Summary
recognizing that mere disagreement with the verdict of a jury is not sufficient warrant for a new trial
Summary of this case from Hernandez v. FelicianoOpinion
October 24, 1952.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County, Charles A. Luckie, J.
Bedell Bedell, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Osborne, Copp Markham, Jacksonville, for appellee.
Bancroft Investment Company was the owner and operator of an elevator in the Professional Building, Jacksonville. Jack Snider was a tenant in the building and boarded the elevator on the ground floor, bound for his office on the sixth floor. When the elevator reached the second floor, on account of the crowded condition, Snider stepped off in order that others might alight more readily. As he stepped aboard, the elevator door struck him on the right shoulder, knocking him against the opposite wall. Two or three hours later, Snider's arm got numb. He sought medical relief and was sent to the hospital, where his arm was placed in a sling, and fitted with a brace. In a suit to recover damages for personal injuries, the jury returned a verdict for defendant and the plaintiff appealed.
Appellant contends, (1) the evidence required a finding of negligence on the part of the elevator operator; (2) contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff was not proven; (3) the applicable rule of law required the granting of a new trial.
Contentions one and two are addressed to the finding of the jury as to the probative value of the evidence. The evidence has been examined, and, while some aspects of its may be susceptible of a different interpretation, the jury, under fair, full, and appropriate charges, settled the point against the contention of appellant. It is further contended that the "verdict is the result of some prejudice," but no such "prejudice" is pointed out, and we are unable to say that the jury was influenced by considerations outside the evidence.
The third contention has to do with the well settled rule, that if the "trial court is of opinion that the verdict does not accord with the manifest weight of the evidence and the substantial justice of the cause, a new trial should be granted if duly made."
This contention is addressed to the conscience of the trial court and his judgment should not be reversed, absent a showing of abuse of discretion. The trial court had the parties and the evidence before him and was in much better position to appraise the probative value of the testimony than we are. For all the record discloses, the charges of the court were acceptable to both parties. The verdict and judgment are presumptively correct, and while we have searched diligently, we fail to find sufficient ground to overthrow this presumption. Mere disappointment at the verdict of a jury or disagreement with it, is not sufficient warrant for a new trial. There must be positive showing of prejudice, misconception, or some other influence that misled the jury. Failing to find any such element in the record, to reverse the judgment would amount to nothing more than a substitution of our appraisal of the evidence for that of the trial court and the jury, which we are not authorized to do.
The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.