' In Smith v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 445, 308 S.W.2d 516 (1958), this court wrote: 'As the state's case depends solely upon circumstantial evidence, the evidence in order to be sufficient to show appellant's guilt must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save and except his guilt and must go further than to raise a probability or suspicion.'
280, 560.120, 560.135, V.A.M.S. Appellant attacks the sufficiency of evidence, contending: I. That the evidence failed to establish that a robbery had been committed because there was not sufficient evidence to establish a taking by defendant of another's property, State v. Conway, 351 Mo. 126, 171 S.W.2d 677; State v. Pippin, 327 Mo. 299, 36 S.W.2d 914; State v. Davis, 337 Mo. 404, 84 S.W.2d 633; State v. Matticker, Mo., 22 S.W.2d 647; and II. That the state's evidence created a reasonable doubt that defendant was one of the assailants, Cooper v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 218 F.2d 39; State v. Matticker, supra; Smith v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 445, 308 S.W.2d 516. A jury reasonably could find: At 1:30 a. m., June 4, 1970, George Hardiman, aged 61, was at 1900 Blair Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri. He had $2.00 in his right trouser pocket, 80 ¢ in his left trouser pocket, and 30 ¢ in his billfold.
The conviction is for robbery; the punishment, 15 years. Upon a former trial for this offense the conviction was reversed and the cause remanded by this court as shown by our opinion in Smith v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 308 S.W.2d 516. The facts set out in our former opinion are substantially the same as those upon the trial of this case, except that on the instant trial the state introduced a written statement of the appellant showing his participation in the commission of the offense charged.
Appellant argues under his first ground that the fingerprint evidence at most only placed him at the scene of the crime and that that fact alone is not sufficient to sustain the conviction. He further argues that the evidence only suggests a probability or strong suspicion that the appellant committed the burglary, and therefore the evidence did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis, save appellant's guilt, citing Smith v. State, 165 Tex.Crim. R., 308 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Cr.App. 1958). We agree with appellant that the rule in circumstantial evidence cases is stated in Smith.