Snelling v. Gregory

2 Citing cases

  1. Honzu v. Doe

    2:22-cv-292 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 22, 2024)

    See, e.g., Harris v. Sowers, No. 2:16-CV-888, 2020 WL 6823117, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2020) (adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that “Oh yeah? It's going to suck to be you” was too vague a threat to be considered an adverse action), amended, No. 2:16-CV-888, 2022 WL 1637564 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2022); Hunter, 2017 WL 1276762, at *11 (holding a threat that “complaining would get [Plaintiff] into a lot of trouble” was too vague and unspecified to form an adverse action); Snelling v. Gregory, No. 1:17-CV-P41-GNS, 2017 WL 2602591, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 14, 2017) (holding a threat that “‘this was not over and that [Defendant] would get [Plaintiff]' is too vague to constitute an adverse action.”); Smith v. Mohr, No. 2:15-CV-1264, 2016 WL 1322347, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2016) (holding plaintiff's allegation that a corrections officer threatened him with retaliatory punishment was too non-specific to be an adverse action), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:15-CV-1264, 2016 WL 3034496 (S.D. Ohio May 26, 2016); but see George v. Bookie, No. 1:23-CV-970, 2023 WL 6210829, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2023) (holding a threat that “[w]e do not care[,] you will do what we want you to do or we will kill you” followed by a derogatory racial epithet was not an adverse action on an initial screen). And Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a causal connection at this early stage between Spetnagel's threat and a retaliatory motive when he alleged that the r

  2. Harris v. Sowers

    Civil Action 2:16-cv-888 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2020)   Cited 2 times

    However, "courts have generally held that vague threats of unspecified harm do not constitute adverse actions." Snelling v. Gregory, No. 1:17-cv-P41, 2017 WL 2602591, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 14, 2017) (collecting cases); see also Hardy v. Adams, No. 16-2055, 2018 WL 3559190, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 2018) ("The alleged threat by Adams that she would make Hardy's life 'hell' is simply too vague to pass this threshold."); Kyle v. Skipper, No. 1:19-cv-353, 2019 WL 3729384, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2019) ("A specific threat of harm may satisfy the adverse-action requirement if it would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her First Amendment rights" and "[t]he threat Plaintiff alleges—"you will regret it"—is too vague and non-specific to deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected conduct") (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Here, the Verified Amended Complaint describes Defendant Hays' threat as follows: