See, e.g., Harris v. Sowers, No. 2:16-CV-888, 2020 WL 6823117, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2020) (adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that “Oh yeah? It's going to suck to be you” was too vague a threat to be considered an adverse action), amended, No. 2:16-CV-888, 2022 WL 1637564 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2022); Hunter, 2017 WL 1276762, at *11 (holding a threat that “complaining would get [Plaintiff] into a lot of trouble” was too vague and unspecified to form an adverse action); Snelling v. Gregory, No. 1:17-CV-P41-GNS, 2017 WL 2602591, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 14, 2017) (holding a threat that “‘this was not over and that [Defendant] would get [Plaintiff]' is too vague to constitute an adverse action.”); Smith v. Mohr, No. 2:15-CV-1264, 2016 WL 1322347, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2016) (holding plaintiff's allegation that a corrections officer threatened him with retaliatory punishment was too non-specific to be an adverse action), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:15-CV-1264, 2016 WL 3034496 (S.D. Ohio May 26, 2016); but see George v. Bookie, No. 1:23-CV-970, 2023 WL 6210829, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2023) (holding a threat that “[w]e do not care[,] you will do what we want you to do or we will kill you” followed by a derogatory racial epithet was not an adverse action on an initial screen). And Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a causal connection at this early stage between Spetnagel's threat and a retaliatory motive when he alleged that the r
Though “threats alone can constitute an adverse action if the threat is capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected conduct,” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 475 (6th Cir. 2010), “courts have generally held that vague threats of unspecified harm do not constitute adverse actions.” Snelling v. Gregory, No. 1:17-cv-P41, 2017 WL 2602591, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 14, 2017) (
Generally, courts have found that such “vague threats of unspecified harm do not constitute adverse actions.” Harris v. Sowers, No. 2:16-CV-888, 2020 WL 6823117, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2020), quoting Snelling v. Gregory, No. 1:17-cv-P41, 2017 WL 2602591, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 14, 2017); see also Hardy v. Adams, No. 16-2055, 2018 WL 3559190, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 2018) (“The alleged threat by [the defendant] that she would make [the plaintiff's] life ‘hell' is simply too vague to pass this threshold.”)
The magistrate judge correctly concluded that even assuming that Hays made the above statement, it was too vague to deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected conduct. See Snelling v. Gregory, No. 1:17-cv-P41, 2017 WL 2602591, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 14, 2017)(noting that "courts have generally held that vague threats of unspecified harm do not constitute adverse actions); see also Hardy v. Adams, No. 16-2055, 2018 WL 3559190, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 2018)("The alleged threat by Adams that she would make Hardy's life 'hell' is simply too vague to pass this threshold"). The magistrate judge correctly concluded that Hays' statement, even assuming it was made, did not arise to the level of an adverse action.
Courts have repeatedly held comments like the ones McGowan made to Benson are too vague and non-specific to be actionable. These include threats by prison staff to "ramp[] things up," Evenstad, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (quotation omitted); make an inmate's "life hell," Hardy, 2018 WL 3559190, at *3 (quotation omitted); "put a case on" an inmate, Johnson v. Govern, No. 2:17-CV-125, 2018 WL 6321548, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 4, 2018) (quotation omitted); "get" an inmate, Snelling v. Gregory, No. 1:17-CV-P41-GNS, 2017 WL 2602591, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 14, 2017) (quotation omitted); and have an inmate "regret" proceeding with a grievance, Kyle v. Skipper, No. 1:19-cv-353, 2019 WL 3729384, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2019) (quotation omitted); see also Snelling, 2017 WL 2602591, at *3 (listing cases).
However, "courts have generally held that vague threats of unspecified harm do not constitute adverse actions." Snelling v. Gregory, No. 1:17-cv-P41, 2017 WL 2602591, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 14, 2017) (collecting cases); see also Hardy v. Adams, No. 16-2055, 2018 WL 3559190, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 2018) ("The alleged threat by Adams that she would make Hardy's life 'hell' is simply too vague to pass this threshold."); Kyle v. Skipper, No. 1:19-cv-353, 2019 WL 3729384, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2019) ("A specific threat of harm may satisfy the adverse-action requirement if it would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her First Amendment rights" and "[t]he threat Plaintiff alleges—"you will regret it"—is too vague and non-specific to deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected conduct") (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Here, the Verified Amended Complaint describes Defendant Hays' threat as follows: