Opinion
24A-CR-272
09-18-2024
Jacob Lee Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Amanda O. Blackketter Blackketter Law, LLC Shelbyville, Indiana. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Shelby Circuit Court The Honorable Trent Meltzer, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 73C01-2207-F6-274
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Amanda O. Blackketter Blackketter Law, LLC Shelbyville, Indiana.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
May, Judge.
[¶1] Jacob L. Smith appeals his conviction of Level 6 felony pointing a firearm.Smith raises two issues on appeal, which we revise and restate as:
1. whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Smith of pointing a firearm at another person; and
2. whether Smith's sentence is inappropriate in light of:
2.1. the nature of his offense and
2.2. his character. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Around 9:00 p.m. on July 28, 2022, Jayden McDaniel was driving on SR 44 toward Shelbyville with Alex Frazier. In an area known as Ray's Crossing, McDaniel encountered a vehicle being driven by Smith. Smith's vehicle also included passengers Alexis Noble, Isaac Massey, Jr., and Andrea Evans. Upon noticing McDaniel, Smith began flashing his car's headlights at McDaniel's vehicle and honking his horn. The occupants of Smith's vehicle also began yelling insults and gesturing at McDaniel. After entering Shelbyville, McDaniel pulled up next to Smith's car at a stop light. The occupants of the two cars continued arguing and yelling at each other, and then Smith raised a handgun and pointed it at McDaniel. McDaniel called 911 to report the incident and gave a description of Smith and his vehicle.
[¶3] Shelbyville Police Department Officer Alric Staggers responded to the call and stopped Smith's vehicle. Due to the nature of the call, Officer Staggers waited for additional officers before removing Smith from the vehicle. When Officer Staggers removed Smith from the car, he seized a handgun from a holster on Smith's right hip. Officer Staggers then arrested Smith.
[¶4] The State charged Smith with Level 6 felony pointing a firearm. During a bench trial on November 3, 2023, McDaniel testified that Smith pointed a handgun using his right hand. Frazier also testified that Smith pointed a handgun, but he asserted Smith used his left hand. The trial court found Smith guilty. At the sentencing hearing on January 4, 2024, the trial court found there was a moderate risk Smith would commit another crime and Smith's two juvenile adjudications constituted a moderate aggravating factor. The trial court did not find any mitigating factors and sentenced Smith to 18 months, with 2 days executed and the balance of 543 days suspended to probation.
Discussion and Decision
1. Sufficiency of Evidence
[¶5] Smith first argues the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his felony conviction. When evaluating insufficient evidence claims, we must consider only evidence that supports the verdict. Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020). Evaluating witness credibility and deciding the weight of the evidence is left to the fact-finder. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). "A conviction will be affirmed unless 'no rational fact-finder' could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Tuggle v. State, 9 N.E.3d 726, 736 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (quoting Hampton v. State, 873 N.E.2d 1074, 1079 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007)), trans. denied.
[¶6] According to Indiana Code section 35-47-4-3(b), "[a] person who knowingly or intentionally points a firearm at another person commits a Level 6 felony." This clear and explicit language prohibits such an act due to the "substantial risk of death or bodily injury." Armstrong v. State, 742 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). Smith contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction due to conflicting witness testimony. However, the State presented two witnesses, McDaniel and Frazier, who testified that Smith pointed a gun at McDaniel. Their testimonies showed they were familiar with Smith and had a clear line of sight on the night of the incident. They both testified that Smith "waved a gun" toward McDaniel. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 26, 42.) The witness descriptions matched Smith's vehicle, and police found a firearm on Smith. Therefore, a reasonable factfinder could find Smith pointed a handgun at McDaniel. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 790 N.E.2d 1061, 1066 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003) (testimony that defendant "pointed [the gun]" at a vehicle's occupants was sufficient for conviction).
[¶7] Smith argues the "conflicting testimony regarding which hand [he] used to hold the gun" undermines the evidence that supports his conviction. (Appellant's Br. at 7.) However, "[i]t is for the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to decide which witnesses to believe or disbelieve." Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 755-56 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 409 (Ind. 2002)). Whether Smith used his right or left hand is inconsequential, given that either could have been used to perform the act. Despite his claim that "this discrepancy goes to the heart of the matter," (Appellant's Br. at 7), the State was not charged with proving which hand was used to commit the crime. See Ind. Code § 35-47-4-3(b) (elements of pointing a firearm). Instead, Smith is asking for a reevaluation of the witnesses' testimonies, which is not permitted. See Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783 ("[T]he reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses."). Because a conviction can rest on a single witness, Craft v. State, 187 N.E.3d 340, 346 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) ("the uncorroborated testimony of one witness may be sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction on appeal"), trans. denied, we hold the State provided sufficient evidence to support Smith's conviction. See id. (affirming conviction based on single witness despite defendant's evidentiary arguments).
2. Inappropriateness of Sentence
[¶8] Smith next claims his sentence of eighteen months is inappropriate. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), a sentence may be revised if, "after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Ind.App. Rule 7(B). Sentencing is a function of the trial court, whose judgment "should receive considerable deference." Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). This deference can only be overcome by "compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character." Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023)). Appellate review of a sentence is to "attempt to leaven outliers, . . . but not to achieve the perceived 'correct' result in each case." Nicholson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 680, 684 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225), trans. denied. The burden of proving that a sentence is inappropriate falls to the defendant. Littlefield v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1081, 1089 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023), trans. denied.
2.1. Nature of the Offense
[¶9] The "advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed." Denham v. State, 142 N.E.3d 514, 516 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 220 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016)), trans. denied. The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony conviction is six months to two-and-one-half years, with the advisory sentence being one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7. The court sentenced Smith to 18 months, with 2 days executed and the balance of 543 days suspended to probation.
[¶10] Evaluating the nature of an offense involves "the details and circumstances of the crime and the defendant's participation therein." Littlefield, 215 N.E.3d at 1089. This analysis "compares the defendant's actions with the required showing to sustain a conviction under the charged offense." Webb v. State, 149 N.E.3d 1234, 1241 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020).
[¶11] Smith argues his sentence is inappropriate based on the nature of the offense because no one was injured during the crime. However, injury is not a required element for the crime, see Ind. Code § 35-47-4-3(b) (elements of Level 6 felony pointing a firearm), and we thus reject it as a reason to adjust Smith's sentence. Moreover, the nature and circumstances of Smith's conviction were serious because there is "no situation in which pointing a [firearm] at another person does not create a substantial risk of death or bodily injury to that person." Armstrong, 742 N.E.2d at 976. Smith's conviction of eighteen months is slightly longer than the advisory sentence of one year, but it is well below the maximum possible sentence for Smith's crime of two-and-one-half years. We therefore hold Smith's sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense. 2.2. Character of the Offender
[¶12] Evaluating the character of the offender allows for a broader consideration of a defendant's qualities. McFarland v. State, 153 N.E.3d 369, 374 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), trans. denied. This can include a person's age, family, relationships, work history, and positive influence on the community. Hall v. State, 231 N.E.3d 868, 877 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024), trans. denied. The court may also consider personal traits, examples of good character, and the defendant's criminal history. Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020).
[¶13] Smith argues he should have been given credit for his lack of prior adult convictions, recent sobriety, and prospective employment. At the sentencing hearing, Smith admitted previous substance abuse issues and testified he had been sober for three years. He also testified that he had recently found employment but had not obtained a permanent residence.
[¶14] At nineteen years old, Smith's lack of prior adult convictions does not weigh heavily in his favor. In fact, Smith's juvenile record, which includes adjudications of criminal mischief and possession of paraphernalia, was deemed an aggravating factor that warranted an enhanced sentence. "Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character." Id. Smith did not provide any evidence that he is a positive influence on his community or has other positive personal traits. While we respect Smith's recent sobriety and prospective employment and we encourage his continued personal improvement, "this consideration does not warrant a lesser sentence." Jones v. State, 218 N.E.3d 3, 16 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (gainful employment does not constitute a mitigating factor for sentence consideration), trans. denied. Ultimately, the trial court was aware of these factors and gave them due consideration when determining Smith's sentence. Therefore, Smith has not demonstrated his sentence is inappropriate based on his character.
Conclusion
[¶15] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Smith's conviction, and Smith's sentence of eighteen months is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[¶16] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.