Snead v. C.I.R

6 Citing cases

  1. Matter of Bjella

    806 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1986)   Cited 2 times

    Finally, this court has inherent power to impose sanctions in order to control its docket and promote judicial efficiency. Cf. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463-64, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980); Charczuk v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 471, 475 (10th Cir. 1985); Snead v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 719, 720 (10th Cir. 1984), modified on other grounds, 744 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1984). Bjella also attacks the Plan's provision that sanctions may be waived only upon a showing of unusual or extreme circumstances.

  2. Casper v. C.I.R

    805 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1986)   Cited 40 times
    Adopting "a rule awarding a flat fee of $1,500 as a sanction for a frivolous appeal from a Tax Court decision"

    In the past we have often awarded damages of $500 and double costs, rather than remanding to the Tax Court for a determination as to actual attorney fees. See Stafford v. Commissioner, 805 F.2d 893, 894 (10th Cir. 1986); Stafford v. Commissioner, 805 F.2d 895, 896 (10th Cir. 1986); Clark v. Commissioner, 744 F.2d 1447, 1448 (10th Cir. 1984); Lamb v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 86, 88 (10th Cir. 1984), modified, Lamb v. Commissioner, 744 F.2d 1448, 1448-49 (10th Cir. 1984); Snead v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 719, 720 (10th Cir. 1984), modified, Lamb v. Commissioner, 744 F.2d 1448, 1448-49 (10th Cir. 1984); Moulton v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 734, 734-35 (10th Cir. 1984), modified, Lamb v. Commissioner, 744 F.2d 1448, 1448-49 (10th Cir. 1984). On appeal, the Commissioner informs us that the average amount of direct costs associated with defending legally frivolous appeals exceeds $1,400.

  3. Lamb v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

    744 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1984)   Cited 7 times
    In Lamb, we withdrew the mandates in a number of cases in which we had previously directed the Tax Court to assess attorney's fees and double costs for the bringing of frivolous appeals.

    Without deciding the issue of whether the Tax Court has authority to make findings and enter judgment on our determination that attorney's fees and double costs should be awarded for bringing a frivolous appeal to this court from the Tax Court, we have determined to withdraw the mandates and to modify them to direct the Clerk of this court to assess attorney's fees in the amount of $500 against each appellant and double costs against each appellant in Lamb v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1984) and Moulton v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1984). In Snead v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1984), the Clerk of the court is further directed to assess attorney's fees in the amount of $250 and one-half double costs against each appellant severally. As thus modified, the judgments and mandates in these cases are affirmed.

  4. Clark v. C.I.R

    744 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1984)   Cited 14 times

    In light of the appellant's timeworn and legally frivolous arguments, the award of attorney's fees and double costs is justified. See Lamb v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 86 (10th Cir.), on motion for reconsideration, 744 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1984); Snead v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 719 (10th Cir.), on motion for reconsideration, 744 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1984); Moulton v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 734 (10th Cir.), on motion for reconsideration, 744 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, attorney's fees in the amount of $500 and double costs are hereby imposed against the appellant for the taking of a frivolous appeal. The judgment of the tax court is AFFIRMED.

  5. Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.

    124 F.R.D. 665 (D. Kan. 1989)   Cited 63 times
    Finding that with respect to a common law fraud claim, “[i]t is implausible that, in initiating or continuing their employment with MCI, the salespersons did not rely on the commissions plans which they were required to sign. Further, whether their reliance was reasonable is an objective inquiry common to the entire proposed class.”

    See D.Kan.Rule 602(b). Just as the Tenth Circuit allows this court great freedom to control its docket, seeSnead v. C.I.R., 733 F.2d 719, 720 (10th Cir.1984) ( " [c]ourts have the inherent power to impose a variety of sanctions on both litigants and attorneys in order to regulate their docket, promote judicial efficiency, and deter frivolous filings" ), we must allow the magistrate significant freedom in controlling the pretrial docket of this court.          On the other hand, the end result of a case, including the course of discovery, is the responsibility of this court.

  6. Rothacker v. Rockwall County Central Appraisal District

    703 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. App. 1986)   Cited 5 times
    Rejecting claim that an appraisal valued in dollars violates the United States Constitution

    Claims similar to the ones presented by appellant have been before the courts numerous times in recent years and they have been uniformly rejected. See Snead v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 733 F.2d 719, modified, sub nom. Lamb v. Commissioner of Internal Reserve, 744 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Rifen, 577 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1978); Radue v. Zanaty, 293 Ala. 585, 308 So.2d 242 (1975); Allen v. Craig, 1 Kan. App. 2d 301, 564 P.2d 552 (1977); Chermack v. Bjornson, 302 Minn. 213, 223 N.W.2d 659 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 915, 95 S.Ct. 1573, 43 L.Ed.2d 780 (1975); Middlebrook v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 387 So.2d 726 (Miss. 1980); Dorgan v. Kouba, 274 N.W.2d 167 (N.D. 1978); Leitch v. State Department of Revenue, 16 Or. App. 627, 519 P.2d 1045 (1974); Trohimovich v. Director of Department of Labor Industries, 21 Wn. App. 243, 584 P.2d 467 (1978).