return, or the most profit from the use of a particular piece of real estate." Brain Trust, Inc. v. City of Raytown , 523 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Mo.App. 1975).
True value in money is, at best, an estimate. Aspenhof Corp. , 789 S.W.2d at 869. The concept of highest and best use is used primarily as a starting point in arriving at that estimate of the property's fair market value. Brain Trust, Inc. , 523 S.W.2d at 159. Similar to the notion that true value in money is the value in exchange as opposed to the value in use, the highest and best use utilized to determine the true value in money has been specified further to be the highest and best use of the next most-likely buyer — that willing buyer who is not obligated to buy from a willing seller. See Clay v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm'n , 951 S.W.2d 617, 626 (Mo.App. 1997).
The only evidence presented at the hearing in the case at bar was from Aztar's two experts, one for the real property and the other for the personal property. Assessor's Exhibit 1, which consisted of her written direct testimony and a detailed balance sheet of Aztar's assets, was excluded from evidence as it related to the appeal to the Commission of the real property assessment, as well as the appeal of the personal property assessment. There is no issue in this appeal concerning the exclusion of that evidence.
Ed Dinan, a real estate appraiser and consultant who had been involved in the appraisals of other casinos, testified in the portion of the hearing before the Commission dedicated to the real estate assessment. On cross-examination, Dinan testified he had indicated in his report "that the highest and best use of subject property in this matter is as currently developed, that is as use as a casino facility[.]" Dinan also testified that, although "[t]he current use as developed was estimated to be the highest and best use[,]" there was also an alternate use "assumed to be an alternate highest and best use." Dinan described this alternate highest and best use as some type of retail commercial use.
When asked to verify on re-cross "that the most suitable and best future use would be as a casino[,]" Dinan stated that he thought he had "testified to the opposite." According to Dinan, the higher value between the highest and best use as a casino and the alternate as a commercial retail facility, "would be some other type of commercial endeavor[,]" rather than a casino.
In his report, which was admitted into evidence, Dinan noted that, if the land was vacant, "[t]he highest and best use of the site is most likely for some type of mixed-use development given current market conditions." Within the highest and best use discussion of the report, Dinan concluded that "the existing property provides an income stream that indicates that the current improvements are providing a contributory value to the site [and] [t]herefore, the highest and best use of the subject property is as currently improved."
As will be more fully discussed in Point II, Dinan arrived at his valuation of the real property using three methods: cost approach, sales comparison approach, and income capitalization approach. For the income capitalization approach, which Dinan concluded provided the best valuation, Dinan noted that an appraiser does not consider the income derived from the business, but only the income attributable to the real estate itself. The hearing officer verified that the approach described by Dinan, using "the stream of income that the property would produce instead of valuing the stream of income from the casino is the proper approach."
Dinan's valuations for the property were $5,530,000 for the cost approach, $5,000,000 for the income capitalization approach, and $4,940,000 for the sales comparison approach. He determined that the $5,000,000 under the income capitalization approach represented the best value, considering factors such as less-than-favorable market conditions for casinos (noting the failure of two casinos in the Kansas City area) and that a gaming license would not be transferable to any prospective buyer.
Dinan reiterated in his testimony, and the Commission agreed, that it was not value in use that was considered, but value in exchange. Within the Commission's decision on the real property, the hearing officer indicated that Assessor advanced a valuation based on the property's value in use — its current use as a casino. The Commission cautioned that the income stream of the gaming business conducted on the property could not be used in the valuation of the property because that income stream was based on the owner having a license to conduct such business, and that license could not be sold to a willing buyer.
Regarding the highest and best use analysis, the Commission agreed that the highest and best use is as currently developed as a casino, but that use was dependent on the gaming license. Without the gaming license, there would be no market for the property as a casino, and the property would have a highest and best use as some type of other commercial entity.
The Commission accepted and adopted Dinan's valuation under the income approach. Dinan did not include the expo center, which is a portable building, in his valuation; he instead considered it as part of Aztar's personal property. In its decision, the Commission found that the expo center was part of Aztar's real property and adopted Assessor's valuation of the center, which was $113,280. Thus, the Commission determined that the total valuation for the personal property was $5,113,280, which led to a corresponding assessed value of $1,636,250. The expo center's valuation is not at issue in this appeal.
We have the definitions of true value in money and highest and best use as outlined above, which neither party disputes. See Missouri Baptist Children's Home , 867 S.W.2d at 512; Daly , 77 S.W.3d at 649. We also have, within those definitions, the notion that true value in money is a function of highest and best use, and that highest and best use is a starting point for determining true value in money. See Aspenhof Corp. , 789 S.W.2d at 869; Brain Trust, Inc. , 523 S.W.2d at 159. In addition, it has been found acceptable for an expert to further specify that highest and best use relates to the highest and best use of the next most likely buyer. See Clay , 951 S.W.2d at 626. Lastly, we have the well-established concept that true value in money is based on a property's value in exchange and not value in use. Daly , 77 S.W.3d at 649.
Taking the above-stated principles with the evidence presented at the hearing, we cannot find that the Commission's decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unlawful, or in excess of its jurisdiction. See Id. at 648. Point I is denied.
Point II — Commission's decision on real property assessment not supported by substantial and competent evidence
In her second point, Assessor argues that the Commission erred in setting aside the real property assessment and setting a new value for the property because Aztar failed to overcome the presumption of the validity of Assessor's assessment and failed to establish the correct true value in money by substantial and competent evidence. Assessor also contends that, if Aztar did not fail in the manner described above, the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial and competent evidence because the accepted approaches to value were not properly applied or should not have been applied, and that either all factors were not considered in those approaches or other improper factors were considered.
As indicated earlier in this opinion, our review is limited to a determination of whether the decision is supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the record as a whole, or whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unlawful, or in excess of the Commission's jurisdiction. Daly , 77 S.W.3d at 648. As noted by Assessor, her valuation of the property is presumed correct. Nance , 18 S.W.3d at 615. However, that presumption may be rebutted if the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence that his proposed opinion on market value is indicative of the market value of the property on the date of assessment. Daly , 77 S.W.3d at 651.
The proper methods of evaluation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. , 852 S.W.2d at 379. There are several acceptable methods that may be used to calculate the true value in money when assessing property. Aspenhof Corp. , 789 S.W.2d at 869. Among these are the sales comparison approach, the income capitalization approach, the replacement cost approach, and the cost of construction approach. Id. Each method has its own set of factors unique to that method and the Commission, once it decides to follow a particular method, must consider all of that method's factors in arriving at a valuation. Id.
Part of Dinan's testimony and report were discussed in Point I. As mentioned there, he used three approaches to his valuation of the real property: the cost approach, the income capitalization approach, and the sales comparison approach. For the cost approach, Dinan used the method that involves taking the replacement cost minus depreciation. This is a widely accepted method and involves three factors: 1) the value of the land if vacant, plus 2) the value of the replacement costs of the improvements, less 3) the value of the depreciation of the improvements. Id.
Dinan valued the land at $1,880,000, the replacement cost of the buildings/improvements (recalling that he did not consider the expo center) at $4,397,000, and the depreciation of those improvements at $3,600,000. This led to his valuation under this approach of $5,530,000.
In valuing the vacant land under the cost approach, Dinan did not take into account the purchase price of the land, which had taken place five years earlier, because he was unable to confirm the price. He used six comparables for the vacant land, four of which were in Pemiscot County, commercial properties including an adjacent property improved with a hotel. The other two were used for casino purposes or purchased with that as the intended purpose; these sites were in St. Louis and St. Joseph. The price per acre Dinan calculated, $50,000 per acre, was not an average of those six properties. To arrive at that amount, the price per acre of the St. Louis and St. Joseph properties were not adjusted, but the others were adjusted downward for reasons that included the fact that a portion of Aztar's property sits on the flood plain.
He used the Marshall-Swift Cost Manual to determine replacement cost. In his report, Dinan acknowledged that if the construction of the improvements is fairly recent, reproduction cost would be preferred over replacement. Dinan determined that replacement cost was more appropriate here because that method eliminates the need to consider functional obsolescence, which Dinan concluded would be an issue for a casino property that was built with extremely high ceilings and "an abundance of ancillary or backroom type space[.]" Another reason Dinan incorporated the replacement cost method was due to the extremely competitive market in the casino business, given the initial period of excitement associated with gaming that has been followed in some areas, such as the State of Iowa and in Kansas City, by failures of similar casinos. His replacement cost amount did include an upward adjustment that took into account entrepreneurial profit, which he calculated raised the replacement cost 5%.
Regarding depreciation, according to Dinan utilizing the replacement method did eliminate functional obsolescence, but that some external obsolescence would still be present. This was because the property is located in a small community that is not located directly off an interstate, and depends on the local and traveling population. Normal depreciation for the buildings was estimated at 10%, with depreciation for the site calculated at 40%, and 5% to account for the external obsolescence. For his final valuation, Dinan did not give much weight to the cost approach because he considered the property "to be an overimprovement for the current market."
Dinan's second valuation approach was the income capitalization approach, which was discussed within the analysis of Point I. The income capitalization approach is based on an evaluation of what a willing buyer would pay to realize the income stream that could be obtained from the property when devoted to its highest and best use and involves projecting the net income stream that could reasonably be anticipated by that willing buyer. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. , 852 S.W.2d at 380. As noted in Point I, the valuation under this method must only value the real property, consisting of the land and improvements, and may not consider any income generated from the business or personal property. Id. at 381.
One aspect Dinan considered was comparable lease income, noting that the pavillion on the property combined office, retail, and storage space. Dinan considered two strip malls in Cape Girardeau each with three or four tenants, and four larger shopping areas in Springfield. Dinan calculated a $12 per square foot gross potential rental, which was similar to the Cape Girardeau properties and adjusted upward from the Springfield properties. Dinan then subtracted losses (due to vacancy and credit) and expenses to derive a net operating income. That amount was then capitalized at 12.5%, which was the combination of the overall capitalization rate and the effective tax rate. Finally, the estimated fair market value of the excess land was added.
The above calculations led to a valuation under the income capitalization approach of $5,000,000. Dinan gave this approach the most consideration because the approach tends to better reflect market conditions and is most appropriate for valuing investment-type properties. Dinan indicated in his testimony that he specifically did not consider theaters, amusement parks, or other properties in areas such as Branson, Lake Ozark, or Pacific, because that would have involved using the income stream from ticket sales, which is not proper under the approach.
Dinan's final approach was the sales comparison approach. None of the comparisons were direct sales of casino properties. Dinan used six comparable sales, including an office building, grocery store, strip mall, and three retail shopping centers. As Dinan determined there had been no comparable sales of casino-type property, he used sales that were within what he determined was the alternate highest and best use of the property, which was as a commercial retail sales facility.
He calculated a price per square foot of $80, which meant that five of the six were adjusted upward. This resulted in a valuation of $4,940,000. Because of his concern that there were no similar direct sales, Dinan gave less weight to this approach.
Assessor raises issue with all of the approaches. With the cost approach, Assessor argues that reconstruction cost should have been used. Under the income capitalization approach and the sales comparison approach, and to some extent the valuation of the vacant land under the cost approach, Assessor argues that the properties used as comparisons were not comparable.
Given our standard of review, we disagree with Assessor's contentions, and find that the Commission's decision was supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the record as a whole, and was not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unlawful, or in excess of the Commission's jurisdiction. See Daly , 77 S.W.3d at 648. Point II is denied.
Point III — Commission's decision on personal property assessment not supported by substantial and competent evidence
Assessor's third point is similar to Point II, but deals with the personal property assessment, specifically the valuation of the casino vessel and the barge. Assessor contends that the Commission erred in setting aside the personal property assessment and setting a new value for the vessel and barge because Aztar failed to overcome the presumption of the validity of the assessment or to establish the correct true value in money by substantial evidence. As for the method of valuation, Assessor argues that Aztar's expert appraiser did not apply any recognized or acceptable method of value.
Our standard is as stated in previous points. Our review is limited to a determination of whether the decision is supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the record as a whole, or whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unlawful, or in excess of the Commission's jurisdiction. Daly , 77 S.W.3d at 648. Assessor's valuation of Aztar's personal property is presumed correct. Nance , 18 S.W.3d at 615. However, that presumption may be rebutted if the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence that his proposed opinion on market value is indicative of the market value of the property on the date of assessment. Daly , 77 S.W.3d at 651. Further, the proper methods of evaluation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. , 852 S.W.2d at 379.
James Manley, a certified marine appraiser, testified for Aztar at the hearing, and his written direct testimony and appraisal report were admitted into evidence. Manley admitted that he did not use either the cost approach or the income capitalization approach to the valuation of the vessel and barge. With respect to both items, Manley determined that the cost approach was not applicable because "it would produce the illusion of a high market value due to the high cost of production of a like or comparable vessel."
As for the vessel, Manley noted that the market conditions were deteriorating for casino boats and that many other boats had excess space for restaurants, counting rooms, etc., which this boat did not have. The vessel was used for the gaming operations. Concerning the barge, Manley testified that the service life for similar barges has expired. A federal law addressing pollution has made such barges obsolete. The barge, on the valuation date, was used for passenger ticketing and queuing, although it since had been improved to include gaming positions.
Manley determined that the income capitalization method was not applicable because any income is related to the gaming license and casino business, not from either the vessel or the barge on their own. Thus, that approach, although it worked well for the real property, did not work well for the personal property.
As for highest and best use, Manley did agree that the highest and best use for the vessel was as a casino vessel, but could only be used as such if the owner had the gaming license. The highest and best use of the barge, according to Manley, was only as a casino facility "under duress" also because any willing buyer would need to have a casino license.
Through his use of the sales comparison approach, Manley arrived at a valuation of $617,740 for the vessel. Manley's sales comparisons for the vessel included sales in 1992, 1995, and 1999 of similar boats. Manley noted that the market was now flooded with used casino boats, and that use of comparisons suggested by Assessor was misleading because they were either of new, more up-to-date vessels or were sales made during a time when the market place for first-generation casino vessels like the one owned by Aztar was quite different.
In arriving at a valuation for the vessel under the sales comparison approach, Manley considered the size of the boats sold as represented by the number of gaming positions, the square footage used for gaming, and the total square footage for both gaming and non-gaming space.
In attempting to use the sales comparison approach for the barge, Manley arrived at a valuation of $125,000, which was essentially as scrap value. Manley indicated that similar barges have sold for as low as $15,000 to a high of $70-80,000. Manley noted that it is the general practice in the gaming industry to either custom build or significantly alter existing equipment. According to Manley, the barge owned by Aztar was designed and equipped to operate in a small market area and would not operate effectively in another market.
In its decision, the Commission found that, with respect to the vessel, Manley made appropriate adjustments to the comparable sales upon which he based that approach. It was further found that Manley reasonably rejected the other methods of valuation. With respect to the barge, the Commission found that Manley based his valuation on his general knowledge and experience and provided reasonable explanations for his conclusions that the barge could only be sold for casino use, but that it was unlikely that any other casino licensee in any state would even consider buying the barge, as that would be contrary to the general practice of the gaming industry.
The Commission concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish the value of both the vessel and the barge. The Commission further noted that its decision "should not be considered as establishing any hard and fast methodology for valuing casino boats and barges."
The Commission is the judge of credibility of the witnesses and evidence. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. , 852 S.W.2d at 380. In addition, it is for the Commission to decide the weight accorded any of the factors in a property tax appeal, not the courts. Id.
Substantial and persuasive evidence was presented in support of the valuations of the vessel and barge. We cannot find that the Commission's decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unlawful, or in excess of the Commission's jurisdiction. Daly , 77 S.W.3d at 648. Point III is denied.
Point IV — Real property valuation approach creates separate sub-class for casinos
In its final point, Assessor argues that the Commission erred in setting aside the real property assessment and setting a new value for the property because its valuation approach was in violation of Article X, Section 10(b) of the Missouri Constitution. Assessor contends that, under the Commission's method, casino properties are treated differently from other commercial properties and a new subclass is created for casinos as they are being appraised at an alternative, less economic highest and best use.
We find no merit in this point. Based on our analysis of the previous points, including the discussion of highest and best use in terms of the next most likely buyer, we find that there was substantial evidence in support of the true value in money determined for the property and that the true value in money was appropriately derived. Further, under Missouri Baptist Children's Home , "[m]erely because a factor exists which impacts on the value of one piece of property that does not affect every other piece of property in the same class is not a basis for violation of the uniformity clause." 867 S.W.2d at 513.
Point IV is denied.
Conclusion
The decision of the Commission is affirmed.
Parrish, J. and Shrum, J., Concur.