Opinion
A22-1747
08-07-2023
Ryan Leroy Smith, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Mille Lacs County District Court File No. 48-CV-21-1260
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
MICHELLE A. LARKIN JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Ryan Leroy Smith challenges the district court's denial of his petition for compensation under the Minnesota Imprisonment and Exoneration Remedies Act (the Act), Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (2022).
2. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Smith with two counts of first-degree driving while impaired (DWI) under Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2008), alleging that he had three qualifying prior-impaired-driving convictions. One of Smith's prior-impaired-driving convictions was a 2005 conviction for criminal vehicular operation. State v. Smith, No. A15-0570, 2016 WL 1081154, *1 (Minn.App. Mar. 21, 2016), rev'd, 899 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. 2017). A jury found Smith guilty of both counts of first-degree DWI. The district court entered judgment of conviction on one of the counts and sentenced him to serve 72 months in prison. Smith, 899 N.W.2d at 122.
3. Smith appealed to this court, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first-degree DWI because his 2005 criminal-vehicular-operation conviction was not a "qualified prior impaired driving incident." Smith, 2016 WL 1081154, at *2. This court agreed that the statute defining prior-impaired-driving convictions did not include the offense that Smith was convicted of violating in 2005. Id. at *1; see also Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 20 (2008) (defining a '"[p]rior impaired driving conviction'"). But this court concluded that interpreting "prior impaired driving conviction" to exclude the offense of which Smith was convicted would lead to an "absurd result." Smith, 2016 WL 1081154, at *2. Accordingly, we affirmed his conviction. Id. at *1.
4. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review and reversed this court's decision, reasoning that Smith's case was not the kind of "exceedingly rare case" to which the "absurdity cannon" applied. Smith, 899 N.W.2d at 125-26 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, the supreme court held that the evidence was insufficient to convict Smith of first-degree DWI because he had only two, and not three, qualifying prior-impaired-driving convictions. Id. at 126. Following the supreme court's reversal of Smith's conviction, the district court vacated his conviction and entered a judgment of acquittal. Smith v. State, No. A21-1113, 2022 WL 433226, at *1 (Minn.App. Feb. 14, 2022).
5. After the district court vacated his conviction, Smith and the county attorney jointly petitioned for compensation based on exoneration. The petition asserted that Smith had been incarcerated for approximately 43 months as a result of his vacated conviction. The district court denied Smith's petition, reasoning that the reversal of Smith's conviction was based on a legal issue-whether his 2005 conviction counted as a prior-impaired-driving conviction-and not on "evidence of factual innocence." As a result, the district court found that Smith had not been exonerated and was not eligible for compensation.
6. Smith once again appealed to this court, arguing that he was entitled to compensation because he had been exonerated of the first-degree DWI conviction. Id. at *1. This court determined that "[w]hile Smith may have committed a crime, it was not the crime for which he was charged" and that he was therefore exonerated under the Act. Id. at *2. Specifically, we concluded that "Smith's conviction was vacated on grounds consistent with innocence" and remanded the case to the district court "for a finding that Smith was exonerated." Id. at *3.
7. On remand, Smith argued that because the parties jointly submitted a petition for compensation, subdivision 3(a) of the Act "conclusively establishe[d]" his eligibility for compensation. The district court denied Smith's petition for compensation, reasoning that during the time Smith was in custody for the exonerated offense, he was also serving time for unrelated offenses and that the time Smith had served for the exonerated offense was equivalent to the time he would have served for matters "contemporaneously dismissed" by the state as part of a sentencing agreement on the exonerated offense. The district court also determined that Smith was not entitled to automatic compensation under subdivision 3(a) of the Act because the original joint petition was "inaccurate by omitting necessary information," and neither Smith nor the state provided "any caselaw or other authority that require[d] the [district court] to approve such a substantively inaccurate petition."
8. Smith again appealed to this court, arguing that he was entitled to compensation under the Act. The state did not file a brief in this matter, and this court ordered that the appeal be scheduled for oral argument by Smith only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03 (providing that if respondent fails to file a brief, the case shall be determined on the merits). Later, this court ordered Smith and the state to file supplemental briefs addressing four issues. Smith complied with the order for supplemental briefing; the state did not.
9. Smith's primary argument on appeal is that because he and the state filed a joint petition for compensation based on exoneration, his eligibility was conclusively established. The relevant portion of the Act provides:
An individual who is exonerated is eligible for compensation in the interests of justice, if the prosecutor, within 60 days of filing the petition, joins the petition and indicates that it is likely that the original complaint or indictment would not have been filed or sought or would have been dismissed with the knowledge of all of the circumstances. Joinder and agreement to compensation based on the interests of justice by the prosecutor shall conclusively establish eligibility for compensation precluding any further proceedings under paragraph (b). Upon receipt of prosecutor's joinder and agreement, the court shall issue an order as described in subdivision 7, granting petitioner's eligibility for compensation under this subdivision.Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 3(a) (emphasis added).
10. Smith's argument raises an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Shire v. Rosemount, Inc., 875 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Minn. 2016). Although we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Smith did not conclusively establish that he is eligible for compensation, we arrive at that result for a different reason. See State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) ("[I]t is the responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with law, and that responsibility is not to be diluted by counsel's oversights, lack of research, failure to specify issues or to cite relevant authorities." (quotation omitted)).
11. Our role in interpretating statutes "is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022). When a statute's intent is clear, appellate courts "apply the statute according to its plain meaning." Save Lake Calhoun v. Strommen, 943 N.W.2d 171, 177 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts "consider a statute as a whole to harmonize and give effect to all its parts" because courts "presume that the Legislature intended the entire statute to be effective and certain." Id. (quotation omitted).
12. Smith repeatedly asserts, and we agree, that the relevant statutory language is plain. Specifically, two things must occur to establish conclusive eligibility for compensation: (1) within 60 days of filing a petition, the prosecutor must join the petition and (2) the prosecutor must indicate "that it is likely that the original complaint or indictment would not have been filed or sought or would have been dismissed with the knowledge of all the circumstances." Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 3(a). Although the prosecutor joined Smith's petition, the record does not contain any indication by the prosecutor "that it is likely that the original complaint or indictment would not have been filed or sought or would have been dismissed with the knowledge of all of the circumstances." Id.
13. Smith argues that the joint petition requests "a declaration and order of eligibility for compensation per Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 3," and that the reference to subdivision 3 effectively incorporates and satisfies the "indication" requirement. We disagree. Again, we presume that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain. Strommen, 943 N.W.2d at 177. Thus, "[a] statute should be interpreted, whenever possible, to give effect to all of its provisions; no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant." Am. Fam. Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted). The statute clearly sets forth two requirements to perfect a request for compensation based on exoneration in the interests of justice. The second requirement is a specific indication by the prosecutor that the original complaint would have been handled differently if all of the circumstances had been known. Allowing a mere citation to section 590.11, subdivision 3, to substitute for the clear, specific indication required by statute would not give effect to the "indication" requirement and would impermissibly render the requirement superfluous.
14. Moreover, the record does not support a finding that the original complaint or indictment would not have been filed or sought, or would have been dismissed, if the state had knowledge of all the relevant circumstances. The record shows that after the supreme court held that one of Smith's prior-impaired-driving convictions could not be used for enhancement, the state asked the district court to enter a judgment of conviction for gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor DWI. The district court declined to do so.
15. Because the record does not contain the "indication" required by the statute, Smith did not perfect his request for compensation based on exoneration under section 590.11, subdivision 3(a). The district court therefore did not err by refusing to grant relief under that subdivision.
16. Alternatively, Smith argues that he is eligible for compensation based on exoneration under section 590.11, subdivision 3(b). Smith argues that in his last appeal, this court "held that [he] was exonerated consistent with innocence and that is the law of the case." The law-of-the-case doctrine "provides that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case." State v. Miller, 849 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn.App. 2014) (quotations omitted). However, the supreme court has issued two decisions since our last decision in this case, and as explained below, those decisions indicate that our previous determination that Smith was exonerated consistent with innocence was incorrect.
17. The first relevant supreme court decision is Kingbird v. State, 973 N.W.2d 633 (Minn. 2022), which was filed on May 4, 2022. In Kingbird, the supreme court addressed whether Kingbird's conviction was vacated on "grounds consistent with innocence" as the statute requires. 973 N.W.2d at 641. The supreme court explained that whether an individual has been exonerated is the threshold determination under the Act. Id. A person is exonerated if a court "vacate[s]" his conviction "on grounds consistent with innocence." Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1)(i). "[G]rounds consistent with innocence" is defined, in relevant part, to mean "exonerated because the judgment of conviction was vacated or reversed, or a new trial was ordered, and there is any evidence of factual innocence whether it was available at the time of investigation or trial or is newly discovered evidence." Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(c)(2) (emphasis added).
18. The Kingbird majority determined the meaning of "factual innocence," reasoning as follows:
Here, the Legislature used a very specific form of "innocence" to ascribe meaning to "grounds consistent with innocence": "any evidence of factual innocence." The word "innocence" means "the state of being not chargeable for or guilty of a particular crime or offense." "Factual," of course, refers to "of or relating to facts" and "restricted to or based on fact." Fact, in turn, means "a thing done" or "an actual occurrence."
Because the adjective "factual" modifies the noun "innocence," the common and ordinary meaning of the phrase "factual innocence" is the state of being not guilty of a crime (innocence) but only when the reason is restricted to or based on facts (factual). Kingbird argues that because a BB gun is not a firearm under Haywood, his actions were not against the law and therefore he is innocent. But this claim of innocence is not restricted to or based on facts, because without Haywood, Kingbird would not be deemed innocent. And because Kingbird's case turns on a legal significance, the statutory meaning of the term firearm-not facts alone- Kingbird's claim does not squarely fit within the definition of "factual innocence."
In other words, the facts of Kingbird's case did not change. The facts of the offense on which Kingbird was convicted are undisputed: he admitted as part of his plea agreement that he possessed a BB gun at a time when he was ineligible to possess certain firearms. His conviction was vacated based on our decision in Haywood-a decision that concluded the State did not have a legal basis to bring an ineligible-person-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge based on an air-powered BB gun. Because Kingbird has not shown evidence of "factual innocence," he has not demonstrated that he was exonerated on "grounds consistent with innocence," as the statute requires. As a result, we hold that Kingbird is not exonerated under Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1.
973 N.W.2d at 641-43 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
19. The Kingbird majority said:
[T]he dissent goes too far in maintaining that factual innocence would extend to any circumstance in which, as here, the State did not prove a fact necessary to the conviction (here, that Kingbird possessed a firearm within the meaning of the statute). To be sure, such a circumstance is an example of "actual innocence," which is a well-defined term meaning "[t]he absence of facts that are prerequisites for the sentence given to a defendant." But the Legislature did not use the term actual innocence; it instead used the distinct qualifier of factual innocence, which must correspondingly have its own distinct meaning.Id. at 642 n.9 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
20. The Kingbird majority also said:
[T]he dissent's concern-that "[i]f the vacation of Kingbird's conviction for a possession of a firearm because he did not possess a firearm does not make him eligible, who can be?"- leads to many readily available answers; namely, any person whose conviction was vacated, reversed, or set aside because the facts of his case have changed. This would include circumstances where there is evidence that law enforcement and prosecutors "got the wrong guy" or that there was another cause for the death that led to a homicide or murder conviction. The authors of the original exoneration bills specifically gave the examples of Koua Fong Lee, who was wrongfully convicted of criminal vehicular homicide after his Toyota Camry accelerated out of his control into another vehicle, and Michael Ray Hansen, who was wrongfully convicted of second-degree murder for killing his infant daughter who actually died of positional asphyxia.Id. n.9 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
21. The second relevant supreme court decision is Back v. State, N.W.2d, 2023 WL 3606283 (Minn. May 24, 2023), which was filed on May 24, after our May 11 deadline for supplemental briefing in this case. The Back majority emphasized that if "a petitioner's claim of innocence is not restricted to or based on facts and turns on an issue of legal significance," then "the petitioner has not established 'any evidence of factual innocence,' as required by Minnesota Statutes section 590.11, subdivision 1(c)(2) (2022), and therefore is not eligible for compensation based on exoneration." Back, 2023 WL 3606283, at *1. The majority applied its interpretation of "factual innocence" from Kingbird to Back's case, and concluded that Back had not presented "any evidence of factual innocence" within the meaning of section 590.11, subdivision 1(c)(2), explaining that
[j]ust like in Kingbird, Back's claim of innocence is not restricted to or based on facts, and instead turns on an issue of legal significance-the meaning of the statutory term "culpable negligence," Minn. Stat. § 609.205(1), and the requirement that the State prove that she had a "legal duty" that made her "criminally responsible for the criminal action of a third party." And just like in Kingbird, Back's conviction was not reversed because the facts of her case changed. This case does not involve the prototypical examples of persons that we referenced in Kingbird, whose convictions were vacated, reversed, or set aside because the facts of their cases changed.Id. at *4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
22. In concluding that Back's claim of innocence was not fact-based, the majority rejected her argument that the earlier reversal of her conviction based on insufficient evidence was fact-based because a review of the evidence involves analysis of the facts. Id. at *5; see State v. Back, 775 N.W.2d 866, 866-67 (Minn. 2009) ("Because the evidence does not establish that appellant breached a duty owed to the victim, the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction of culpable negligence manslaughter in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.205(1) (2008)."). Thus, like the Kingbird majority, the Back majority stated that a conviction reversed based on insufficient evidence is not necessarily based on evidence of factual innocence.
23. We read Kingbird and Back to mean that a reversal based on a change in the law or on legally insufficient evidence does not result in "factual innocence," as the supreme court has now interpreted that phrase. Here, Smith's conviction was based on legally insufficient evidence. See Smith, 899 N.W.2d at 120 (stating that the evidence was insufficient to convict appellant of first-degree DWI "because one of the three predicate prior convictions, appellant's 2005 conviction of gross-misdemeanor criminal vehicular operation resulting in bodily harm, is not included in the list of qualifying statutory offenses.") The facts of Smith's case have not changed, and he is not a prototypical example of-or even similarly situated to-the persons described by the Kingbird majority, whose convictions were vacated, reversed, or set aside because the facts of their cases had changed.
24. We therefore hold that because Smith's claim of innocence is not restricted to or based on facts and instead turns on an issue of legal significance-the requirement to prove a necessary element of the charged offense-he has not established any evidence of factual innocence. Without a showing of factual innocence, Smith has not been "exonerated" under section 590.11, subdivision 1. Thus, Smith is not entitled to an order declaring him eligible for compensation based on exoneration.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. This court's decision in Smith v. State, No. A21-1113, 2022 WL 433226 (Minn.App. Feb. 14, 2022) is overruled.
2. The district court's denial of Smith's request for a declaration that he is eligible for compensation based on exoneration is affirmed.
3. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.